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This study is focused on the social positions of individual organizational 
members in organizational strategy processes. Strategy is a social practice 
existent in a wide variety of different organizations, influencing, either directly 
or indirectly, a large number of organizational members. Strategy research 
has, however, largely neglected the individuals, whose actions and practices 
make up the strategy process, concentrating on organizations as seemingly 
homogenous entities. There is even less research exploring the contributions 
of middle managers and employees acting as strategic agents.  
The objective of this study is to understand and illuminate the variety of social 
positions assumed by organizational members from the CEO to the operative 
employee level in organizational strategy processes. The research is built 
around a set of 301 qualitative interview texts from 12 organizations. The 
interviewees are treated as knowledgeable agents capable of reflecting their 
social positions and roles in the strategy process.  
The data is analyzed in a grounded theory -setting.  The data analysis consists 
of three 'encounters' with the interview texts. In the first encounter, a three-
dimensional schema is created for analyzing the social positions. In the second 
encounter, 20 social positions are identified and explored under the categories 
of champion, citizen and cynic. In the third encounter, the 20 positions are 
divided into three performance categories: role-players, role-seekers and 
bystanders. Roles performed and reasons for not performing a desired role are 
traced and discussed. 
The research contributes to strategy research a viewpoint on the role that the 
social practice of strategy plays in the work of various organizational 
members. Through the exposition of social positions and performance 
categories, it deepens the understanding on why strategies succeed or fail in 
being enacted by individual organizational members. Furthermore, it allows a 
large group of organizational members to use voice in the discussion on 
strategy. The practical contribution of the research is associated with such 
issues as the communication of strategy, participation in the strategy process, 
as well as dissent and cynicism in the strategy process. 
 Tiivistelmä (Abstract in Finnish) 
Strategiaksi kutsuttu sosiaalinen käytäntö on läsnä lukuisissa erilaisissa 
organisaatioissa. Se vaikuttaa suorasti tai epäsuorasti suureen joukkoon 
organisaatioiden jäseniä. Tästä huolimatta strategiatutkimus, jonka lähtökohta 
on organisaatiotasoinen tarkastelu, on kiinnittänyt varsin vähän huomiota 
yksilöihin strategian toteuttajina. Keskijohdon ja operatiivisen henkilöstön 
toimintaa strategiaprosessissa koskevaa tutkimusta on vieläkin vähemmän.  
Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena on ymmärtää ja kuvata sosiaalisia asemia, 
jotka kuuluvat strategiaprosessiin liittyville yksilöille ylimmästä johdosta 
operatiivisen henkilöstön tasolle. Tutkimuksen aineisto koostuu 301 
haastattelusta, jotka tehtiin 12 organisaatiossa. Haastateltavat nähdään 
toimijoina, jotka kykenevät reflektoimaan rooliaan ja sosiaalista asemaansa.  
Analyysitapa on aineistolähtöinen. Analyysi tehdään kolmessa vaiheessa, 
kolmessa kohtaamisessa aineiston kanssa. Ensimmäisen kohtaamisen 
tuloksena syntyy analyysikehikko yksilöiden sosiaalisten asemien erittelyyn. 
Toisessa kohtaamisessa eritellään kaikki 301 yksilön kuvaukset omasta 
sosiaalisesta asemastaan, minkä tuloksena syntyy 20 luokkaa, jotka 
ryhmitellään aktivistin, kansalaisen ja kyynikon kategorioiden avulla. Luokat 
kuvataan tarkasti. Kolmannessa kohtaamisessa 20 luokkaa ryhmitellään 
kolmeksi toiminnalliseksi kategoriaksi sen mukaan, kokevatko yksilöt 
voivansa toimia oikeaksi katsomassaan roolissa.  
Tutkimus tarjoaa strategiatutkimukselle vastauksia melko tutkimattomaan 
kysymykseen, minkälainen asema strategialla voi olla eri yksilöiden työssä.  
Käsittelemällä yksilöiden sosiaalisia asemia ja toiminnallisia rooleja 
strategiaprosessissa, tutkimus syventää ymmärrystä strategian toteuttamisen 
onnistumiseen tai epäonnistumiseen liittyvistä tekijöistä. Lisäksi tutkimus 
antaa äänen lukuisille organisaation jäsenille, joiden näkökulma 
strategiaprosessiin on aiemmin pysynyt piilossa. Tutkimuksen käytännöllinen 
anti liittyy kysymyksiin strategian viestimisestä, strategiaprosessiin 
osallistumisesta ja strategiaan ajoittain liittyvästä kyynisyydestä.   
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Personal prologue: Why I am interested in strategy 
The researcher is a research instrument, especially in a qualitative study like this one. 
I therefore feel the need to give a short account of my personal history together with 
the topic of my research, exposing some of my personal biases and peculiarities. I 
hope this will help the reader to assess whether I have managed to be aware of these 
while writing the text. 
My educational background is twofold. I have master’s degrees in philosophy and in 
electrical engineering, though I did the latter thesis in the field of work psychology 
and leadership. I regard the topic of strategy as a kind of a contingent middle ground 
between these two extremes. Strategy is philosophically interesting because of the 
deep sociological/action-theoretical question involved: How is it that organizational 
actions can be regarded as portraying properties normally attributed to intelligent 
behavior? Can organizations be intelligent? What is the relation between the 
individual agent and organizational action? On the other hand, strategy is one of the 
key issues of organization studies toward which I gravitated at the end of my 
engineering studies.  
Phenomenology versus positivism 
My philosophical upbringing was largely analytical, which reflects many ideas social 
scientists prefer to call ‘positivist’. For the duration of my undergraduate studies in 
philosophy, I was drawn toward naturalist and realist streams of thought in the 
philosophy of science, i.e. I regarded natural science as the model for all good 
science. 
Any reader will probably soon notice that I have wandered quite a long way from 
these ideals. As I was recruited more or less by chance to a project involving research 
on strategy implementation from a work psychological standpoint, I ended up being 
faced with a subject that was largely unexplored. I realized that the only way to 
understand the social science of strategy implementation was by talking to people and 
trying to understand what they said about it. I did not have specific questions I wanted 
to include in a survey, not to mention the fact that we did not want to try to find 
quantified measures for phenomena that we did not really know about. 
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In this process, I started to shift towards phenomenology. While I still hold many 
enlightenment ideas dear, I have started to believe that there is a radical difference 
between social science and natural science in terms of ontology. In social science, the 
roots of many of the phenomena lie in the individual Lifeworld, which constitutes 
something wholly different from the natural world. 
There is an uneasy alliance between analytical philosophy and phenomenology in my 
style of analysis and writing. I regard explicitness and conceptual clarity as the best 
parts of analytical philosophy, while phenomenology has the upper hand in 
accounting for the topics that are really important in social science. I tried to keep a 
wary eye open as I wrote the text, trying to avoid superimposing too many ideals from 
analytical philosophy onto a phenomenological framework. 
My personal experiences with strategy 
The most important formative experience during my undergraduate studies was the 
year I spent as president of the Helsinki University of Technology Student Union. The 
Student Union is an organization that was at that point 126 years old, with 
approximately 10 000 members and assets of approximately 50 M€.  The Student 
Union executive board is elected every year, so the post of the president was for one 
year only. 
I became fascinated with the functioning of the Student Union as an organization. As 
a person with a philosophical streak, I started trying to explain to myself why the 
organization existed (the executive board also had the task of rewriting the regulations 
for the Student Union that year). With the executive board, we went to a cabin in the 
woods to write the strategy for the Student Union for the next five years. We ended 
up with a ten-page draft. We had a succession of meetings in which we managed to 
compress it into one page (the font was smallish). We felt we really had come up with 
the direction our organization should follow, the reasons it existed and what it should 
do to best serve its members. 
At the same time, I discussed the strategy paper with ex-activists of the Student 
Union, many of whom were practicing managers. They generally felt that I should not 
really worry about strategy, but rather concentrate on ‘doing good stuff’ at the more 
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operative level. I thought we did that already, and found their belittling attitude 
somewhat infuriating. 
A few years have gone by and I have ended up giving today's activists the same 
advice that I was given: do not concentrate your efforts too much on strategy but 
rather on action. The Student Union has an infectiously strong culture that guides 
individuals to carry out its purpose. I ended up creating a strategy process that created 
a strategy paper. I am happy that it has been carried on from generation to generation 
for the five years of its scope. I learned a lot doing that. But the time I really learned a 
lot about reality was when we acted; when we acted we did good stuff, as when we 
built an ad hoc bus service at the time of a transportation strike that prevented our 
members getting a bus to the campus, i.e. when we had an emergent strategy to carry 
us through. 
The moral from my experiences with strategy was that action really counts. I have a 
philosophical affection toward strategy as it represents issues that go beyond everyday 
thinking, but I also have an inherent suspicion toward it, in as far as it has the 
potential to transcend talk.   
Leaders and followers 
As president, I got to be the leader in the Student Union. I was responsible for 
assembling and chairing a board of smart, enthusiastic people, as well as working in 
close cooperation with the employees of the Student Union. I loved being a leader, but 
ended up despising the role as well. It was immensely gratifying to be able to look at 
the ‘big issues’ and facilitate discussion to reach smart conclusions. I got to be very 
close friends with the executive board. On the other hand, I felt I had to understand 
and support everybody, while nobody really understood what I had to go through. I 
had to answer for things I had no possibility of knowing about (of course, I was 
glorified on similar accounts as well). As my year was over, I felt really gratified at 
having done it. But also gratified of being freed of having to worry about being 
politically correct all the time. Regaining the privilege of just worrying about my own 
business. All in all, I think I learned to appreciate the hardships of being a leader, and 
have even tried to be a better follower in my days as an employee. 
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On the other hand, I have really grown tired of management rhetoric. There is a lot of 
literature on management hovering between practice and science that is particularly 
arid in this sense. I feel the main problem is that there does not seem to be room for 
uncertainty in the managerial worldview. Every issue has to have a quick, simple, and 
very causal solution. Organizations are bewilderingly complex human systems often 
operating in extremely complex environments. I find the confidence of managerial 
rhetoric alarming, especially when it becomes apparent in managerialist scientific 
discourse. Leaders are central figures in the strategy process, but I think I am biased 
towards them in two ways: I am quite sympathetic towards their hardships, but the 
rhetoric they use worries me. 
I have discussed my personal history as it relates to my topic of research, touching on 
my potential prejudices and biases. I will try to be aware of them as I go along. But 
now, let the journey begin. 
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1. Introduction. Individuals in strategy processes 
Organizational strategy is a phenomenon with an abstract streak. The organizational 
strategy process is also a flesh and blood phenomenon, affecting a multitude of 
agents. The objective of this thesis is to elucidate the organizational strategy process 
from the standpoint of an individual organizational member. I want to understand how 
organizational members perceive the strategy process and the role they perform as 
part of the strategy process. The research question I seek to answer is: In what ways 
can an individual agent be socially positioned in an organizational strategy process? 
The research question itself, and the concept of agent, already give away something 
about the scientific paradigm of this thesis. Agents are persons who are capable of 
carrying out action, i.e. intended behavior, and of reflecting on the reasons and 
consequences of their actions (Giddens, 1984). The social positions of the agents in 
the strategy process are constituted of the roles the agents perform as members of the 
strategy process, along with their own conceptions of those roles (ibid.)  
This is a microsociological account of the strategy process, centered on the level of 
analysis of an individual agent. More specifically, it is a phenomenological study, 
centered on the viewpoints on the strategy process of active, knowledgeable agents, 
that is, on the role the strategy process plays in their Lifeworlds. Furthermore, while 
strategy literature is typically centered on managers making decisions, this thesis 
places its interest in agents from all levels in the organizational hierarchy. 
What, then, is the motivation for a thesis such as this? Strategic management is the 
dominant trend in management sciences, yet questions as to how organizational 
members perceive the strategy process as well as their individual positions in the 
process remain unanswered. Issues concerning strategy and strategy process have 
been widely discussed on the organizational and broader levels of analysis, yet have 
not been explored on the level of the individual, at least if we are willing to regard 
other organizational members as the senior management having something to do, or at 
least being affected by, the strategy process. The absence of the individual in the 
strategy process is a problem noticed by authors corresponding to a new school of 
thought that regards strategy as practice (cf. Whittington, 1996; 2002). Social 
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positions constitute the nexus of practice that lies between the individual and the 
strategy process. The inquiry on social positions here is also intended to service the 
emerging practice school. 
The literature on strategy implementation has been curiously lacking in its discussion 
on how individual organizational members adopt strategies. It has become more and 
more evident that finding the right strategy amounts to nothing if no change takes 
place in organizational actions, i.e. in organizational members (Alexander 1985, 1991; 
Noble 1999; Beer & Eisenstat 1996, 2000; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Hamel, 2000). 
The strategy textbooks (Higgins, 1990; Hrebniak & Joyce, 1984; Johnson & Scholes 
1999; Judson, 1990; Pearce & Robinson, 1996; Yavitz & Newman, 1982) address 
questions of implementing strategy by listing a large number of managerial actions 
centering on systems and structure, yet they neglect the experience of strategy shared 
by a large number of operative organizational members, contending to remind 
managers that issues such as leadership and communication are important. 
Emphasizing the importance of leadership and communication is all very well, but 
both ends of such interactive processes are essential if prescriptions are to rely on a 
real understanding of the phenomena they are intended to affect, i.e. the actions of the 
organizational members. So, if implementation is to affect the actions of 
organizational members, we must understand how individual actions come about.  I 
will argue that an understanding of the social positions of the agents is the key to 
understanding how strategic action is produced.  
What should happen in order for implementation to be successful? In a mechanistic 
model of implementation, the answer offered is that whatever the strategic content is, 
it should be realized in organizational action. But what if the strategy formulated is 
wrong? What if the implementers notice a need to change the strategy in order for the 
organization to perform better? Clearly, the possibility of adjusting strategy as it is 
implemented should exist, as has been argued by such authors as Mintzberg (1994) 
and Hamel (2000). Understanding how strategy is adjusted in the strategy process 
requires an understanding of such notions as dissent (Dooley & Fryxell, 1999), i.e. 
how people disagree, and cynicism (Dean et al. 1998; Reichers, Wanous & Austin, 
1997; Wanous, Reichers & Austin, 2000), i.e. who stands in opposition and why. 
Literature on these phenomena in strategy literature has been nonexistent, especially 
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when the discussion has concerned other stakeholders as the top management team. A 
residual trace of the implementation as overcoming resistance to change, a dubious 
concept nowadays (Dent & Goldberg, 1999; Piderit, 2000), hovers above many 
normative models of implementation.    
A further motivation stems from the fact that strategic management is an ideology in 
its own right that affects organizational members. Since organizational members are 
people, the effect strategic management plays on people can, and should be, 
discussed. Strategic management has been criticized by many authors (e.g. Hardy, 
Palmer & Phillips 2000; Knights & Morgan 1991; Lilley, 2001; Shrivastava, 1986; 
Whipp, 1996) for implicitly advocating managerialism, non-reflexivity and overt 
masculine power. While I will do my best to present my results from a value-free 
standpoint, and while the research design is not set to induce change in those 
organizations participating in the research, the results of this study may be used to 
critically examine the phenomenon of strategic management. 
My research is presented in three main parts. First of all, theory is explored in two 
sequential encounters with theory. In the first encounter the link between strategy and 
the individual is explored by moving ‘downward’ from the strategy towards the 
individual. The concepts of strategy and the strategy process are explicated first. The 
individual/strategy process link is explored through a review of literature on action 
theory, based on a conception of strategy as a collective intention. The collective 
intention view is criticized from various viewpoints, and a better link is sought from 
the theory of structuration, created by sociologist Anthony Giddens. In the second 
encounter with the theory the individual/strategy link is studied further, now moving 
‘upward’ from the individual viewpoint toward strategy, starting with sensemaking 
literature by Karl Weick. The exploration is continued by supplementing sensemaking 
with literature on power, moving toward literature on roles in the strategy process. 
The individual/strategy process link is finalized as a study of social positions adopted 
from Giddens.  
A short intermission is taken, in which my data is described, with a discussion on 
methods, epistemology and ontology. The text from 301 semi-structured interviews is 
analyzed in three encounters with data, and social positions described in the 
subsequent chapters. In the first encounter, a conceptual schema is created for 
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analyzing social positions. In the second encounter, 20 social positions are described 
and discussed. In the third encounter, a final categorization of the twenty positions is 
drawn, and a link to individual performance explored.  Finally, the results, along with 
the credibility and limitations of the study, are discussed. 
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2. The strategy process. First encounters with 
theory 
In the first encounter with theory, I will be exploring the link between the individual and 
strategy by moving ‘downward’ from strategy toward the individual.  
2.1. What is strategy? 
Strategy is one of the main questions in organization studies these days. As Lyle as 
put it:  
“‘strategic’ has become a buzzword for all disciplines, trying to stress the importance 
of their work.” (Lyle, 1990: 363)  
Strategy is a popular topic in management schools all over the globe, in MBA 
programs and in top journals. In a way, strategy seems to be the Holy Grail 
researchers and practitioners alike are seeking in order to understand why 
organizations succeed or fail in their aspirations.  
On the level of analysis at which it is often presented, strategy is quite easily 
understood. We can think of it as the collection of choices the organization makes in 
order to survive and succeed in its environment. This is a definition given by many 
contemporary textbooks (e.g. Johnson & Scholes, 1999; Shrivastava, 1994; 
Thompson & Strickland, 1995). When we think back to the meaning strategy has in 
the contexts from which it has been adopted, i.e. game theory and warfare, this 
definition fits quite well. The master chess player makes choices when making his 
individual moves, with the aim of winning the game. The general, in whose art lie the 
etymological roots of the concept strategy1, orchestrates his troop deployment with 
the intent of winning the war. 
My definition above is not complete, however. Strategy is more than a mere 
collection of choices. What we understand by strategy would seem to imply a very 
ordered set of choices, choices that form a coherent whole. It is not sufficient to say 
that strategy consists of whatever choices are made that lead to success. Beginner’s 
luck, for example, does not tell of strategy, however successful the lucky individual’s 
                                                
1 Strategos, the art of the general 
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actions may be. Furthermore, the choices have to be directed towards reaching a goal 
of some sort, often related to economic success in organizational contexts. 
Inkpen and Choudhury (1995) address this question in their discussion of strategic 
absence. They argue that in order for a firm to have a strategy, there has to be some 
sort of logic to the decisions and actions, a pattern to hold them together: 
“For example, if no decisions have been made about organizational goals, scope and 
competitive strategy – or those decisions exhibit no pattern or coherence – is there a 
strategy? While an organization may have a product line, this paper argues that the 
existence of product lines and markets is insufficient to support the argument that all 
firms have strategies.” (Inkpen and Choudhury, 1995; 314.) 
The definition above would seem to lead to a conception of strategy in which a 
rational, goal-directed scheme directs the choices made in the organization. Indeed, 
this is the classical viewpoint on strategy. It reflects Ansoff (1965) on strategic 
planning, Andrews (1971) on SWOT analysis, and Porter (1980) on strategic 
positioning. 
The classical position has been attacked from various positions. This stems from the 
fact that the world is no chessboard and even if it were, human beings are not chess 
players in everyday life. The discussion on rationality in decision-making was brought 
to the discussion from the realm of political theory by such classical authors as March 
& Simon (1958) and Cyert & March (1963). By now, pretty well everybody agrees 
with the notion that human beings are not purely rational as decision makers. The 
interesting question is whether decision making in organizations is somewhat rational 
(bounded-rational) or not rational at all, moved by the whims of political movers and 
shakers (the garbage-can model) (cf. Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992.) In other words, 
this means that it would be fascinating to discover the level of rationality strategists 
can be claimed to have in their decision-making. 
While human beings are not purely rational, the environment also poses quite a few 
challenges for the strategists. Almost everybody agrees that the world organizations 
exist in today is certainly no chessboard, with complexity and the increased rate of 
change resulting in uncertainty (e.g. Emery & Trist, 1965; Courtney, Kirkland & 
Viguerie, 1997; Hatch, 1997a; Löwendahl & Revang, 1998). The environment seems 
to challenge human cognition, making strategic decision making extremely 
challenging or even obsolete in various contexts. 
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Social constructionist authors on organizations (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985; Weick, 
1995; Daft & Weick, 1984) go even further, arguing that the 
environment/organization border may not exist at all. They claim that since the 
organization constructs its own environment, the environment exists within the 
organization, thus annihilating the whole organization/environment-distinction. In the 
more center-field discussion on strategy, there has been a shifting of power from 
theorists emphasizing environment as the key determinant of strategy (e.g. Porter, 
1980), to the resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney 1991; Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1994), which claims that strategy is based on the exploitation of internal 
organizational resources, such as core competencies (cf. Farjoun, 2002).  
Another stream of criticism emanates from the viewpoint that successful strategies 
need not be formulated beforehand. Strategies can emerge from action and can be 
observed only after they have been realized (e.g. Mintzberg, 1978). This viewpoint is 
very close to that of social constructionist sensemaking writers, most notably Weick 
(1995), who claim that thinking and acting in organizational decision making are 
intertwined and the rationale behind them can only be made sense of in a historical 
framework (see also Mintzberg, 1995). The only problem of marrying sensemaking 
authors with emergent strategy authors would seem to be the fact that sensemaking 
writers often refuse to talk about strategy at all – Weick (1987) has even taken steps to 
assure his readers that “any old map will do […] too much strategy can harm an 
organization”. 
This discussion would seem to indicate that strategy is a concept that cannot be used 
in a uniform manner, i.e. it has no single distinguishable meaning. Strategy would 
indeed seem to be a cluster concept (Putnam, 1975; Wittgenstein, 1951), the meaning 
of which does not consist of any one-core definition, but a set of definitions, like the 
individual threads in a rope. Mintzberg (1995) has proposed that we can mean five 
different things when we use the term ‘strategy’: plan, position, ploy, pattern or 
perspective. He has elsewhere (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel, 1999) proposed that 
strategy has been studied from ten distinct schools of thought. Chaffee (1985) offers a 
simpler categorization of strategy, based on three models: the linear, the adaptive and 
the interpretive. All in all, it would seem that no unified conception of strategy could 
be easily distinguished from the field. 
The strategy process 
 12
Whittington (2001) conceptualizes four conflicting viewpoints on strategy. He argues 
that there are no easy solutions to account for differences between classical (“analyze, 
plan and command”), evolutionary (“keep your costs low and your options open”), 
processual (“stay close to the ground and go with the flow”) and systemic (“play by 
the local rules”) approaches to strategy, as he divides the schools of thought. 
Whittington goes on to argue that each of the four viewpoints on strategy has different 
implicit assumptions and valuations that one should be aware of. In this, he assumes a 
different stance as, for example, Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1999) who seek 
to unite all the different schools in a unified framework in their “configuration” 
school. I tend to agree with Whittington on this – it would seem that to think that 
strategy is an “elephant” (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 1999) which exists in 
itself, and the different models present different parts of the elephant, would be to 
disregard any possibility of real conflict between the models. I seriously believe that 
different models of strategy represent different ideologies, and that between these 
ideologies, there is an inherent conflict (Shrivastava, 1986).  
A further way of searching for a definition of strategy is determining what kinds of 
issues strategy researchers deem important. Rumelt, Schendel & Teece (1994) claim 
strategy research has a particular affinity with three distinct scientific principles, 
namely economics, organizational sociology, political science. They propose the 
following four fundamental questions for strategy researchers:  
o How do firms behave? 
o Why are firms different? 
o What is the function of, or the value added by, the headquarters unit in a 
diversified firm? 
o What determines success or failure in international competition? 
This thesis is set to answer a particular sub-field of the first question, while the three 
others clearly fall outside its scope. It should be noted that all the questions are posed 
at the organizational level of analysis, which is typical for most strategy research. 
This thesis, in contrast, is centered on the level of the individual agent in the strategy 
process. This focus connects the thesis to an emerging tradition of strategy as 
practice. The focal point of this stream of research is the practitioner of strategy, and 
her activities of strategizing (Whittington, 1996; 2002). 
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In this thesis, strategy is addressed as a social practice, a phenomenon consisting of 
social action and cognition. Strategy is a body of choices and actions, the way an 
organizational member thinks and acts in a manner that is regarded as coherent and 
goal-directed by others and herself. The nature of this social practice is elaborated 
further as I go along. 
2.2 What is the strategy process? 
The discussion on the nature of strategy has dealt expressly with the content of 
strategy. The main goal has been to understand what kinds of strategies organizations 
have and, of course, what kinds of strategies they should have. The soup thickens 
somewhat when one moves from strategic content to process.  
The question of the strategy process arises at the latest when one starts to ponder 
questions related to strategy implementation. From a managerial standpoint, it is self-
evident that strategies amount to nothing if they are not realized. From the standpoint 
of a researcher on the other hand, the process in which the organizational actions are 
molded to facilitate the realization of strategy is of great interest. The development of 
interest from the mere content of strategy to the process in which strategy is 
formulated and implemented has in a way split the field of strategy literature into two:  
the content and process literatures (Pettigrew, 1992; Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992). The 
latter, younger, process field consists of a plethora of sciences, from sociology and 
social psychology to economics (Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992.) 
The process authors interest themselves in the whole process in which organizations 
formulate and implement strategies. The topic can be approached from various 
disciplines: classical strategists (e.g. Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 1974; Miles & Snow, 
1978) argue that “structure follows strategy”, i.e. organizational structure should be 
molded to best serve the content of strategy, while political theorists argue that 
strategy execution is a question of power (e.g. Pettigrew, 1990; Eden, 1992), and 
interpretivist authors emphasize the role of communication and collective 
sensemaking (e.g. Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Liedtka & Rosenblum, 1996). 
This thesis, being placed in the field of strategy as practice, regards the strategy 
process from the viewpoint of organizational microsociology. Giddens (2001) defines 
The strategy process 
 14
the scope of microsociology as the study of everyday behavior in face-to-face 
interaction, at the level of the individual or the group. He characterizes the role of 
microsociology as: 
“Micro studies are […] necessary for illuminating broad institutional patterns. Face-
to-face interaction is clearly the main basis of all forms of social interaction, no matter 
how large-scale the context. Suppose we are studying a business corporation. We could 
understand much about its activities just by looking at face-to-face behavior. We could 
analyze, for example, the interaction of directors in the boardroom, people working in 
the various offices, or the workers on the shop floor.” (Giddens, 2001: 83-84).  
As noted earlier, strategy is typically conceived at the organizational level of 
analysis.2 Without individuals, there are no organizations, however. If one is willing 
to embrace a holist (e.g. Durkheim) and functionalist (e.g. Parsons) position, one may 
be willing to reduce individual actions to social structures (such as organizational 
structure and systems). My taking the individual in the strategy process as the focus of 
my research arises from my unwillingness to adopt such as position. This thesis is 
therefore a part of the strategy process literature in its interest in the whole process of 
strategy: both formulation and implementation. It is not placed in the center field of 
strategy process research, but in a sub-field that has been poorly illuminated so far: 
the emerging micro-sociological field of strategy as practice. 
I tend to think that we should approach sociological issues, strategy being no 
exception, with the general approach laid out by von Wright (1971) – i.e. the 
teleological approach, seeking to understand the intentions behind actions, not trying 
to explain them merely by resorting to socially determined “covering laws”.  At this 
point, I also want to stress that I am not attempting to discredit other authors, but am 
trying to shed light on an area that has not been properly explored yet. While I realize 
that my approach is far from the center field in strategy research, this is not due to my 
regarding strategy classics or strategy content authors as unimportant. It has been 
widely argued (e.g. Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel, 1999; Whittington, 2001) that 
the whole strategy field consists of various viewpoints. I concur with the authors that 
this has to be accepted – we have to live without one unifying theory of what strategy 
is, at least for now. In sociological theory, it has been argued often that there can be 
                                                
2 Except perhaps in those cases in which strategy is regarded as the conception of a single visionary 
leader (i.e. Mintzberg’s entrepreneurial strategy: Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). 
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no unified theory of society, but we are nevertheless bound to grapple with the issues 
from the various viewpoints (Giddens, 2001). 
2.3 Strategic intent 
I have discussed what is meant by strategy and strategy process. The discussion so far 
has concerned the organizational level of analysis. In order to understand individual 
social positions in strategy processes one needs to understand what strategy means at 
the level of the individual agent, how the individual thinks and acts strategically. To 
approach such individual strategies one needs first to understand intentions, the 
traditional building blocks of rational agency3. 
If the term ‘strategic’ is used to describe a decision or an action, a certain intention is 
implied. It is not required that the intention be consciously present for the 
organizational actors at the time of action, however. Strategy can be formed 
beforehand as classical authors suggest, but retrospective sensemaking can trace an 
emergent strategy (Mintzberg, 1978) from past action, as noted by Weick (1995). 
Still, if the term ‘strategy’ is used, the sensemaking will result in the description of an 
intention, uniting action. If sense is made of action afterwards, and the term ‘strategic’ 
is used in characterizing a stream of decisions and actions, the actions are 
characterized as if they had a guiding intention. The presence of this guiding intention 
makes the actions seem rational, and thus strategic. 
The first definition I gave for strategy was drawn from textbooks and was based on 
the concepts of choice made by an organization in order to succeed. I am not very 
happy with that definition, however. As I noted above, there should be a way of 
approaching the coherence and goal-directedness one expects to see in a set of 
choices or actions made by a strategist in order for them to gain the attribution 
‘strategic’. One promising way of looking at this would be to look at the intention 
behind strategy. If these intentions are acted out by organizational members, a real 
strategy process can become visible. 
                                                
3 Philosophers use the concept ’intention’ while psychologists tend to favor the concept ’goal’, as in 
’goal-directed behavior’. I have chosen to discuss intentions because the fundamental definitions in 
action theory are philosophical in nature. I will, however, address the relation of goals and intentions as 
I go along. 
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What exactly is intention? Intention is a type of intentional states, i.e. mental states 
that are directed to the world4 in some way (Searle, 1983; Anscombe, 1963). 
Intentions are closely tied to the discussion of goal-directed behavior in psychology 
(cf. Frese  & Sabini, 1985). Intentions direct actions, performed in order to reach 
goals (Searle, 2001; Heckhausen & Kuhl, 1985). Heckhausen & Kuhl note that people 
have goals of different orders, i.e. goals form systems in which larger goals break 
down into smaller ones. The same can be said of intentions – I intend to do eight 
hours of heavy writing today, because I intend to complete my thesis. The same idea 
can be rephrased as my having a sub-goal of doing eight hours of writing, which in 
turn can be traced back to my master goal of becoming a Ph.D. 
How is this related to strategy? Strategies are often spoken of as if they were master 
intentions or objectives of large magnitude. My goal of becoming a Ph.D. constitutes 
a large enough project to be called my strategy for becoming a Ph.D. In the context of 
rational agency, my strategy should break down into a subset of intentional actions, 
one of them being the writing of this chapter.   
Intentions, goals and the sort are associated with the general discussion on rationality 
in action theory. The discussion dates back to Socrates and his students, and involves 
the problematic relation between forming, having and carrying out intention in 
action.5 Searle (2001) illustrates this by claiming that there is a gap in rational 
decision-making. Searle argues that the gap manifests itself in three distinct contexts. 
The first context in which the gap can be perceived is between the deliberative 
process and the decision itself, i.e. the thinking of goals and needs and the sort, and 
coming to a decision. The second manifestation is between the intention to carry out 
the decision and the action that takes place. The third and final manifestation of the 
gap is between individual intentions and their causes and is extended to carrying out 
patterns of action, such as writing a Ph.D. thesis (Table 1). 
                                                
4 I admit that this is somewhat imprecise. There are intentional states that are directed to other mental 
states as well. I may intend to be happy in the future, or believe that I am happy, for example.  
5 One of the key issues in this classic discussion is the question of akrasia, the weakness of will.  
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Table 1. Searle’s (2001) gap in rational agency 
Context Manifestation of the gap 
The making of an individual decision Between deliberation and decision 
Once a decision has been made Between intention and action 
In the midst of a larger project Between individual intention and action; and 
the pattern of action 
Searle argues that the gap reflects a  
“Feature of consciousness, that feature whereby our conscious experiences of making 
up our minds and our conscious experiences of acting (the exercise of the will, the 
conscious feeling of effort – these are all names for the same thing) are not experienced 
as having psychologically sufficient causal conditions that make them happen (ibid. 
63).”  
The link to strategy should be obvious here. The last manifestation of the gap 
illustrates in essence what strategy is all about – the forming of coherent patterns of 
individual actions, guided by meta-intentions. The formation of coherent patterns of 
action has been called plans by Bratman (1999a), who has argued that individual 
actions can best be understood through their roles in larger plans.  
I have given a tentative account of how the strategies of an individual can be 
understood. The understanding of organizational strategy, however, is still at least a 
few steps away. What is the link between organizational strategy and individual 
strategy? Organizational strategy is a phenomenon at the organizational level of 
analysis. Whether it can be reduced to individual strategy (goals, intentions), is at 
least in part related to the functionalist claim that individual action can be explained 
by social structures. Most authors who discuss the role different organizational 
members play in the strategy process are unwilling to admit that structure dictates 
individual actions in a fatalistic fashion.6  
If social structures in organizations do determine individual actions, strategy 
execution is indeed a matter of transforming organizational structure as proposed by 
Chandler (1962) and others (e.g. Porter, 1980). The tricky part is that these authors 
                                                
6 This would basically mean any author who admits that the individual organizational member has 
significance in the strategy process. Many authors attribute significance to upper management (almost 
everybody), but also to middle management (Floyd & Wooldridge 1992; Floyd & Lane 2000; Nonaka 
& Takeuchi 1995). A recent discussion has been started by Hamel (2000) who argues that any 
organizational member can be a strategic change agent, or revolutionary.  
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who discuss strategic content do not discuss individual organizational members at all. 
How is it that organizational structure, molded to facilitate strategy, creates a shared 
strategy, a shared strategic intent? 
While many authors such as Porter maintain a silence on this matter, some authors 
(e.g. Higgins, 1990; Hrebniak & Joyce, 1984; Pearce & Robinson, 1996) have 
attempted to form models of strategy implementation to facilitate structural 
determination. They usually avoid the question of shared intentions by talking about 
behavior instead of action. Shared intent is irrelevant. The relevant question is how 
top management can create structures and control mechanisms that create behavior in 
their subordinates that implements strategy. Implementer cognition is regarded as 
irrelevant. Desired behavior is brought about by mechanical means, such as rewards 
and punishments, e.g. in Hrebniak & Joyce’s model: 
“Appropriate incentives are critical to the successful implementation of strategy […] 
Our view of motivation and the employment contract enables us to develop a 
straightforward stimulus-response-reinforcement model of the application and use of 
incentives and controls in organizations.” (Hrebniak & Joyce, 1984: 185, 189.) 
The problem of structural-behavioral models of strategy implementation is that the 
psychology they are based on has become extinct with the demise of behaviorism in 
the 1950’s.7 If human beings are not stimulus-response-automata, why should they be 
regarded as such in organizations? In leadership literature it is commonly held that 
one of the key roles of leaders is the management of meaning (cf. Bryman, 1996). 
Ghoshal & Bartlett (1994) have even concluded that top managers should move from 
strategic planning to communicating the purpose of the organization. They criticize 
strategic ‘managerialism’ as follows: 
“In its constant struggle for appropriating value, the company is pitted against its own 
employees as well as business rivals and the rest of society.” (Ghoshal, Bartlett & 
Moran, 1999: 12). 
It would seem that structural behaviorism has not managed to eliminate the question 
concerning shared intent.  
                                                
7 Chomsky’s (1959) critique of Skinner’s theory of verbal behavior was in many senses the final blow 
to behaviorism.  
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Is organizational strategy, then, an organizational intention? What is the connection 
between organizational intent and individual intent? Mintzberg & Waters (1985) also 
speak of certain strategies of having an intent behind them. They call these deliberate 
strategies, naming entrepreneurial and planned strategies as strong examples. Hamel 
& Prahalad (1994) have expressly spoken of strategic intent, on the organizational 
level of analysis. Hamel & Prahalad (1989: 64) define strategic intent on as  
“…a [sustained] obsession with winning at all levels of the organization”,   
i.e. a shared, long-term commitment for achieving a major goal. They do not address 
the question of what is meant by shared intent, however, or what the linkage between 
the organizational and individual levels of analysis is. They do note that strategic 
intent exists at all levels of the organization, but the nature of this shared intent is not 
elaborated on.  
There is, however, a discussion of collective intentions in the theory of action. In this 
field, discussion rages over whether collective intentions can be reduced to individual 
intentions or not. Tuomela & Miller (1988) offer a positive (individualist) account, 
defining collective intention as: 
“A member Ai of a collective G -conditionally we-intends to do X if and only if 
there is a condition Ci  such that Ai intends to do his part of X, given that Ci obtains; 
Ai has a belief to the effect that the joint action opportunities for X will obtain, 
especially that at least a sufficient number of the full-fledged and adequately informed 
members of G, as required for the performance of X, will (or at least probably will) do 
their parts of X; 
Ai believes that there is (or will be) a mutual belief among participants of G to the 
effect that the joint action opportunities for X obtain.” (Tuomela & Miller, 1988: 382.) 
According to Tuomela & Miller’s account, collective intentions consist of individual 
intentions joined by beliefs that other members of the collective are also intending to 
do their part. Bratman (1999b) has given a somewhat similar account in his planning-
based theory of collective action. Bratman has argued that individual intentions can 
best be understood in the context of the roles they play in larger plans, just as my 
intention of writing eight hours today can be understood through its role in my plan of 
completing my Ph.D. studies. Bratman uses the concept of planning to explain 
collective intention. He argues that the intentions of other agents can play a role in an 
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agent's plan, resulting in a collective plan consisting of a network of multiple agents’ 
intentions.   
Gilbert (1989) argues for the holist position opposite from that of Tuomela & Miller 
and Bratman, i.e. that collective intention is indeed an ontologically collective 
phenomenon, which cannot be reduced to individual intentions. She argues that social 
groups constitute plural subjects, and collective intentions consist of individuals 
placing their individual intentions into a pool of wills. The plural subject is expressed 
by the group members’ use of the pronoun ‘we’. While I am not willing to put my 
money on either the holist or the individualist position just now,8 Gilbert provides an 
enlightening passage on organizations as plural subjects: 
“Clearly, in some organizations there is a clear sense of what is being achieved by the 
firm and that it is being achieved by the efforts of all. There are firms in which it would 
be natural enough to members overall to refer to what we do in referring to the 
organization. I could argue, therefore, that it is this aspect of some organizations and 
firms which could lead organizations in general to be put on some list of social 
groups.”(Gilbert, 1989; 231.) 
So, some organizations are social groups and some are not, depending on whether the 
organizational members can meaningfully speak of the whole organization as ‘we’. 
By ‘meaningful’, I wish to transcend mere figures of speech such as those used in 
managerial rhetoric. The fact that many managers speak of their organizations as ‘we’ 
does not make the plural pronoun meaningful for all organizational members. 
Organization size would seem to impact quite heavily on the issue: it would seem that 
in a small start-up firm, for example, it is much easier to speak of ‘we’ than in a large 
multinational company. 
Concerning strategy, the question of plural subjecthood would also seem to cover the 
question of collective strategic intent. If the organization is small and culturally tight 
enough to constitute a plural subject in Gilbert’s sense of forming a social group, it 
may have collective intentions, phenomena typical of plural subjects. It would seem, 
however, that in most organizations this is not the case. In most organizations, 
organizational members do not know the intentions of agents other than those placed 
                                                
8 I find the reasoning of Tuomela & Miller convincing in the sense that it is really hard to account for 
the ontology of a holist we-intention. Above everything, I wish to avoid the notion of a group 
consciousness hovering above us all. Yet I do agree with the argument of Gilbert and Searle (1991) that 
I can meaningfully state ‘we intend’ without stating anything about my beliefs of other group members.  
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in their immediate vicinity, such as in their own unit. Something more than a shared 
intention is needed to explain how strategies can be shared. 
2.4 The critique of strategic intent as collective intent 
It should be easy to see that strategy cannot easily exist as a collective intention in 
most organizations. Or it can, according to Gilbert, but in that case the class of 
strategic actions has to be classified into a group so small that each member has to 
know the other members, e.g. the executive board. A similar conclusion can be drawn 
from individualist accounts – Tuomela & Miller set beliefs of other members’ 
intentions as a condition, which is also included in Bratman’s planning model.  
Social identity theory (Ashforth & Mael, 1989) does dictate that individuals construct 
parts of their identities through the collectives in which they belong to, but few 
organizational identities can be regarded tight and homogenous enough to be called 
plural subjects. While Albert & Whetten (1985) describe organizational identity as 
central, distinctive and enduring, they do not explicate the link between individuals 
and organizational identity, and it seems unlikely that their concept of organizational 
identity would be as strong and as binding as a plural subject would demand. 
Furthermore, in recent discussion, the centrality of organizational identity has been 
challenged in the discussion of multiple identities (Pratt & Foreman, 2000), as has its 
enduringness in the discussion of identity change (Gioia, Schultz & Corley, 2000). 
The first difficulty with the collective intention approach is dealing with the small size 
of the group of strategic actors that it warrants. In a corporation, the strategic actors 
would in principle be the executive board, while the whole organization would consist 
of passive puppets who have no active role in bringing about the organization’s goals. 
To take this as granted at the definitional level would be to accept structural 
behaviorism at face value. Mintzberg and Waters (1985) have argued that planned 
and entrepreneurial strategies do exist, but are limited to very few companies – if we 
regard strategy as something that really constitutes organizational action. Hart (1992) 
has argued that a form of strategy process that regards individuals as “sheep” is likely 
to result in worse performance than processes in which organizational members are 
“active players”.  
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The emphasis on structure in implementation implies a vote for functionalism. 
Functionalism has faced harsh critiques directed towards its emphasis on value 
consensus9, as well as its reduction of individual actions to social structures (e.g. 
Giddens, 1984; Garfinkel, 1967). The view on strategy implementation as a business 
of redesigning structures has been subjected to a more specific critique by Mintzberg 
(1995). 
While the first form of critique concerns conceptual issues, the collective intention 
viewpoint on strategy can be criticized from various practical viewpoints as well. The 
planning conception of collective intention can be subjected to Mintzberg’s (1994) 
critique of strategic planning, for example, which is based on evidence that, on one 
hand, many successful organizations do not build their strategy on planning (the 
critique of rational decision making), and, on the other, that planning is not a very 
good model for creating success, being rigid and slow for more and more turbulent 
environments (e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 1977). The critique of planning is emphasized 
by the fact that strategic planning has largely been abandoned in real-life 
organizations (cf. Mintzberg, 1999; 1985). 
The notion of strategy as a collective intention can be subjected to an even more 
intensive critique, often given by authors with a postmodern streak. They have 
claimed that strategy is a form of rhetoric used by management, drawn from military 
language in order to project a masculine form of power and sense of confidence in 
one’s ability to make the correct decisions (Lilley, 2001; Knights & Morgan, 1991). 
Strategy can be seen as a rhetorical tool that can be used to warrant managerialism. As 
Lilley puts it: 
“Strategy is up there. Right up there. At the top. And, above all, the language that it 
mobilizes, and is mobilized by it, is what puts it there.” 
To think of strategy in terms of collective intention could deepen the managerialist 
non-reflexivity even further. If strategy were a shared intent, based on managerial 
                                                
9 The basic critique is typically given by conflict theorists (cf. Giddens, 2001). Furthermore, from a 
sociological point of view, it seems strange to assume that some people’s actions were determined by 
structure, while others could escape this determinism and even mold new structures. Why would top 
managers be categorically free of structural determination? 
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intent, the researcher would have to use managerial intent as a basis of her inquiry, 
thus falling into the trap of implicit managerialism. 
While the notion of strategy as collective intention can be criticized at the 
organizational level of analysis, it can also be subjected to a critique concerning the 
rationality of individual action. This stems from the fact that in most situations 
individuals do not (1) formulate an intention and then (2) try to realize it, but action is 
a complicated system, consisting of an interplay between interpretation and praxis 
(e.g. James 1950; Heidegger, 1997; Dewey, 1997; Mead, 1934; Giddens, 1984; Weick 
1979, 1995). 
This critique would seem to indicate that the strategy process, the process in which 
strategy is created and realized, couldn't be definitively linked to an individual agent 
through the notion of collective intention. The strategy process has to exist as a 
structure in addition to a shared intent, yet mere functionalism is not a satisfactory 
explanation either. Nor will a structural-behaviorist view do either, as noted before. 
A famous attempt to bridge the gap between functionalist and individualistic 
sociological theory has been made by the British sociologist Anthony Giddens. His 
theory has had a direct influence on the study of organizational structure (Ranson, 
Hinings & Greenwood, 1980; Riley, 1983), in the bridging of managerialism and 
critical theory in organization studies (Heracleous & Hendry, 2000), social systems 
theory (Whittington, 1992), organizational identity (Sarason, 1995) and fighting the 
incommensurability of varying metatheoretical approaches (Weaver & Gioia, 1994). 
Structuration theory has also had a major impact through its effect on such notable 
theorists as Pettigrew (e.g. 1987).10 
                                                
10 The action/structure debate is a classical debate in social science that is still a topic of heated 
discussion in organization studies (cf. Bouchikhi, Kilduff & Whittington, 1997). Knights (1997) has 
argued that the whole notion should be deconstructed, and not transcended as is done in a structuration 
framework. My choosing the structuration framework thus communicates my unwillingness to adopt 
such a radical postmodernist approach. 
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2.5 The strategy process as a process of structuration 
The strategy process is a process of social interaction. Social interaction is linguistic 
in nature (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969). Consider Wittgenstein’s (1951, §18) beautiful 
description of language:  
“Do not be troubled by the fact that languages (2) and (8)11 consist only of orders. If 
you want to say that this shows them to be incomplete, ask yourself whether our 
language is complete; whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the 
notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, 
suburbs of our language. (And how many houses or streets does it take before a town 
begins to be a town?) Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little 
streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various 
periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular 
streets and uniform houses.” 
The “city of language” in organizations shapes the paths of its citizens (organizational 
members), yet the citizens also shape the city. I think this metaphor gives us an 
introduction to Giddens’s theory of structuration. Giddens’s main argument is that 
while societies consist of individual, conscious agents who are capable of 
transforming structures, their actions are in turn defined by those structures (cf. 
Giddens, 1979; 1984). 
Giddens’s ontological position is interesting in the sense that he argues that structures 
only have existence through their instantiation in everyday interaction. On the other 
hand, agents’ knowledgeability of structures of various kinds is what makes 
meaningful interaction possible in the first place – failure to pay attention to a number 
of rules attached to different social situations would be to disrupt the interaction 
completely: 
“The way forward in bridging the gap between ‘structure’ and ‘action’ approaches is 
to recognize that we actively make and remake social structure during the course of 
everyday activities […] all social action presumes the existence of structure. But at the 
same time structure presumes action, because ‘structure’ depends on regularities of 
human behavior.” (Giddens, 2001: 688-689.) 
Structuration theory can be used as a link between the strategy process and the 
individual agent. The strategy process is a social structure, acting as the channel 
                                                
11 Languages (2) and (8) are primitive languages existing in communication between a construction 
worker and his apprentice. The vocabulary of the languages consists of the names of construction 
items. When the construction worker utters a name denoting an item, the apprentice picks the item up 
and brings it to his master.   
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through which organizational action is directed. This channel in part defines the 
context for the agents, yet the agents in turn influence the process – if only because 
the only reason the process exists is through instantiation in the agents’ actions. This 
is to say that the ‘citizens’ of the strategy process ‘city’ can actively shape their city, 
building new suburbs, and even tearing down old buildings and starting anew: but 
they are also defined as citizens through living in the city. Just as a cyclic diagram 
portraying an organizational strategy process has only some marginal form of 
existence if nobody adheres to it, a city is only a collection of buildings if it has no 
citizens. 
Structuration theory has been utilized in the study of strategy by Andrew Pettigrew, 
one of the founders of the strategy process school. He has argued (1987) that the 
content of strategy can only be understood in association with the process of how it 
came about as well as the unique organizational context, which the organization 
constitutes. As noted by Sarason (1995) structuration fits in quite nicely with issues 
closely related to the strategy process such as an organizational identity: social 
identity theory (Ashforth & Mael, 1989) clearly echoes Giddens’s claim that social 
structures act in the definition of individual identity, a claim echoed by such notable 
proponents of the dynamic conception of individual identity as the pragmatists 
(Dewey, James), the proponents of narrative subjectivity (cf. Polkinghorne, 1988) the 
symbolic interactionists (Mead, Blumer, Goffman) as well as many psychodynamic 
authors on organizations (e.g. Brown & Starkey, 2000) and sensemaking theorists 
(Weick 1995). Strategy is closely linked to organizational identity in the sense that 
strategy should correspond to organizational identity in order for it to be felt as 
sensible (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991).   
The theory of structuration has answered most of the challenges that was posed for the 
collective intention –conception of strategy. In structuration, the agents are affected 
by strategy, but also mold strategy, so the only way strategy may exist is through 
instantiation in the agents’ social actions. While this grants emergent strategy a 
foothold, it does not rule out pre-intended strategy. Giddens (1984) notes that in social 
settings people with legitimized positions are enabled to mold structures, resulting in 
the creation of a strategy, resulting in the possibility of classic strategic management. 
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Structuration does not necessitate a strict awareness or beliefs about other 
organizational members’ intention as the collective intention-schema would seem to 
necessitate. Instead of a demand to have knowledge or beliefs about other people’s 
intentions, which would result in the group of strategic actors being very small, 
structuration places a demand on the knowledgeability of organizational members. 
Knowledgeability concerns the rules that social structures pose on everyday 
situations, which can be shared by a large group of people. 
On the other hand, the theory of structuration does not advocate a “structure follows 
strategy” schema, in which social structure is designed to pre-determine the actions of 
the majority of an organization’s members. Agent knowledgeability allows for the 
molding of strategy by individual agents in the strategy process. 
The final critique concerning the rationality of individual action does not affect the 
theory of structuration either. Giddens bases his whole model on the notion that while 
people do maintain a “theoretical consciousness” of their actions in everyday 
discourse, the flow of action is based on reflexive monitoring, an interplay of action 
and interpretation.  
One of the reasons structuration theory fits in so nicely with the study of strategy 
process is that it combines many elements often not found interlinked in organization 
studies: organizational structure and individual interpretation, power and 
sensemaking, etc. This is probably the reason for the appeal of Giddens’s work in a 
larger context as well: structuration is an attempt at building a bridge between 
traditions that would at first glance seem incommensurable. There is, however, the 
fear that the theory of structuration will take strategy so far from its roots that many 
people may be tempted to abandon the notion altogether. In the framework of 
structuration, the strategy process is truly a process, constantly changing, tough to 
predict, hard to control, only existing if reflected in actions, laced with uncertainty 
and contradiction. Some strategists may feel that strategy involves a notion of control 
and prediction to the organization in order it to be strategy. Whittington (1992) has 
argued that it is through careful manipulation of the tensions between contradicting 
structural principles that managerial action in organizations is enabled. 
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2.6 Is or ought? Strategy on the ontological level 
One important question remains: what is strategy, really? By this I mean: is it 
ultimately just a normative concept for decision makers to use as a tool or is it a 
phenomenon to be found in organizational action? In Section 3.1, I noted that I regard 
strategy as a social practice. What does this mean? 
Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel (1999) have spoken of normative and descriptive 
approaches to strategy. The first of these is concerned with the managerial need to 
find the correct strategy for her organization and influence it to execute that strategy. 
The latter is concerned with giving a description of how strategy comes into 
existence, and is implemented. 
As a student of the strategy practice paradigm, my interest is of the descriptive kind. I 
have therefore to address a tough ontological question: in reality, is there a 
phenomenon in organizations one can call the strategy process, the understanding of 
which furthers the understanding of the organization’s actions? Not many authors 
really address this question, leading Inkpen & Choudhury (1995) to argue that 
researchers often claim to see strategy where it is not, and thus a theory of strategy 
absence should be created. 
The question would be easier to answer in a normative framework: “sure, managers 
say they have strategies, they speak of strategy in their organization, my job is to 
invent them concepts that they find useful and that help them manage the organization 
into success.” Some (e.g. Porter, 1996) say that this is all that strategy amounts to, i.e. 
that strategy is a normative concept and nothing more, while if it is included to cover 
process issues, the concept becomes too vague. 
In a sense I agree with the position that strategy is purely normative. Indeed, it can be 
said that much of strategy language is the type of masculine jargon that managers 
employ to make it seem as if they have more answers than they really do have 
(Knights & Morgan, 1991; Lilley, 2001; Barry & Elmes, 1997). Strategy as a shared 
intent may be futile in many organizations in an ontological sense. But it may be 
fruitful in other senses - in the sense that organizational members have a hunger for a 
sense of a shared vision and purpose (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1994; Kotter, 1996; 
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Westley & Mintzberg 1989), for example. Even if they may not be able to share an 
intention in the strictest sense, they may be more motivated in their work. Or, perhaps 
we can think of strategy in the same manner as Tsoukas & Chia (2002) think of the 
organization in general: strategy is an accomplishment in a continuous effort of 
finding common direction. Strategy, as the organization, is not a static construct, but 
is in a constant state of ‘becoming’.  
On another hand, there is something in existence, something that people enact when 
they speak of strategy, the social practice of strategy. The theory of structuration 
enables coherences and structures in action that can be regarded as strategies being 
created and executed. It would seem that what the strategists want to enact is a 
collective intention of some sort, but the reality of a strategy process is a structuration 
process in which action and intention are negotiated in a continuous process. The 
process is polyphonic, with lots of voices joining, interlinking and conflicting (Hazen, 
1993). The voices compete for the position of the narrator, the voice that tells the 
story of strategy (Barry & Elmes, 1997). 
So a lot is being done in real-life organizations under the “strategy process” label. The 
outcome of these activities is crucial because the activities constitute a large amount 
of managerial activity. They also touch upon the work of lots of other people. This is 
why I am interested in understanding individuals in the strategy process. It is at the 
individual level where the fundamental descriptions can be made. 
This study is concerned with shedding light on how strategy, a normative concept, 
takes form at the individual level of analysis, more precisely in the individual 
Lifeworld. This is exciting, because this level of analysis is not well known. We really 
don’t know what strategy turns into when it reaches the individual. I am inclined 
towards a phenomenological analysis of organizational phenomena. I am not so much 
interested in the “official” realities the organizations claim to exhibit, but the 
phenomena the organizational members, the individuals in the strategy process, 
perceive in their respective Lifeworlds (Husserl, 1999). I regard strategy as too often 
treated implicitly as a grand narrative (Lyotard, 1985) that can be understood just by 
asking those in power and seeing their power points, whereas I think a lot can be 
learned when one looks at the micro narratives, accepting the polyphony that they 
create in organizational narrative (Boje, 2001).    
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So, finally, is there a strategy process that takes place, involving a large number of 
organizational members, uniting their actions? I would answer the question that 
something is being done in the name of strategy, so normatively speaking; the social 
practice of strategy certainly exists. On the descriptive level, there are Giddensian 
structures, constantly in a state of flux, polyphonic strategic narratives unfolding. If 
the descriptive level can really be considered ‘strategic’ in the final ontological sense, 
I think Shrivastava’s (1986) description of strategic praxis is a good one:  
“If organization is conceived of as the continuous self-transformation and dialectical 
reproduction of both subjects and objects, then organizational strategy may be viewed 
as praxis, consisting of thoughtful, theoretically informed actions that guide this self-
transformation. In this sense, strategy serves as an organizing principle and becomes 
fundamental to defining goals, product-market domain, internal structures, and 
management control practices.” (Shrivastava, 1986: 372). 
Because this thesis is concerned with the individual in the strategy process, my 
emphasis will be the descriptive study of the normative concept of strategy from the 
individual standpoint. The strategy process is present as a normative artifact in 
organizations and my emphasis is the understanding of how this artifact is reflected 
by organizational members.  
In the first encounter with theory, I have discussed the strategy process as a 
phenomenon largely at the organizational level of analysis (see Table 2 for a 
summary), moving downward toward the individual. This has been necessary in order 
to understand the concepts strategy and strategy process. In the second encounter 
with theory the movement will be reversed, from the individual towards strategy. The 
discussion will be centered on the individual level of analysis. The second encounter 
will arrive at individual positions in the strategy process. 
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Table 2. Summary of the first encounter with theory 
Main concepts  Strategy, strategy process, strategic intent 
First model linking the individual and 
the strategy process 
Strategy as collective intention 
Critique of the first model Organizational level of analysis: 
Critique of planning, managerialism, small possible 
number of strategic agents 
Individual level of analysis:  
Critique of rational action 
Second model linking the individual and 
the strategy process 
Theory of structuration, linking the individual action 
and strategy as structure 
The strategy process as an object of 
study for this thesis 
Things done in organizations in the name of 
strategy, affecting agents; the ontology of the 
strategy process is the process of structuration 
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3. Individual positions in the strategy process. 
Second encounters with theory 
In the second encounter with theory, I will be exploring the link between the individual 
and strategy by moving upward from the individual towards strategy. 
How does, then, an individual come to act as a part of the strategy process? In other 
words, how does the individual adopt strategy? We have all heard stories of 
communication procedures consisting of dreary briefings with nobody asking 
questions, and managers e-mailing power point-presentations to subordinates with the 
order: “communicate this!” Authors with a normative intent often emphasize the need 
for managers and middle managers to communicate strategy (e.g. Beer & Eisenstat 
1996, 2000; Noble, 1999; Alexander, 1985; 1991). 
The unfortunate thing about many of these writings as well as about many strategy 
textbooks is that they don’t really talk about what they mean by communication in the 
descriptive sense. Back in the times of Claude Shannon communication was about 
sending and receiving information, but nowadays the process is somewhat more 
complex, consisting of interpretation and interaction (Kreps, 1990).  
3.1 A linear model of strategy implementation 
So what happens when strategies are adopted in organizations? Noble (1999) defines 
strategy implementation as communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment of 
strategic plans. Noble’s definition communicates a willingness to overcome the 
barriers between the content and process paradigms. It combines the functionalist 
demarcation between implementation and formulation with concepts from process-
oriented literature. This may not be the best of ideas, since this kind of demarcation 
seems to overrule the possibility of participation in the formulation stage of strategy: 
if strategy implementation starts with communication, there seems to be some specific 
informational content to be communicated, which implies a pre-made decision. A 
further concern is that Noble does not give any indication to the interrelations 
between his four concepts.  
If one uses the concepts of communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment as 
a succession of steps, one has created a top-down communication model with a linear 
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view on communication and human cognition, ending up in a situation described in 
Figure 1 below. I have formed the linear model in order to be able to discuss the 








Figure 1. A linear model for strategy implementation. 
The normative literature on strategy implementation seems to be split in two with 
regard to the linear model. The first group consists of more or less functionalist 
authors who are willing to embrace the model (Higgins, 1990; Hrebniak & Joyce, 
1984; Hrebniak, 1990; Pearce & Robinson, 1996; Vasconcellos, 1990). While they 
note that communication is important, they more or less regard the strategy process as 
a linear succession of formulation, implementation and control.  The second group of 
normative authors (Beer & Eisenstat, 1996, 2000; Giles, 1991; Hambrick & Cannella, 
1989) is in apparent conflict with the linear model due to their emphasis on dialogue 
between varieties of stakeholders, especially during strategy formulation. The 
problem with these authors in the present context is that they rarely provide any 
insight into the process of adoption itself, but center on prescribing managerial 
communicative actions. The other partner in dialogue, the follower, is thus given no 
attention.  
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The first problem with the linear model is that there are few situations in real life 
when human beings in organizations act in such ordered ways. Literature on learning 
underlines this – adoption, or learning new things, happens in an experiential process 
of interaction with the world (cf. Dewey, 1997; Kolb, 1984; Schön, 1983). A second 
concern is added when one tries to move on from the framework of one person 
communicating the message and another receiving and processing it into the complex 
phenomena of a social world consisting of a network of multiple communicators and 
receivers. The seeming failure of the linear model adds a further, process-minded 
concern: whether the formulation - implementation distinction is fruitful at all. A third 
concern is the managerialism of the model. Managers formulate and communicate, 
while the personnel members interpret, adopt and enact. If discussion takes place, this 
is only to ensure correct interpretation and compliance, not to mold the original 
strategic content.  
One might also approach the issue by replacing the concepts communication, 
interpretation, adoption and enactment with related, but better interlocking concepts, 
such as learning, reflection (as employed by Argyris & Schön, 1979, Schön, 1983), 
understanding, commitment, motivation and the like, but it would seem that the linear 
structure of the model would not do any better. There would seem to be no pre-set 
ordering of such concepts that would account for all situations. In some cases, the best 
way to motivate oneself is to fully understand the benefits of an issue; in others, one 
understands the benefits only after multiple attempts to do things differently. In most 
cases, the learning process would seem to be a complex combination of multiple 
approaches. 
These problems might be attacked by drawing feedback loops and interrelations in the 
model’s flowchart, but to date I have failed to fully account for the complexity of 
strategy adoption by simply adding arrows. New counterexamples keep stacking up 
with each addition of a loop. It would seem that a cyclical representation of adoption, 
consisting of a dialectic of sensemaking and sensegiving between leaders and 
followers, such as the one offered by Gioia & Chittipeddi (1991), would be a more 
suitable model for adoption. In essence, the primitive phenomenon in adopting new 
content is interacting with that content in various ways. The key account of this 
interaction process has been given by Karl Weick in his exposition of sensemaking. 
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3.2 Sensemaking in the strategy process 
I have built the model presented in Figure 1 to illustrate the difficulty of modeling 
issues related to how people learn and interpret things. The significance of 
interpretation cannot be denied, however. Human beings give interpretation to 
informational inputs all the time, regardless of whether the quality and quantity of 
accessible information warrants interpretation. People make sense of things, whether 
the things would seem to warrant this or not. 
Literature on sensemaking is to my knowledge the most prominent field of literature 
on organizational communication that is sensitive to the interactive, interpretive and 
microsociological elements of communication. I take this to mean that sensemaking 
literature provides the deepest description of communication in the grassroots level. I 
will therefore choose the framework of sensemaking as my first theoretical 
framework.   
One enlightening example of this notion is presented in Garfinkel’s (1967) 
experiment, in which university students received random yes/no-answers to 
questions concerning their studies and lives, which they thought came from a student 
advisor. Regardless of the fact that the answers were given at random, even in cases in 
which the student asked repeated questions such as “you really think that?” almost all 
the students thought they could make perfect sense of what they were advised to do. 
In many organizations, people have to make sense of complex things all the time. This 
is especially true if one acts as a part of the strategy process. As was noted in the 
preceding section, strategy is about making the choices best for the organization, and 
this may be one complex task! In many cases, the big picture may be incomplete or 
not available at all. Sensemaking takes place in any case, however. 
Weick (1995) has written the book on sensemaking in organizations. He provides the 
following seven properties for sensemaking in organizations. 
1. Sensemaking is grounded in identity construction 
Weick states that sensemaking is based on identity construction. The identity of the 
individual to be constructed is not a singular, atomic self that goes through changes, 
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but rather a dynamic construction of different identities in need of definition. An 
important phenomenon for sensemaking is that people learn about their identities by 
projecting them into the environment and observing the consequences of this 
projection. This is not to say that people simply accept the reactions of the 
environment at face value – they also try to actively influence the environment. This 
is in essence what is meant by impression management (Goffman, 1959), which I will 
discuss further in the next section in association with roles. Suffice it to say for now 
that roles and identity are interlinked. 
Weick argues that the needs an individual has for her identity are reflected in her 
organization’s identity. This would seem to suggest that an individual is not bound to 
tolerate large inconsistencies in the values of her organization (or a large identity gap) 
for long: she either tries to influence the organization, finds a new organization, 
changes herself or perhaps becomes passive and just “does her job”. 
2. Sensemaking is retrospective 
We make sense of past events, not the ones taking place right now. Sensemaking is in 
a way historical. This point will be easier to demonstrate if one begins by examining 
two conceptions of time, that of duration and that of experience. Duration is a stream 
that cannot be divided into bits. Experience, on the other hand is always singular in 
nature and placed in the past. We are conscious of our experiences, not of duration as 
such, and our experiences are always in the past. Sensemaking is based on our 
experiences, so sensemaking is always retrospective in nature. 
Weick connects the notion of the retrospective nature of sensemaking to Mintzberg’s 
(1978) notion of emergent strategy. Reacting is also something that happens after the 
event or action reacted to, so a reactive view of strategy is retrospective in nature. 
3. Sensemaking is enactive of sensible environments 
Weick stresses that the environment should not be viewed as singular, fixed and 
external to the enacting subject, but as a dynamic process including the subject.  The 
subject constructs reality by doing things in the world. Enactment constructs sensible 
environments because it labels reality with concepts, with sense. That meaning is 
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created and discovered by acting in the world. The border between the organization 
and its environment is blurred.  
Weick’s view on enactment places him in the social constructionist tradition, 
according to which reality is created by subjects (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). While I 
agree with the fact that this is true when speaking of social facts, I also concur with 
Searle (1995) that there are also brute natural facts, which exist regardless of what we 
think about them.  
4. Sensemaking is social in nature 
The creation of meaning is essentially social: done by a group of people instead of a 
single subject. Wittgenstein made this point in an elegant way in his discussion of the 
impossibility of a private language. The meaning of a concept is its use in language 
and language is used in social contexts in various language-games (Wittgenstein, 
1951).  According to Weick, in addition to the nature of sensemaking as the social 
construction of shared meaning, one must also take into account the redirection of 
people’s actions according to that social sensemaking. In addition to understanding, 
there is action in sensemaking. I will return to the discussion of action in the next 
section. The social aspects of sensemaking, as well as his social theory of identity 
construction, which Weick stresses, also emphasize his intellectual link to the 
symbolic interactionist tradition from which microsociology has emerged (e.g. Mead, 
Blumer, Goffman). 
5. Sensemaking is ongoing 
According to Weick, sensemaking is ongoing activity: it never starts and it never 
stops. People are constantly acting in situations and their actions affect the situations 
they are in – often against their will. This does not mean that the stream of action is 
monotonous: there are situations of importance that “crystallize meaning”, such as the 
launching of a new product in an organization. The most important practical finding 
contained in this notion would seem to be that sensemaking is bound to happen. The 
organizational members make sense of situations if they are not told to do so – and 
even if they are told not to do so! A practical example of the inevitability of 
sensemaking is the case of an organization in which a large transaction is made 
involving, for example, a new unit bought abroad without the reasons for buying it 
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being communicated to the personnel. As illustrated by Garfinkel’s example, they are 
bound to make sense of the action no matter what; the conclusions they come to, 
however, may be very different from what the decision makers had in mind.  
6. Sensemaking is focused on and by extracted cues 
Sensemaking is based on familiar points of reference that can be extracted from 
chaos. These cues act as seeds for new meaning; what is selected as a cue is 
dependent on context or culture. Here one can see for the fist time sensemaking 
forming a bridge between culture and process. If culture is to be defined as the totality 
of meaning in some context, then sensemaking, the creation of new meaning, is 
dependent on previous meaning and knowledge structures. 
Since sensemaking of cues is dependent on culture, sensemaking can be affected in a 
profound way by the smallest details. Weick notes that since small, recognized cues 
form an uncertain starting point for sensemaking, this even decreases the role of 
strategic planning in organizations. People can start enacting new reality from any 
source that contains some familiar elements. “Any old map will do”, he concludes. 
As to whether Weick considers strategy important or not is not perfectly clear. It is 
certain that he does not hold strategic planning in high regard. He does not employ the 
concept strategy very much in his own theorizing, apparently regarding strategy as a 
planning-based, normative phenomenon.  
7. Sensemaking is driven by plausibility rather than accuracy 
Weick rests on the assumption that people are not looking for accurate accounts of the 
meaning of concepts. He argues that they are looking for explanations that they can 
believe and fit into their larger schemas, the ones that serve them. Among the reasons 
for this are: the high amount of information people are faced with, the ambivalence of 
meaning of many concepts, the need for speed in understanding new situations, the 
interpersonal nature of sensemaking and the need for common understanding and also 
the role of emotions in human decision making. 
Weick builds his analysis of organizational sensemaking on four levels of analysis. 
The first level above the intrasubjective (the individual) is the intersubjective level. At 
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this level, meaning becomes transformed from the thoughts, feelings, beliefs, etc of an 
“I” into those of a “we”, i.e. subjective meanings are transformed into intersubjective 
meanings through conversation and interaction. 
The next level is that of a social structure, for example, an organization. At this level, 
all notions of individual selves are left behind, and are replaced with a generic, 
shared, self (perhaps one might call this the organizational identity). The final level of 
analysis is that of extrasubjective analysis. There is no generic self any more, but only 
pure (in a sense, objective) meanings. 
Weick argues that organizing lies atop the movement between the intersubjective and 
the social structure, as a continuous movement between those two levels of analysis. 
This is where the core of organizational sensemaking takes place. The core of 
sensemaking is therefore a movement between the intersubjective and structural level 
of beliefs, values and attitudes; it is the ongoing transformation of meaning between a 
group self and the organizational identity. Tensions between the innovations of 














Figure 2. Sensemaking and the levels of analysis. 
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I think much of what Weick attributes to organizing in general can be attributed to the 
strategy process. In the strategy process, individual organizational members and 
groups build social structures, while they adapt their actions in a sensemaking process 
to shape the organization’s path. 
Weick’s model resembles Giddens’s theory of structuration in many senses. In both 
models, agents are able to affect social structures, yet they are also bound by those 
structures. Weick elaborates in organizational life much of which Giddens proposes 
on the general sociological platform. There is a key element in the theory of 
structuration, which Weick does not discuss, however. 
3.3 Power in the strategy process 
Weick’s model of sensemaking in organizations fails to address the issue of power. In 
the theory of structuration, power is discussed in addition to interpretation issues, with 
which sensemaking is largely concerned. If the process in which social action is to be 
studied completely, from either the individual or the social standpoint, then the 
relations of power would seem highly relevant. 
In the strategy process we need to account for power. In an organization in which 
there is no joint plural subject for the whole organization, but a number of relevant 
stakeholders and interest groups, politics comes into play. As Eden & Ackermann 
(1998) put it: 
“Strategy development will almost always imply changes in the organization – in its 
relationship with the environment and its relationship with itself. Any organizational 
change that matters strategically will involve winners and losers… It follows that any 
strategy development or thinking about strategy will, without deliberate intention, 
promote organizational politics.” 
If Giddens’s model in Figure 3 is studied, it will soon be noted that the first column, 
mediated by interpretive schemes, is largely what Weick’s model of sensemaking is 
elaborating in organizations. The notions of power/domination and 
sanction/legitimation have not been discussed. 
Giddens’s ontological position is present in this schema as much as ever: structural 
processes such as signification, legitimation and domination do determine action, but 
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only exist by being instantiated in the social interactive processes, i.e. communication, 











Figure 3. Giddens’s model of structuration (Giddens, 1984). 
Figure 3 helps to illustrate Giddens’s notion of power: it is a phenomenon present at 
the level of social interaction, reflecting the structural process of domination, being 
mediated by the notion of facility, being able to act in some way. Legitimation can in 
some ways be regarded as a symbolic sibling of domination (Hardy & Clegg, 1996). It 
is mediated by norms and instantiated as sanctions on the social interaction plateau.   
Weick was not too specific with regard to the role of the individual in terms of power. 
The attributions he proposed for sensemaking brilliantly describe how meaning is 
created at the level of the individual as well as the organization, but as we have 
learned from the study of rhetoric, as well as the genealogy of institutions (Foucault), 
it is very hard to distinguish power from knowledge; which again is very closely 
related to meaning. Legitimation is a structural concept in which the everyday notions 
of power and knowledge can be seen to merge: in a sense, power is integrated with 
symbols in all sorts of normative systems. The omission of power from Weick’s 
model may also explain why it is hard to account for the phenomenon of leadership in 
the model. Gioia & Chittipeddi (1991) have in my opinion touched upon this by 
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giving an account of how an effective leader can induce sensemaking in her 
organization via sensegiving practices, bringing about strategic change.   
Giddens has illustrated how sensemaking and power are related, but we have yet to 
define power. The classical notion of power, called pluralist, can be defined as A 
having power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do (Dahl, 1957). This notion was criticized as behaviorist in the sense that it 
required observable behavior to be brought about in order for power to be used. 
Bacharach & Baratz (1962) criticized this view accordingly and argued for the ability 
of power holders to keep certain interest from entering the decision-making arena 
altogether, causing these interests to remain inarticulate. They defined power as the 
mobilization of bias. Lukes (1974) based his critique of the previous two models of 
power on the argument that instead of simply keeping some people out of the decision 
making arenas, power holders may affect the cognitions and preferences of the others. 
Lukes defined power as A having power over B when A affects B in a manner 
contrary to B’s interests. This form of power is normally upheld by institutions. 
Lukes’s notion of power is related in some ways to Foucault (e.g. 1979) whose 
conception of power, while by no means easily identified, is also based on different 
social institutions. Foucault studied power through the study of the genealogies of 
different institutions such as clinics, asylums and prisons. He argued that the 
individual is disciplined to monitor herself through institutional discourses. One of 
Foucault’s key notions is naturalization, the deeming of certain practices to be natural 
or self-evident. This notion of bio-power can be interpreted in an organizational 
context to validate a whole number of practices, such as internal career systems 
(Hiley, 1987). 
One important feature of the interconnection between power and knowledge such as 
proposed by Foucault and Lukes is that power is not an overtly negative phenomenon 
that has to be gotten rid of. Foucault (1979) argues that while studying the 
genealogies of different institutions enables us to better understand the forms of 
discipline we are subject to, there is no way of freeing ourselves. This doesn’t, in 
itself make power a positive phenomenon, but if one thinks of the quotation from 
Wittgenstein in Chapter 2.5, describing the city of language, one may come to 
perceive meaning (signification) itself as connected to webs of legitimation and 
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domination, as described in the theory of structuration. The language we use to 
convey meaning is a social phenomenon, and being social, power is always present. 
Power is a positive phenomenon in the sense that the only meaningful way for us to 
exist is within all sorts of power structures.   
A further relevant notion is whether power can be defined as a relation between 
individuals, as attempted by Lukes and others. Hannah Arendt (1958) has 
conceptualized power as a collective phenomenon corresponding to the human 
capability of acting in concert. She notes that power is never an individual property 
but a group property. Lukes (1974) argues that this is an idiosyncratic conception 
since power is always about A consciously affecting B in some way. Ball (1993) tries 
to find a common ground for these authors, as well as for authors as different as 
Habermas, Giddens and Foucault, by retaining the relational property of power, and 
adding the property of communication, claiming that all use of power requires 
communication between A and B. This again links the discussion here squarely to the 
frame of structuration in which the social interaction forms of power and 
communication are linked (see Figure 3). 
3.4 Agent activity 
The study of the discourses of strategy can reveal a third dimension to understanding 
the link between an individual and the strategy process to complement the dimensions 
of sensemaking and power. In addition to understanding the agent’s sensemaking 
capacities (understanding of the strategy process) as well as the power in the process 
(capability of influencing the strategy process), it is also relevant to understand the 
activity of the agent: whether he/she has put these capabilities to use in the process. 
The activity dimension is needed to address the quite simple question, whether the 
individual is doing something to act as in the strategy process. In a sense, we can 
think of sensemaking and power as enabling factors, and activity as the forms of 
actually influencing the strategy process. 
It is necessary to understand that activity is not isolated from power and sensemaking: 
indeed sensemaking is rooted in action (Weick, 1995), while interpretation and power 
are interrelated in structuration (Giddens, 1984), etc. The interconnections have been 
elaborated by Hardy, Palmer & Phillips (2000). They have built a model of the 
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discourse of strategy on three interconnecting circuits, namely activity, connectivity 
and performativity. Their model describes the movement of a new discursive element, 
such as a new strategic concept, through the three circuits (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. A model of the discourse of strategy (Hardy, Palmer & Phillips 2000).  
The first circuit of activity represents the individual’s possibility of influencing the 
discourse of strategy through introducing new content. I am reminded of the ‘creative 
seeds’ an individual may bring into collective sensemaking, as Weick proposed. The 
circuit of performativity is the circuit in which other people are introduced to the 
picture, as the political processes determine whether the content introduced is adopted 
by other organizational members. If this is to take place, the content must be sensible 
to the other people. I think this stage has a lot to do with the first two columns of 
communication and power in the model of structuration. The final circuit, the circuit 
of connectivity, is where the new content is integrated into structure and practices. 
The circuit of connectivity represents the process of structuration at large, in which 
systems and social interaction interconnect. It is also reflected in Weick’s interaction 
of the individual, group and social context (Figure 2). 
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3.5 Social positions in the strategy process 
The overall goal of this chapter is to illustrate the link between the individual agent 
and an organizational strategy process. In the previous sections, three central 
dimensions have been introduced: sensemaking, power and activity. The next logical 
step is to identify the concept interconnecting all three. One promising candidate can 
be found in the concept of role, typically thought as the nexus between the individual 
and structure. 
What is it to have a role? The anthropologist Ralph Linton is often (cf. Popitz, 1972; 
Katz & Kahn, 1966; Giddens, 1984) attributed for bringing the concept of role to 
social theory in his Study of Man (1936). The concept was adopted quite soon by both 
macrosociology, as it became a central concept for functionalism, as well as 
microsociology when Goffman embraced the concept in his dramaturgical approach.   
The concept of role is generally offered as the link between the individual and her 
organization, i.e. the organizational structure. As noted (see Chapter 2.5), strategy 
process can be regarded as a social structure. This means that the concept of ‘strategic 
role’ can be regarded as the link between the individual agent and the strategy 
process. Roles are relevant in understanding how strategy is enacted, how individuals 
act as strategic actors. This question can be regarded as a fundamental question in 
strategy implementation or strategic practice in general.  
There is a lot of talk about management roles, team roles, the roles of different 
functional units, etc. Some may feel that in organizations the concept of a role is 
interchangeable with such everyday concepts as job, task, and so on (e.g. Hellriegel et 
al., 1995). This kind of strong relation between role and organizational function, or 
office (Katz & Kahn, 1966), reflects a functionalist orientation to organizations. 
Classic functionalist authors quickly embraced the concept of role in their theories of 
society. Parsons used the concept to explain how social structure determines 
individual actions. He defined role as 
“the system of normative expectations for the performance of a participating individual 
in his capacity as a member of a collectivity. The role is the primary point of 
articulation between the personality of the individual and the structure of the social 
system.” (Parsons, 1967)  
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Whereas Parsons emphasized consensus between individuals performing their roles as 
members of a collectivity, his student Merton (1957) emphasized the need to account 
for the multitude of roles the individual has in her role-set, as well as conflicts arising 
between individuals and the roles society has set for them. 
A classical, functionalist exposition of roles in organizations was given by Katz & 
Kahn (1966). They used the concept of role in building an account of organizational 
behavior, claiming that organizations are role systems. Roles link the individual and 
organization by determining the behavior of individuals. Organizations are networks 
of offices, manned by individual organizational members. In Katz & Kahn’s account, 
roles are sent to individuals in accordance with the offices they hold. The individuals 
modify their behavior to compensate for the expectations they confront. Role 
expectations constitute the sent roles, while received roles in turn result in role 
behavior.   
While functionalist authors approach roles from structure to the individual, 
micrososiologists do the exact opposite, trying to account for how the individual 
enacts her role in various social situations. In the microsociological framework, the 
concept of a role is something that determines how people act and interact, and make 
sense of social situations. As Goffman (1959) puts it:  
“An establishment may be viewed ‘technically’, in terms of its efficiency as an 
intentionally organized system of activity for the achievement of predefined objectives.  
An establishment may be viewed ‘politically’, in terms of the actions, which each 
participant (or class of participants) can demand of other participants… An 
establishment may be viewed ‘structurally’, in terms of the horizontal and vertical 
status divisions… Finally, an establishment may be viewed ‘culturally’, in terms of the 
moral values which influence activity in the establishment… It seems to me the that the 
dramaturgical approach may constitute a fifth perspective… The technical and 
dramaturgical perspectives intersect most clearly, perhaps, in regards to standards of 
work… Power of any kind has to be clothed in effective means of displaying it, and will 
have different effects depending on how it is dramatized. (Goffman, 1959: 233-234.)” 
So, one crucial dimension to social situations in organizational establishments is the 
dramatical dimension. Roles constitute the actors in a drama. What is a role, then? 
Goffman begins by defining a performance as the activity of an agent, which 
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influences the other participants. A part is the pre-established pattern of action that is 
unfolded in a performance. A social role, finally, is the enactment of rights and duties 
attached to a given status, consisting of one or more parts. (Goffman, 1959.)  
A social role enacts rights and duties of an individual holding a status in a certain 
setting. The individuals carry out performances, supporting each other’s roles by tacit 
and explicit means. This is how they make sense of the situation. It is important to 
remember that to treat individual roles in organizations interchangeably with such a 
concept as “office” would be to deny the existence of the tacit dimension in social 
dramas and abandon the dramatic dimension for the technical. There is ample 
evidence for the existence of the tacit role expectations an individual faces – take 
Garfinkel’s (1967) experiment, for example, in which students, who were asked to act 
as polite guests in normal family situations, caused rage and all kinds of sensemaking 
when family members tried to deal with this breach of role structure (“he is working 
too hard”, “he has had a fight with his fiancée”, “he is making a joke.”) 
The interest of studying roles in the strategy process lies in the fact that the dramatical 
dimension combines the sensemaking dimension with the power dimension in 
individual social existence. Roles make social situations sensible; they consist of 
enacting statuses, thereby distributing power. 
What is it that happens in the strategy process in terms of individual roles? As 
Goffman put it, there are five interconnected dimensions from which to describe 
social establishment: the technical, the political, the cultural, the structural and the 
dramatical. Classical literature has approached strategy from the technical and 
structural dimensions (e.g. Porter 1980), sensemaking authors (e.g. Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick 1987) might be characterized as having an outlook on 
strategy based on the cultural dimension, and the political dimension is also presented 
by major authors (e.g. Pettigrew, 1992; Eden & Ackermann, 1998). The dramatic 
dimension of strategy has not been properly explored. 
Roles or social positions? 
But what of the dimension of activity? The concept of role would not seem to address 
it very well. As Giddens (1984, 84) has put it, roles, both in their functionalist form 
and dramaturgical form  
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“each tend to emphasize the ‘given’ character of roles… The script is written, the stage 
set and the actors do the best they can with the parts prepared for them.”  
There would indeed seem to be a certain fatalistic tendency to the role metaphor. As 
the master playwright himself (Macbeth Act V, Scene V) wrote:  
“Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player that struts and frets his hour upon the 
stage, and then is heard no more.”  
Such fatalism does not fit well with Giddens’s theory of structuration, based on active 
and knowledgeable agents. Nor does it suit this thesis, since the third dimension 
discovered for mediating the link between an individual and the strategy process is the 
dimension of activity. Giddens offers an alternative metaphor to replace roles. He 
chooses to speak of social positions, which he characterizes as follows: 
“Social systems only exist in and through the continuity of social practices, fading 
away in time. But some of their structural properties are best characterized as 
‘position-practice’ relations. Social positions are constituted structurally as specific 
intersections of signification, domination and legitimation which relates to the 
typification of agents. A social position involves the specification of a definite ‘identity’ 
within a network of social relations, that identity, however, being a ‘category’ to which 
a particular range of normative sanctions is relevant. (Giddens 1984: 83.)” 
It may well have been enough to speak of roles and explicate the emphasis on activity 
for the purposes of this thesis. The concept role has quite a strong connotation to 
function in management literature that I wish to avoid, however. I concur with 
sensemaking authors that organizations are much more than just networks of offices, 
as Katz and Kahn present them. Roles are not just job descriptions. The concept of 
social position offered by Giddens rids me of this worry, while simultaneously 
providing more space for the activity of agents. This is the reason I have chosen to 
address the question of social positions as my research question. I will still talk of 
roles as I describe the accounts of individuals as they perform strategically. Yet there 
will be many positions in which the individuals have failed to find a role to play. 
These positions have to be accounted for as well. I will address roles as performance 
categories, whereas the concept social position will refer to the agent’s whole 
relation to the strategy process as a totality of her cognition, affect and actions.  
I have finally come to the point where the background for my research question In 
what ways can an individual agent be socially positioned in an organizational 
strategy process? has been explicated. 
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3.6 Research on organizational roles and social positions 
The relevant empirical literature concerning social positions in strategy processes is 
largely written under the label of roles. It is simultaneously very limited and quite 
extensive. There would seem to be a large amount of literature touching on the topic 
of roles in the strategy process, yet very little has been written that is directly relevant 
to the topic. The different streams of literature have been summarized and their 
relevance and limitations discussed in Table 3 below. 
Table 3. Streams of literature touching on social positions in the strategy process 




Bourgeois & Brodwin (1984), Nutt (1983) 
on project planning, Quinn (1980) on 
strategic incrementalism 









Floyd & Wooldridge (1992; 1994; 2000) 
on strategy process 
Touch on the topic 
of strategy process 
Functionalist bias on 






Mintzberg (1994) on planning critique, 
Hamel (2000) on revolutionaries, Nonaka 
& Takeuchi (1995) on knowledge 




may have affected 
organizations 
Have limited empirical 
support, simplified 
descriptions, no 
emphasis on power 
issues, etc.  
Follower roles Leadership literature on followership (e.g. 
Kelley, 1992; Hughes, Ginnett & Curphy, 
1999), literature on organizational 
citizenship (e.g. Podsakoff et al.   & extra-
role behaviors (Dyne, Cummings & Parks, 
1995) 










Belbin on management group roles Clearly defined role 
positions, roles in 
their atomic form 
Level of a 
psychological group, 
not the strategy 
process; static, non-
knowledgeable 




Mintzberg (1971), Pitcher (1997)  Clear set of roles, 
dramaturgical flavor 






Van Maanen & Schein (1979), Van 
Maanen (1976), Schein (1988), Reichers 
(1987) 









Lewin (1951) on gatekeepers, Scott 
(2000), Wassermann & Faust  (1994)  
Direct analyses of 
social positions  
Behavioral emphasis 
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The reader can note that the wide scope of the different approaches does not enable 
me to discuss them all.  I will attempt to summarize the roles different authors have 
discovered for agents in organizations and in positions somehow relevant to the 
strategy process. I will categorize the roles at top management, middle management 
and employee levels.  I realize that this sort of categorization has a functionalist bias 
on pre-set offices as in Katz & Kahn (1966), which may be regarded as being in 
conflict with my phenomenological approach to the topic (see Chapter 4). This 
categorization reflects the approach in almost all the literature to be discussed, 
however. My approach to analyzing my data and discussing the results will discuss 
the relation of official functional roles and observed roles further. 
Top management roles 
Some models of strategy implementation have discussed individual roles. Bourgeois 
and Brodwin (1984) categorized strategy implementation practices into five models of 
implementation. The models are categorized largely according to the role that top 
management assumes in implementation. 
The commander model draws its influences from military life, the CEO wielding 
absolute power. In this model, the CEO is the rational agent behind the strategy 
decisions and plays no role in implementation. According to the authors, the CEO-
model works best with a powerful executive with few personal biases and vast and 
accurate sources of information. The change model is based on planned interventions 
in the organization’s structure and systems, which will set off the desired behavioral 
outcomes. This model enables more complicated strategic plans than the commander 
model, but also results in inflexibility for unanticipated events. The authors note that 
both of the two models may suffer from motivation problems. 
The collaborative model extends the power of strategic decision-making from the 
CEO to the organization’s top management team. This model helps to motivate the 
managers and also provides the strategic decision-making process with more 
information and cognitive capital. The problem of this model results from the fact that 
more decision-making implies more politics and conflicts of interest, which may 
mean less rationality. Bourgeois and Brodwin note that the collaborative model works 
best in complex environments where it is impossible for the CEO to know everything. 
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The cultural model is based on molding the organization’s culture to ensure the 
acceptance of a shared vision. This model is based on the participation of all 
organizational members in decision making directed towards perpetuating the vision. 
The main problem of this model is the vast amount of time it requires. It also 
presupposes an intelligent and responsible workforce. 
Taking into account the problems and strengths associated with the former four 
models, the authors suggest a fifth model called the crescive model. In this model, the 
members of the organization create the strategic decisions in a bottom-up process. 
The role of the CEO is to act as judge and premise-setter and ensure an organizational 
context (structure, systems and culture) that will promote openness and innovation. 
The crescive model offers to make full use of the knowledge and effort of 
organizational members in the strategy process, encouraging participation. It bears a 
close resemblance to Hamel’s (2000) notion that every organizational member should 
be a strategic revolutionary, promoting strategic leads to the top management. 
The five models offered by Bourgeois & Brodwin can be categorized through the 
stance assumed by the CEO. She acts as the sole rational actor in the commander 
model, as an architect in the change model, as the coordinator of the top management 
team in the collaborative model, as a coach for the whole organization in the cultural 
model, and as a premise setter and judge in the crescive model. 
Many authors note that the top management role is not monolithic and universal, but 
is contingent on context and content issues in the vein of Pettigrew (1987). Nutt 
(1983) argues that implementation style and top management role depend on internal 
and external context. He identifies three types of management roles in 
implementation: unilateral, manipulative and delegated. The management style 
depends on both the organization’s internal and external context. Quinn (1978) has 
developed a generic model of implementation in his logical incrementalism approach. 
While the model suits multiple contexts, it is built upon a succession of several steps 
that call for different orientations from the top management in different stages, e.g. 
need sensing, legitimizing, gathering support, etc.  Waldersee & Sheather (1996) on 
the other hand emphasize the effect on the type of strategy that is implemented in 
managerial actions. Their study demonstrates that innovative strategies involve more 
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participative leadership actions, whereas conservative strategies seem to indicate more 
of a top-down approach. 
Some research has been conducted into top management roles in terms of group 
member roles in top management teams. Belbin (1981, 1993) presented a 
classification of such roles, following the use of psychometric tests. Belbin states that 
managers have roles in management team situations distinct from their functional 
roles. Belbin distinguishes the following nine12 team roles: 
o Plants are creative, yet ignore details.  
o Resource investigators are explorative and enthusiastic, yet overoptimistic. 
o Coordinators are clear and mature, good chairpersons, who may be regarded 
as manipulative. 
o Shapers are pressure-driven and dynamic, yet may hurt other people’s 
feelings. 
o Monitor evaluators make accurate judgments and think strategically, but 
lack the drive to inspire others - and may be too critical. 
o Team workers are co-operative and diplomatic, yet indecisive in tough 
situations. 
o Implementers may be trusted to turn ideas into actions, but are somewhat 
inflexible.  
o Completers are scrupulously conscientious and precise in their work, yet 
they are also prone to nitpicking. 
o Specialists provide hard-to-find knowledge but tend to overlook the big 
picture.  
Belbin noted that it was fairly typical for a manager to adopt one or two roles and 
perform them fairly consistently. The problem of an exposition such us Belbin’s to 
this kind of an inquiry is that his model is rather static in nature. Being collected by 
psychometric tests, the data presents a static situation, the members of the group being 
unable to modify their roles to a greater degree. This thesis, on the other hand, relies 
on the central notion of the theory of structuration that an agent is knowledgeable of 
                                                
12 There were eight in his original study (1981) – the ninth was added in later (1993). 
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the social structures she is in and that she is capable of monitoring her role and 
changing it.   
The notion of performing different roles in different contexts is nicely portrayed in a 
study done by Schultz (1991). She studied the radically different contextual work 
settings of a group of managers in a Danish ministry. Her main proposition is that 
members of an organization often have to switch between different, disconnected 
symbolic domains in their work settings. She cites the conflicting roles of managers as 
monks (doing their administrative tasks), fire fighters (in crisis situations) and 
disciples (for the politically chosen minister) as examples of having to fluctuate 
between symbolic domains. 
Belbin discussed manager’s roles in teams. Mintzberg (1973) conducted a 
groundbreaking study on the everyday activities of single managers, which challenged 
many classical, rationalist managerial role models. Mintzberg conducted his research 
by following the managers as they went about their daily businesses. He categorized 
the ten roles he discovered to three groups: interpersonal, informational and 
decisional.  
Interpersonal roles 
o Figurehead role: the handling of symbolic and ceremonial functions 
for an organization. 
o Leadership role: the social aspect to managerial work.  
o Liaison role: the development of information sources inside and 
outside the organization. 
Informational roles 
o Monitor role: seeking and receiving information 
o Disseminator role: dissemination of the received information 
o Spokesperson role: dissemination of the received information outside 
the organization 
Decision roles 
o Entrepreneurial role: initiate projects and identify the need for change. 
o Disturbance handler role: solve conflicts, etc. 
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o Resource allocator role 
o Negotiator role: represent the organization in interacting with 
outsiders.  
It is easy to believe Mintzberg has managed to shed light on the descriptive element 
of managerial activity. Mintzberg’s research revealed a fragmented daily routine full 
of interruptions, heavy on meetings and verbal communication. While the method 
Mintzberg used is sensitive at the microsociological level of analysis, his 
categorization of role positions the manager fluctuates between during daily life is 
rather functionalistic: based on roles that are official organizationally accepted 
functions of an executive, forming a static hierarchy. Trujillo (1983) criticizes this 
static nature of managerial roles and notes that, instead of a categorization, it would 
be more suitable to assume a performative stance towards the roles, describing unique 
contexts in which the roles are performed. Mintzberg’s categorization does not 
illuminate the manager’s viewpoint on what they were doing, the intent, context and 
symbolic element behind their actions.  
Pitcher (1997), a student of Mintzberg’s, continued the discussion on leadership roles 
into the dramatic context, as she claims. She studied a group of 15 CEOs and gathered 
observations from the peers, board members and direct subordinates, simultaneously 
acting as an insider (member of the board of directors). She groups the leaders into 
three archetypes: artists, craftsmen and technocrats. Their qualities are summarized in 
Table 4 below. 
Table 4. Leader archetypal roles by Pitcher (1997) 
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Pitcher argues that the three archetypes are constantly struggling for power. If one 
examines the attributes offered for the technocrat, one may suspect that Pitcher does 
not share much sympathy with the last of the three archetypes. She argues that 
organizations must protect themselves from technocrat hegemony. 
Pitcher presents an interesting case, yet like Mintzberg, she seems to treat the leaders 
as static objects, not dynamic subjects. While she does admit that real people never 
fully correspond to one archetype, she builds her case on individuals resembling one 
static archetype, and does not discuss how agents themselves reflect on their roles, or 
on how their roles may change. This is also reflected in her method: she bases her 
finding on the observations of others, not the reflections of the leaders themselves. All 
in all, I think Pitcher is aiming for a normative standpoint: “protect your organization 
from technocrat hegemony”. I think Giddens would pose the same critique of 
fatalistic roles to Pitcher that he poses both to the functionalists and Goffman.   
In order to form a pre-understanding of individual roles to suit my study of social 
positions in the strategy process, descriptive literature on roles is what is needed. That 
literature offers a few partial models, but not much. In classical management literature 
there is a multitude of prescriptive works describing ideal management roles – 
beginning with the Functions of an Executive by Barnard (1938). Indeed, the 
formulation of the right role for a manager was one of the first movements in 
organization studies (Hatch, 1997a). In classical strategic management literature, there 
was the emphasis on the vision of an entrepreneur (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel, 
1999). Hamel’s (2000) notion of strategic revolutionaries is an example of a later 
prescriptive model of roles in the strategy process. Mintzberg’s work on managerial 
roles stays, however, one of the few solely microsociological accounts of roles in 
organizations; of strategy there are none. 
Middle management roles 
Middle management is one area recognized as crucial for strategy in the last ten years. 
While many authors on strategic change (e.g. Quinn, 1992) view the middle 
management as a nuisance to be avoided and promote the flattest possible 
organizational structure, others view the middle management as an important 
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communicator between the management and the personnel, perhaps most notably 
Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) who speak of a middle-up-down management.    
There is not much research done on middle managerial roles in strategy processes. 
Floyd & Wooldridge are the authors who have been the most prominent champions of 
the topic. They (1992) have discovered four middle management activities in the 
strategy process. They conducted a large study of the activity of middle managers in 
25 organizations. The four activities they discovered were: 
Championing: justifying new programs, evaluating new proposals, searching 
for new opportunities, proposing projects to upper managers 
Facilitating: encouraging informal discussion, relaxing regulations to get new 
projects started, buying time for experiments, providing resources for trial 
projects 
Synthesizing: gathering information about the feasibility of new programs, 
communicating competitor activities, assessing changes in the environment, 
etc. 
Implementing: monitoring activities to support top management objectives, 
translating goals into action plans, translating goals into individual objectives, 
selling top management initiatives to subordinates. 
Floyd & Wooldridge (1994) argue that middle managers have on the one hand 
hierarchical influence both upward and downward in the organization, while on the 
other they have divergent and integrative cognitive influence. By this they mean that 
middle managers both mediate the messages from their superiors to the personnel, and 
vice versa, and they also both support information richness and meaning integration 
in different contexts. It is interesting to note that Floyd & Wooldridge’s hierarchical 
and cognitive influence are similar to the distinction I have drawn between power and 
sensemaking in organizational roles. 
Employee roles  
While there has been some discussion on middle management roles in strategy 
process, discussion on employee roles has been a virtual desert in terms of coverage 
of strategy research. Shrivastava (1986) argues that one of the implicit interests of 
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strategy literature has been the universalization of sectional interests and ideology, i.e. 
the interests of the top management. The failure of strategy authors to acknowledge 
their own ideological underpinnings is what Lyle (1990) refers to as the lack of 
reflexivity in the field. 
The field in which employee roles have been most explicitly discussed is leadership, 
in the discussion on followership. The importance of followership can be understood 
as soon as one understands that leadership is not a phenomenon centered on a single 
person, but a group of people. A leader will not accomplish what she is doing unless 
she gains somebody who is willing to follow. Kelley (1992) has studied followership, 
seeking to rid it of its unnecessarily negative connotations. He argues that 
followership is as important to organizational success as leadership and should be 
valued as such.  
Kelley argues that followers are not homogenous “sheep”, but sentient beings, who 
can possess many kinds of roles. He distinguishes five role-types, which he groups 
according to their positions on two dimensions: activity and independence. After 
interviewing both managers and personnel members, Kelley argues that the best 
followers are those who assume ownership of matters and are capable of independent 
freethinking. He calls them exemplary followers. According to Kelley, exemplary 
followers do not blindly conform to the will of their superiors, but are ready to stand 
up to their superiors. They seek to act in their organization’s best interest using their 
own ingenuity. Exemplary followers are not rebels, however. They are “deal makers, 
not deal breakers”. 
Alienated followers are freethinking followers, who, on the other hand are on the 
passive side. Alienated followers like to describe themselves as conscientious agents 
who have the integrity to honestly address negative issues concerning their 
organization. Their superiors describe them as troublemakers and cynics. Kelley 
suspects that alienated followers are often former exemplary followers who have been 
disappointed too often and lost interest in taking active action to correct the wrongs 
they perceive. Conformist followers are people who actively carry out orders but 
depend on other people to do their thinking. They are the “yes people” of 
organizations, who get stuck if they do not get the guidance they need. They do not 
want to raise trouble but wish to be model citizens. Passive followers lack the same 
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initiative the conformist followers lack, but do not have any drive in carrying out their 
assignments either. 
Kelley’s fifth group of followers is constituted by pragmatist followers who are the 
mediocre performers in both thinking and acting. They do not want to be noticed, so 
they carry out their tasks inconspicuously, and not with any particular enthusiasm. 
They are mediocre both in terms of activity and independence. 
It is important to remember that followership, just as leadership, is a phenomenon 
present in collectivities, not individuals. Hughes, Ginnett & Curphy (1999) note that, 
for example, the passivity of passive followers is caused primarily by the social 
system they are in, not their personal characters. I think notions such as exemplary 
followership are largely cultural – it is contingent on organizational culture on what 
kinds of issues one can bring up, and in what manner. Some organizational cultures 
are readier to accept criticism, while others even regard criticism as a sign of 
disloyalty. I don’t think there is any single way of demarcating ‘acts of rebellion’ and 
‘standing up for what is right’.   
The discussion on followership activity and independent thinking is closely related to 
the discussion of extra-role behaviors. Dyne, Cummings & Parks (1995) define them 
as  
“behavior which benefits the organization and/or is intended to benefit the 
organization, which is discretionary and which goes beyond role-expectations.” 
The authors group organizational citizenship behaviors, pro-social organizational 
behavior, whistle-blowing and principled organizational dissent under the conceptual 
roof of extra-role behaviors. Their definition of extra-role behaviors implicates a 
functionalist conception of role, according to which role is identified with an official 
role such as job description. Kelley’s exemplary followers would seem to be prone to 
extra-role behaviors of all of the four kinds.  
One notion becomes clear in the short review of literature on roles in the strategy 
process: there is a limited number of empirical data on the subject and that data is 
very biased toward management and with some reference to middle management. 
Looking at the various texts on roles, there has been much discussion on managerial 
roles in general, some discussion on roles in the strategy process at the managerial 
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and middle management level. Discussion of personnel-level roles in strategy 
processes has been nonexistent. I have tried to find other sources to compensate for 
this. The roles discussed in this section will serve to reflect the social positions 
discovered in the data. 
3.7 Individual positions in the strategy process: a 
summary of the two encounters with theory 
Before I move into describing my research design, a quick summary of the two 
encounters with theory is in order. The first encounter left me with the theory of 
structuration as a link between the individual and the strategy process. The second 
encounter integrated the theory of structuration with sensemaking notions as well as 
the notion of discourse as a strategic resource. From this combination, the core 
dimensions of sensemaking, power and activity were extracted and used in concert 
with distinctions arising from the data to create a schema for analyzing individual 
social positions. Social positions were also explored through a review of literature on 
roles in the strategy process as well as organizational roles in general. The concept 
role was widened to the concept social position to enable individual reflection of her 
social position as required by the notion of knowledgeability in the theory of 
structuration. 
My two encounters with theory are visualized in Figure 5 as two independent paths, 
the first moving from strategy toward the individual, and the second moving from 
individual towards strategy. Both of the paths can be seen converging in the theory of 
structuration, with the second path identifying a target within that theory, laying the 
foundation for my research question.  
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WITH THEORY  
Figure 5. Two encounters with theory 
The research question set for this thesis was defined as: 
In what ways can an individual agent be socially positioned in an organizational 
strategy process? 
I have explicated a theoretical foundation, based on structuration theory, linking an 
individual agent and the strategy process with the concept social position.  
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4. Intermission: Encountering the data 
My data consist of the text from a set of 301 semi-structured interviews, varying from 
one to two hours in length. The interviews were conducted as a part of the STRADA 
project in the Laboratory of Work Psychology and Leadership of the Helsinki 
University of Technology. The objective of the STRADA project is to study and 
enhance strategy implementation in Finnish organizations in the knowledge and 
service sectors. The interviews were conducted by four researchers13. I conducted 76 
interviews. The use of a semi-structured interview outline enabled the collection of a 
large, relatively coherent, mass of interview data, while nevertheless enabling the 
interviewee to actively address selected topics within the theme of the strategy 
process. Since strategy implementation is an important, yet an often neglected and 
poorly understood phenomenon (Alexander, 1985; 1991; Beer & Eisenstat, 1996; 
2000; Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984; Noble, 1999), an exploratory mindset was 
preferred. As we started to look through the data for an initial analysis, we soon 
realized the material was rich enough to support all our PhD dissertations – especially 
because our interests were varied. 
I had realized early on that I was mainly interested in the individual level of analysis. 
I started to read the data, both to find out what questions I wanted to explore, as well 
as what questions the data answered best. The first question to arise concerned 
collective intention: did strategy exist in the individuals as a collective intention of 
some sort? As I read theory concerning collective intention, I started to realize that to 
regard strategy as a collective intention in organizations simplified the phenomenon. 
Returning to the data, I realized that what the individuals were discussing in relation 
to strategy were their roles in the strategy process – or the lack of them. Returning to 
theory, I discovered the literature on structuration and found that satisfying. My 
research question, In what ways can an individual agent be socially positioned in an 
organizational strategy process? came to take form. 
The paradox that in order to come up with good questions you actually have to have 
knowledge about answers was classically formulated by Plato in Meno (1983). While 
                                                
13 Petri Aaltonen, Heini Ikävalko, Saku Mantere and Mari Ventä 
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the theoretical roots of my research question have been elaborated in the first two 
chapters, the actual process in which the research question came to be realized was a 
dialectical process, in which I searched for the correct question while I was 
simultaneously searching for the answer. I became interested in social positions as I 
heard, figuratively speaking, what the data and theory were discussing about. While 
the traditional style of scientific writing often poses the research question as if it were 
determined as an a priori issue, I have found that good questions can usually be 
discovered only after you have immersed yourself in the data and theory. 
4.1 Phenomenology as paradigm 
The meta-theoretical frame in which the theory section of the thesis is built is the 
theory of structuration. According to Giddens (1984), the theory of structuration 
accounts for four different types of sociological inquiry, representing different levels 
of analysis: (1) hermeneutic elucidation of frames of meaning, (2) investigation of 
context and form of practical consciousness (the unconscious), (3) identification of 
bounds of knowledgeability, and (4) specification of institutional orders. This thesis 
corresponds to the first category, being intent on understanding individual frames 
from which the link between the individual and the strategy process can be 
understood.   
The hermeneutical elucidation of frames of meaning is a phenomenological type of 
inquiry in social science (Schutz, 1967). The overall emphasis of such an approach is 
the notion that the individual Lifeworld is placed at the center of attention. As Husserl 
(1999: 353) described this emphasis in the larger frame of the philosophy of science: 
 “But now we must note something of the highest importance that appeared even as 
early as Galileo: the surreptitious substitution of the mathematically constructed world 
of idealities for the only real world, the one that is actually given through perception, 
that is ever experienced and experienceable – our everyday life-world.”  
The Lifeworld consists of those phenomena nearest to the knowledgeable subject: her 
personal schemas, values and affect, as they exist prior to any idealization into formal 
models and theories. I am sympathetic towards the symbolic interactionist tradition in 
social science, according to which individuals construct society (Berger & Luckmann, 
1967) and themselves in linguistic interaction (Mead, 1934; Blumer, 1969). As naïve 
as it may sound, strategy processes become what people make them to become.   
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The focus of study in this thesis is the individual, and the data set consists of 
individual interview texts. This may raise a question as to whether this research 
design corresponds to symbolic interactionism, according to which meaning is 
essentially socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). I do not dispute this in 
any way, but do argue that the knowledgeable subject is capable of reflecting her 
social position as one central expert to this phenomenon. It is by no means the whole 
picture of the phenomenon – another picture could be obtained through group 
discussions or observation of social behavior – but the picture the elucidation of 
frames of meaning approach prescribes. The emphasis on the individual in part no 
doubt reveals my suspicion towards social cognition as a holist phenomenon, even if 
there have been some promising accounts lately (e.g. Hutchinson, 1995; Weick & 
Roberts, 1993). While I do admit that the social world regulates and affects cognition, 
and that cognition is at least partly linguistic (Fodor, 1975), language being essentially 
social (Wittgenstein, 1951), I still forcefully argue that thinking is something done by 
an individual, not a group. 
Therefore, I think along the lines of Harré & Secord (1972), who regard individual 
agents as the best source of information in the quest to elucidate the subjective frames 
of reference organizational members attach to the strategy process. The 
knowledgeable individuals can elucidate the interpretation horizons (Gadamer, 1993) 
they perceive from within the strategy process. This thesis also relies on the notion of 
narrative knowing, according to which there are two forms of having knowledge: the 
scientific-nomological and narrative. The latter form corresponds to the individual 
Lifeworld and is therefore of essential importance to phenomenological social 
science. Narrative knowing is a form of knowledge that consists of memories of 
issues/events, structured in narrative form (Polkinghorne, 1988; Bruner, 1996; Taylor, 
1992). 
The phenomenological approach described above also has implications for my 
relationship with background variables. I regard them as significant only when the 
interviewee reports them as such in the text. This applies to issues such as formal 
positions, educational background, age and gender. Formal positions would no doubt 
in many cases be a basis of analysis. This thesis is not about formal positions, 
however. I don’t think it will be a great revelation to say that managers more often 
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than personnel members feel that they are able to influence strategies. I will mention 
official positions when the interviewees mention them. I will not structure my 
approach according to official positions, however. My interest is the phenomenon of 
social position in the strategy process, not the function of an individual in the strategy 
process. 
In practice, while reading the interview texts, I tried my best to avoid making 
judgments about the accounts individuals provided of their social positions. I did not, 
for example, try to reason whether an individual had grounds for complaining about 
lacking possibilities of voicing her opinions, whether she really understood the 
strategy if she claimed to know it (i.e. I judged by criteria external to her account of 
understanding it perfectly well), or whether she was justified in being a cynic. The 
approach I took lays no blame and does not seek a reality outside the accounts. This is 
due to my conviction that knowledgeable agents are the primary source of information 
when trying to comprehend their social positions in a phenomenological framework. 
The pragmatist/managerialist notion that there is an official organizational reality 
against which individual claims can be measured is a siren song often tempting and no 
doubt useful in many other types of inquiry. Indeed, organizational functioning in 
many senses would be impossible without a belief in such an ontological notion. 
Furthermore, the interviewees in my data set no doubt discussed issues from their 
particular frames of reference. No doubt they used power in their accounts – power to 
make reality seem they way they liked it. The Foucauldian notion that power cannot 
be escaped is central here, however: for the researcher to resort to a seemingly value-
neutral frame will only result in the normalization of managerialism or some other 
ideology. The risk of doing just this is emphasized by many authors (Hardy, Palmer & 
Phillips 2000; Knights & Morgan 1991; Lilley, 2001; Shrivastava, 1986; Whipp, 
1996). While an approach such as this does not free itself of power, it represents a 
larger variety of voices than many other approaches.  
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4.2 Data 
The characteristics of the data from 301 interviewees are portrayed in Table 5 below. 
The level of operative personnel forms the largest group, corresponding to the lack of 
research done on this topic. Middle managers are also well represented due to similar 
reasons. The organizations studied were mainly professional service organizations, 
including eight companies from finance, insurance, retail and telecommunications 
sectors plus four government or municipal organizations. The educational background 
of the interviewees reflects this emphasis. This was intended since we wanted to 
concentrate on organizations in which the employees had a component of independent 
decision making in their daily work. The size of the organizations or the 
organizational units14 under study was 100 to 500 employees. 
Table 5. Description of the interview sample. 
Personnel group N  Organization type N 
Operative personnel 179  Public organization 100 
Middle management 83  Public firm 74 
Top management 39  Private organization/firm 127 
     
Tenure with the organization N  Education N 
less than 2 yrs 39  No professional education 33 
2-10 years 94  Vocational education 121 
over 10 years 168  University 145 
   Not known 2 
 
The interviewees were chosen at random, ensuring, however, that different tasks, 
work groups, and departments were represented equitably. The interviews were 
conducted in privacy, in most cases in a meeting room of the particular organization. 
The duration of the interviews ranged from one to two hours. At the beginning of each 
interview, the researcher told the interviewee about the purpose and the 
                                                
14 If the organization to be studied was larger than 500 people, an organizational unit consisting of 100-
500 members was chosen as the area of study. 
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confidentiality of the interview. The interviews were tape recorded with the 
interviewees’ approval, and fully transcribed. 
The same basic interview outline was used in all case organizations. One major source 
of variation was the introduction of a strategic theme in the interview outline. The 
strategic theme was a strategic concept or an objective selected from the strategy of 
each individual organization. The criteria for the strategic theme in each organization 
were: (1) it had to be central to the organization’s strategy, (2) it had to have an 
(actual or intended) effect on as many organizational members as possible, and (3) it 
had to have been officially communicated recently. The strategic theme was chosen in 
association with representatives of the organization, keeping in mind the goal of 
reaching organizational members whose daily activities are not ordinarily regarded as 
‘strategic’, as the actual terminology of strategy is often foreign to the personnel 
members. 
Some further variations were made to the interview outlines for top managers, middle 
managers and personnel members. The top management and middle management 
were questioned more thoroughly on strategic concepts, asking for definitions, etc. 
These variations in interview outlines result from different interests within the four 
researchers, yet the additional questions to top and middle managers do concern the 
social positions of the interviewees, the topic of this thesis. The interview outlines for 
personnel, middle management and management can be found in Appendix 1. An 
extract of the interview outline is presented in Figure 6 below. 
EXTRACT OF INTERVIEW OUTLINE / OPERATIVE EMPLOYEES 
(The underlined terms are tailored according to the theme in each organization) 
1. Have there been any changes in your work lately? What kind of changes? 
2. How well do you know the strategy process of the organization? 
3. How do you participate in the strategy process (Reference to the strategy process diagrams) 
4. Do you consider your abilities sufficient for participating in the strategy process? 
5. What is the strategic theme in your organization in your view? 
6. Why is the strategic theme important for the organization? 
… 
15. How is the promotion of the strategic theme present in your work? Please provide an example.  
… 
17. Do you feel that you have been given a sufficient opportunity to influence goals associated with the 
strategic theme? (If not: how would you have wanted to influence them?) 
Figure 6. An extract of an interview outline 
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In addition to the interview texts, contextual data was gathered in the form of 
documents related to the organization’s strategy process: graphs, strategy documents, 
annual reports, goal definitions, memos, etc. These were used in forming a pre-
understanding of the strategic theme discussed with the interviewees.   
4.3 Grounded theory as an analysis approach 
As the topic of social positions in the strategy process is an unknown field, the 
exploratory stance and iterative methodology of the grounded theory approach 
seemed ideal as my research question started to form. The overall goal of this thesis is 
therefore to create theory in the sense of Glaser & Strauss (1967), i.e. “middle-range 
theory” (ibid.: 32) - not grand theory, nor theory of mundane details. My goal is to 
formulate substantive theory, the substance being individual social positions in the 
strategy process. While Glaser & Strauss claim that the grounded theory approach can 
be utilized in the creation of formal theory as well, I will not make any such attempt 
here. The strategy process, approached from the viewpoint of the knowledgeable 
individual, is a substantial area in need of exploration. My intention is to do just that. 
As the research question for this thesis started to form, the data had already been 
collected. Our interview outline remained relatively stable through the 301 interviews, 
i.e. little iteration was done during data collection (a few questions were added along 
the way; none were removed). At first glance this may seem like an unusual position 
from which to do grounded theory. The standard view of grounded theory research 
design in organization studies (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989) is conceived as an interplay 
between reality and the researcher, the researcher analyzing the data while collecting 
it, iterating her approach to data collection (e.g. her interview questions) as she 
progresses. My explorations began with a mass of text, already collected. I do not, 
however, see this as a problem, because the text itself is a rich source of information. 
The interview outline (see Appendix 1) is quite general, discussing the individual’s 
social position from various viewpoints. The mass of interview texts provides in itself 
much more information dealing with social positions than “necessary”. 
The interview outline was constructed in order to explore how agents at all 
organizational levels conceived organizational strategy. As I explored the interview 
text, I realized that what most interviewees were really discussing were their own 
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social positions. While my grounded theory approach started with a pre-set mass of 
data, the interpretive path could be chosen in a multitude of ways. In my case, 
choosing the path involved the actual explication of a research question. While Glaser 
& Strauss (1967) describe the data collection process, theoretical sampling as they 
call it, as a joint process of data collection, coding and analysis, they also note that the 
grounded theory can be done, for example, on library materials:  
“…[a cache of documents] can be regarded much like a set of interviews, done with 
either a sample of people or a representatives of different groups.” (ibid.: 167.) 
I regard my set of interviews as a cache of interview data, sampled from a variety of 
organizations, representing a wide variety of formal positions.   
Structure of the analysis process 
The interview data set consists of approximately 3000 pages of transcribed talk. How 
does one approach such a large mass of text? I read and re-read the data with the 
intent of letting the data speak for itself. As I had done in my exploration of theory in 
the first two chapters, I structured the analysis of interviews to three steps, or 
encounters, with the data. The units of analysis had to be rather large-grained in order 
for meaningful sensemaking to take place during analysis. More importantly, the 
actual phenomenon analyzed, i.e. the social position of the agent, is also a rather 
general issue that can be regarded as being embedded in a larger set of interview 
questions. 
In the first encounter with the data, I started out by reading the data with only some of 
my theoretical framework in place. The result of the first encounter was the creation 
of a three-dimensional schema for analyzing social positions. In the second encounter, 
this schema was put into use and descriptions written from the social positions 
discovered using the schema, while in the third, the social positions were compared, 
and similarities between them explored, with the aim of giving an overview of social 
positions in the strategy process. 
I held a different mindset in each encounter. In the first encounter, my mindset was 
conceptual, as I tried to discover a categorization to help make sense of the data. In 
the second, my mindset was emphatic (Patton, 1990), as I tried to understand what the 
individuals responding to different categories were trying to communicate about their 
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positions. In the third, my mindset was unifying, or delimiting as I tried to find 
commonalities in the various positions discovered in the second encounter. The three 
encounters are illustrated in Figure 7 below. 
Time 




-explicating the research question
-creating a schema for analyzing social positions
Second encounters with the data:
-emphatic mindset
-writing notes of each interview
-grouping the notes into social positions using the schema as a 
lens
-analyzing the positions using the notes, writing descriptions




-writing substantive theory 
 
Figure 7. The structure of the analysis process as three encounters with data 
Coding 
I followed the coding procedure that Glaser & Strauss (1967) refer to as the constant 
comparative method for generating theory. The authors describe their method as 
consisting of four steps: (1) comparing incidents applying to each category, (2) 
integrating categories and their properties, (3) delimiting the theory, (4) writing the 
theory. I formulated a three dimensional framework out of a large set of rough codes 
in the first encounter (steps 1 through 3). I tested the framework in order to 
understand the data in the second encounter, writing out the results (step 4). I explored 
the results and categories that had arisen, building a more general model of social 
positions in the third encounter, writing that one as an end result (steps 1 through 4). 
In a sense, I carried out the whole coding process twice, arriving at the model 
explicated in the third encounter. 
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I treated the texts as having been created by knowledgeable agents, as dictated by the 
theory of structuration. I attempted to unlock knowledge the agents possessed of their 
own social positions. The interview texts were read as accounts (Harré & Secord, 
1972) describing the agent’s conception of her social position in the strategy process. 
The analysis was narrative analysis in the sense that statements describing the agent’s 
social position were sought in association for the reasons the agents provided. This 
linking of description of events and their causes is the most basic definition of a 
narrative, given by Polkinghorne (1988). My narrative analysis approach consisted of 
finding reasons that agents gave for the themes they regard as essential to their social 
position. I concentrated on identifying recurrent themes (discourses) in each interview 
text, and structuring the texts as meaningful micro-narratives. In almost every 
interview, there were themes the interviewee mentioned again and again. The 
narrative approach did not involve a structuralist approach to analysis (e.g. Greimas, 
1983), i.e. I did not seek to find any sort of universal plotlines to the interviews aside 
from this rough microstructure of events and their causes. 
The narrative analysis was chosen instead of discourse analysis, because I wanted to 
identify individual accounts of social positions. I was not interested in the ways the 
agents constructed reality through the use of language, the goal usually set for 
discourse analysis (Hardy, 2001). Instead, I wanted to treat what the interviewees said 
as small stories regarding their positions, and compare these stories. Furthermore, the 
micro-narrative approach I adopted can be contrasted to content analysis, at least to 
the practice of content analysis common today, in which words and expressions are 
counted and coded (Schwandt, 1997). In an effort of understanding a large-grained 
concept such as a social position, traditional content analysis would not have helped 
me to “see the forest from the trees”.  
To summarize the chain of methodological choices that I made: first of all, a 
commitment to qualitative research was made by our research team as we chose semi-
structured interviews as the data-production method. This was due to the explorative 
nature of the research – there was not enough prior research to build hypotheses. I 
made a second commitment as I chose grounded theory as a basis of structuring the 
analysis process. The reason for this was again the exploratory nature of the topic, as 
well as the fact that a large mass of interview material could best be utilized using an 
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iterative approach. A third commitment was made as I chose narrative analysis as the 
lens through which I read the actual interviews. The primary motivation for this was 
that, as I read the interviews in the beginning of the iteration, narratives seemed to be 
the way the data could best be approached.  
The coding procedure in the second encounter thus ended in the categorization of the 
301 micro-narratives I had written in my notes into 20 social positions, using the 
schema I developed in the first encounter. In the third encounter I sought out 
commonalities and differences between the 20 social position descriptions, forming 
three main categories.  
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5. A schema for analyzing social positions. First 
encounters with the data 
One of my initial interests with this data was identifying and understanding 
individuals who were in opposition to the strategy process somehow, individuals I 
thought were strategic cynics (Mantere & Martinsuo, 2000). I started looking for them 
by looking for negative answers to isolated questions such as  “why is this strategic 
issue important for your organization”. When I started reading the complete interview 
texts, however, I noticed that there were all sorts of reasons for being in opposition 
regarding strategic issues, many of them idealistic rather than cynical. Besides 
deepening my conception of what cynicism meant, this realization also widened my 
interest to the whole range of social positions in the strategy process, not just the issue 
on cynicism. Instead of being a cynic, what did it mean to be a champion on the one 
hand, or a good citizen on the other? 
I read interview texts as complete, individual accounts. While analyzing the 
interviews I made individual notes about each interview. I recorded issues the 
interviewee reported as significant to her social position, as well as the reasons and 
explanations she provided for these issues. I was initially surprised to notice that most 
interviewees had a few recurring themes that ran through the whole interview, often 
related to her social position in some way.  I realized I could draw on these themes to 
build an interpretation of each interview as a micronarrative.  
I tried to let the data speak for themselves with few theoretical assumptions, but of 
course there were certain implicit theoretical interests and positionings that influenced 
me. Sensemaking was the theoretical lens in my masters thesis (Mantere, 2000) and 
through that work I became aware that an understanding of the strategy process 
demanded that sensemaking be supplemented with power issues. My initial interest in 
cynicism directed me to issues related to activity. I made sense of the three 
dimensions of influence, sensemaking and activity simultaneously by exploring 
theory – widening the field outwards from sensemaking and cynicism – and reading 
the interview texts. 
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As I read the interviews, I started to write notes. From the onset, I formed rough codes 
to account for the descriptions of social positions, paying close attention to those 
recurrent themes that were repeated in each interview. These themes often acted as 
reasons or ‘narrative twists’. I repeatedly went back to the codes, trying to identify 
commonalities between them, offering possibilities of delimiting the number of codes.  
Having read about a third of all the 301 interviews, I started to notice that a 
categorization scheme was starting to appear to order the interviews. I first noticed 
that my own reflections could be positioned in one of the three theoretical axes in 
Figure 8 below. These are the three central dimensions to social positions at which I 




Figure 8. Dimensions for analyzing social positions in strategy processes 
Then I noticed that the axes could be divided into three sections each. This happened 
when I thought about what the individuals were saying about their social positions in 
the strategy process in terms of the three axes. It then occurred to me that they were 
essentially either claiming that things were “all right” in the axis, or that there was an 
excess or scarcity. I started to think of the axes as personal “spheres” around the 
individual, which fit well, were too tight or cramped, or were too large.  
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5.1 The three spheres 
The sphere of sensemaking represents the individual’s description of her 
sensemaking as an agent in the strategy process. There are three sections on the axis, 
“too small”, “enough room” and “too large”. “Too small” means an account according 
to which sensemaking of strategy is hindered because there are not enough ‘cues’ to 
be extracted, from managerial communication, for example. In essence, this means 
that the agent reports that she is not allowed to make sense. A prototypical account 
would be one in which a personnel member feels she does not know the direction her 
organization is taking because it has not been revealed to her level. 
(Q1) “Sure, I have heard of [the strategy process]. But I guess… I guess we [the 
members of my unit] are not valued as much as others in this organization.  We are not 
getting enough information.” 15 
“Too large” means that there are simply too many cues or too little support for 
interpretation for successful sensemaking. In other words, the individual has failed to 
make sense of strategy or the strategy process.  
(Q2) “I am still in a developmental stage [within strategic planning], the field is so 
wide that all you really see is your own project […]” 
“Enough room” represents a situation in which the agent feels she has managed to 
form an understanding of strategy, where the sensemaking sphere ‘fits her’.  
(Q3) “Question: Are you familiar with this [strategy process diagram]? 
A: Yeah, very well.  
Question: How so?  
A: We have gone through it. 
Question: On the YT-board [cooperation board]? 
 A: Yeah, and also in my own group.” 
                                                
15 The quotations were translated to English. I tried my best to maintain the original character of the 
language. My translations were checked as a part of the language checking of this thesis. The 
quotations can be found in their original form in Finnish in Appendix 3.  While some may feel that this 
is unnecessary, I want to make my translations transparent to the readers fluent in Finnish and English. 
I feel this increases the validity of my claims.  
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The sphere of influence represents the individual’s conception of her possibilities of 
influencing issues she conceives as strategic. This axis stems from the dimension of 
power that was extracted from theory, as influence can be regarded as a specific form 
of power, being defined as “the ability to affect another’s attitudes, beliefs or 
behaviors (Huczynski 1996, 6)”. “Too small” a sphere of power represents an account 
in which the agent feels that the organization does not enable her to fulfill her role in 
the strategy process through carrying out meaningful actions. 
(Q4) “Question: Would you like to influence these [strategic objectives]? 
A: Sure, I would love to. I guess everybody has an opinion of how it [the strategic 
theme] should manifest itself at our unit, but of course I understand that there is a 
limit…. Of course you can’t have every member of the organization making strategy. 
But the objectives still come to me pretty much ‘given’ as they are.” 
“Too large” means that the agent feels that she has too much strategic responsibility to 
bear by herself. In many cases, the agents felt alone with too many decisions to make. 
(Q5) “[…] if a problem situation arises, I bet none of us will know where to look for 
answers […] I hope some guidelines will be written in the next few years at least […]” 
“Enough room” means that she is satisfied with her possibilities of influence.  
(Q6) “[…] we have quite a clear framework for action, at least I haven’t had any need 
to argue that it should be otherwise.” 
At this point, one theoretical concern has to be addressed. It must be remembered that 
sensemaking and influence are not separate issues, as was noted in the discussion of 
the link between power and knowledge (Section 3.3). The reason why they are 
presented as separate here is because this is a phenomenological account, in which the 
main emphasis is on the issues addressed by the interviewees. They often speak of 
these issues as separate. Along the journey, this concern was kept in mind while 
conducting analyses. For example, if an agent describes a situation in which enough 
cues are not provided for sensemaking about the organization to succeed, she may not 
be able to explicate the ways in which she would like to influence the strategy 
process. This is a situation in which care has to be taken when interpreting the 
interview text as to whether the agent would have wanted a larger sphere of influence 
or not. 
A schema for analyzing social positions. First encounters with the data 
 75
The sphere of activity consists of three sections, “cynic”, “citizen” and “champion”. 
A cynic is a person who communicates a conviction that it is not worthwhile to 
influence even one’s own work in order to act as a part of the strategy process (e.g. 
execute strategy, influence strategy creation).  
(Q7) “Sure you can give feedback, tell them that this and this doesn’t work but what 
then? It won’t do any good. I can tell you right now that there won’t be any real goals 
for this year, no way.” 
The word ‘cynic’ has its roots in the ancient Greek cynics. The two cynics most often 
mentioned are Antisthenes and Diogenes of Sinope. The cynics held individual 
wisdom to be the highest virtue, and were often known to question and criticize the 
values of the majority, as well as laws and customs (Copleston, 1962). Cynicism 
nowadays is not quite what it used to be 2500 years ago. While the ancient cynics 
were known as relentless critics, the concept of cynicism nowadays has the mark of 
inherent pessimism and distrust. Dean et al. (1998) have defined organizational 
cynicism in the modern way, as “… a negative attitude toward one’s employing 
organization, comprising three dimensions: (1) a belief that the organization lacks 
integrity; (2) a negative affect toward the organization; and (3) tendencies to 
disparaging and critical behaviors toward the organization that are consistent with 
these beliefs and affect.” Cynicism may be observed in negative feelings, such as 
frustration and hopelessness, towards strategic changes (Dean et al., 1998, Reichers et 
al., 1997; Wanous et al., 2000). While cynicism is often attributed a negative bias, 
many authors concur that cynics may also represent the "voice of conscience" for the 
organization and, thereby, question the suitability of poor strategic choices in the 
organizational context (Dean et al., 1998; Cutler, 2000). 
A citizen communicates a general conviction of acting as a part of the strategy 
process, but does not offer any reports on influencing the organization in strategic 
issues transcending her own immediate working sphere. 
(Q8) “Question: What motivates you in implementing [a strategic theme]? 
A: Well, the [shareholders] have set given us… this principle, and if you cannot act 
according to their wishes, well that’s that […]” 
As noted in the beginning of the section, I wanted to widen the notion of activity from 
the negative framework of cynics to cover neutral and positive frameworks as well. I 
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started looking from the interview texts and soon added the notions of citizen and 
champion to illustrate other positions towards the organization. Organizational 
citizenship behavior (OCB) is a topic of a large set of discussions, which are 
summarized by Podsakoff et al. (2000) to include the following themes: (1) helping 
behavior, (2) sportsmanship, (3) organizational loyalty, (4) organizational compliance, 
(5) individual initiative, (6) civic virtue, and (7) self development. In this sense, 
organizational citizens would seem to represent anything that cynics are not. While 
the list is a faithful categorization of what has in fact been written about OCB, I wish 
to narrow it down somewhat for my schema to be able to distinguish role types. I will 
adopt Bolino’s (1999) conception of organizational citizens as “good actors”, not 
“good soldiers”. Bolino argues that OCB is present for reasons of impression 
management affecting behaviors as much as altruistic motives. This reflects well on 
Goffman (1959) who notes that impression management is one of the main forces 
mediating social action.  
Champions, on the other hand, are people who report on actively trying to influence 
the larger sphere, e.g. other people’s opinions, larger organizational systems, etc. in 
order to act as strategic agents. 
(Q9) “I tend to “wake people up” to notice that there are problems [inhibiting the 
realization of the strategic theme]. Well, if you put it nicely, that is.”  
The notion of strategic champions is something that is often present in normative 
literature on strategic management and leadership. Kotter (1996) emphasizes the need 
of visionary leaders to engage a group of champions spread out in different parts of 
the organizations. Hamel (2000) addresses the champions themselves, arguing that no 
matter at what organizational level or function, anybody can, and should be a strategic 
revolutionary. Strategic champions are people who are actively showing initiative in 
bringing about changes in the organizations. This corresponds to point (5) in the list 
of OCB above, yet I wish to draw a line between actively developing one’s own work 
and competencies and seeking to influence the organization on a larger scale, 
affecting other organizational members as well. 
Champions can, in a sense, be regarded as a special subset of organizational citizens. I 
wish to make this distinction, however, because it was a distinction that arose from 
the data itself. There was a clear distinction that I started to notice when I was reading 
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through the interviews. As Bolino would predict, many people portrayed an image of 
themselves as good citizens performing their duty, but there was a clear distinction 
between individuals who communicated a passion to change the organizations in 
issues they regarded as strategic. 
I found it illuminating to notice, both in the interview texts and in the literature, that 
being active and disagreeing are orthogonal issues. A champion may disagree with 
what she regards as official strategy and seek to actively influence the strategy 
process to make other people see the correct direction – indeed this is what Hamel 
(2000) is proposing that being a revolutionary is all about. A cynic, on the other hand, 
may agree with official strategy, but regard it as irrelevant and unworthy of attention. 
In literature, this distinction has been acknowledged by the distinction of the 
phenomena of cynicism and dissent (Dooley & Fryxell, 1999). 
5.2 The schema 
The schema for analyzing data is depicted in Figure 9 below. It represents the three 
spheres of activity, sensemaking and influence, each divided into three subsections as 
described above. The sphere of activity differs somewhat in its logic from the other 
two spheres in the sense that the concept activity is something that moves from the 
agent to its environment, whereas the influence and sensemaking axes represent a 
relation to the opposite direction, i.e. how the environment affects the agent. On the 
activity axis, the middle section does not represent an ideal situation as in the two 
other axes, but more like a compliant situation. 
The schema was born at the intersection of two ‘paths’, a path of theoretical reflection 
with the goal of linking the individual and the organization, and the path of studying 
the interview texts, trying to understand how the people regard themselves as agents 
in the strategy process. The theoretical path has been described in the text of the first 
two chapters. 
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Sphere of sensemaking











Figure 9. Schema for analyzing social positions in the strategy process 
The schema will form the structure for the exposition of different social positions in 
the next encounter with the data. I have categorized the accounts using the schema 
and will discuss to length what the different social positions look like.  
Secondary coding 
Two steps were taken to assure the reliability of my coding. First of all, in a relatively 
early stage of the process as the schema was still forming, there was a session in the 
STRADA team in which I asked each of my three researcher colleagues to read three 
interview texts I had chosen in their totality. We then discussed our impressions of 
them. I presented the micronarratives I had written and asked my colleagues to 
comment on them. This brought some unexpected questions, helping me to tighten 
some of my coding principles. I had to e.g. explicate the “too large” category of 
sensemaking more fully, because my colleagues had trouble understanding what I 
meant by it in the context of one of the interviews we discussed.  
Since the analysis was done in a grounded theory setting, a typical interrator 
reliability testing was not possible - I could not expect a second interpreter to follow 
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me through the whole analysis process. Furthermore, the goodness of grounded theory 
cannot be measured using standard criteria for validity or realiability, but by using 
such criteria as coherence, consistency, plausibility, usefulness, and potential for 
further elaboration (Dougherty, 2002). It should also be noted, that the coding was 
based on micronarratives, i.e. was not done using any mechanical set of content 
analysis criteria. With narratives, the interpretive, subjective element is always there, 
which I think is also one of sources for richness for this approach (Boje, 2001).  
The coding of the interviews using the schema in Figure 9 was the only part of the 
research process in which relatively standardized coding guidelines could be written 
to facilitate secondary coding. This approach is not problem-free, however. I am 
somewhat skeptical about the possibility of creating a set of guidelines to fully 
account all the logic I followed and created during my own coding process. 
Furthermore, even if I could do that, each secondary coder is bound to interpret the 
guidelines against her own background. There is a certain element of insight that you 
develop with a pool of data, specific to that data, as you get deep into the data. 
Secondary coders with little experience with the data cannot be expected to be able to 
follow the same line of reasoning.     
However, especially because this research is a dissertation, I did see the need to 
convince the reader about the reliability of my coding, using some sort of secondary 
coding. Therefore, in a later stage of the research process, when the third encounter 
was almost written, I conducted a test involving three colleagues as secondary 
coders.16 I wrote a set of coding guidelines and asked them to read a number of 
interviews I had chosen at random17 for them. The coding guidelines can be found in 
appendix 2. Since all three of the coders had read my research drafts, I made sure I 
had not quoted any of the chosen interviews in my drafts.  
The coding of each interview involved three orthogonal judgments, i.e. coding the 
sensemaking, influence and activity spheres. This means that both the secondary 
coders and I had made thirty (3 judgments / interview, times 10 interviews) judgments 
                                                
16 Researchers Petri Aaltonen and Virpi Hämäläinen from the STRADA project both read three 
interviews. Researcher Jouni Virtaharju from the Laboratory of Work Psychology and Leadership read 
four interviews.  
17 I utilized the MS Excel random function.  
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that were compared. The overlap between judgments between the secondary coders 
and me was 63 % (19 out of 30 judgments).  
I reviewed the notes made by each secondary coder and discussed their findings with 
them. I paid special attention to the discrepancies, asking them why they had made 
those codings the way they did. The reasons for discrepancies could be related to the 
following four categories:  
1) Bias created by small sample size. The secondary coders reported to comparing the 
interviews, trying to find variances to help them with coding. Indeed, this was what I 
did when I was creating the schema and doing the coding. The difference was that I 
had 301 interviews to compare, while the secondary coders had three or four. The 
activity category seemed to be especially vulnerable here - it was difficult for the 
secondary coders to make judgments discerning championship from citizenship, for 
instance. 
2) The coding guidelines did not answer all the questions related to their application. 
The problem here was that the guidelines were written after I had done the coding. It 
may not have been able to account for the categories in their richness, causing the 
guidelines to be a source for misunderstanding.           
3) The fuzziness of some interviews in relation to some categories. In some cases I 
agreed with the secondary coder that the categorization was not clear-cut. These 
categories were typically such that the interviewee had made very few comments of 
them, leaving room for speculation.  
4) In one judgment (of the 30) I would have been willing to alter my initial judgment 
after hearing the analysis of the secondary coder. In this case I noted that I had been 
too eager to interpret what the interviewee had to say, which I felt was not warranted 
in the end.  
The results of the secondary coding showed that that there is some vagueness in some 
coding instances. The reader is invited to challenge my reasoning as I proceed to give 
descriptions of the twenty positions in the next chapter. Too much emphasis cannot be 
placed on the secondary coding procedure, however. In a grounded theory setting the 
interpreter develops a relationship with her data, which cannot be fully mechanized 
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and operationalized. She develops tacit knowledge, the explication of which is not 
fully possible in the form of procedural guidelines. I have reviewed all my codings 
after reading all the 301 interviews, while the secondary coders had to rely on a few 
interviews and a coding schema, which they had to interpret to a certain degree.  
The secondary coding process, especially the discussions with the secondary coders, 
gave some assurance that the coders generally read the interviews in the same manner. 
This was due to the finding that the coders noted that there was usually one dimension 
that arose as most significant in the interview text. This corresponded with my 
analysis that there was generally one main issue the interviewee wanted to address 
concerning her social position. It was notable that the level of agreement between the 
second coders and I was much higher in these ”dominant” categories. 




6. Champions, citizens, cynics. Second encounters 
with the data 
After the schema had been built, I had to re-read those interviews I had already read 
in order to enable me to use the schema to categorize them. I also supplemented my 
interview notes concerning those interviews. I then went on to read the rest of the 
approximately 200 interviews, writing notes for each, and then categorizing the notes. 
I used the notes in association with the interview texts in determining to which of the 
27 possible categories in the schema (Figure 9) she belonged. The whole process took 
me approximately 6 months of part-time work, a rough estimate being 60 days of 
uninterrupted work. This was the most time-consuming part of the analysis process. 
My initial approach for understanding the individual accounts was emphatic, as I tried 
to follow the reasoning of the interviewees. I wrote a micronarrative of each 
interviewee, summarizing the story she had told. My notes were my primary source of 
data when I started writing accounts of the categories that were supported by data. I 
used quotations from the original interview texts to make my reasoning more 
transparent and to enliven the text. To assist both myself and the reader in 
sensemaking about the data, I also used quite a few tables as data displays (Miles & 
Hubermann, 1984). Some readers may find the number of tables a nuisance, and 
would argue that only the primary issues should be tabulated. My answer to this is 
that structuring issues through tabulation will help to keep my own thought process 
transparent to the reader, which is the one of the cornerstones of credibility in 
qualitative research (Patton, 1990). Twenty social position types in all were found in 
the data. The following chapter consists of accounts of all of them. The seven 
positions that did not find support in the data will be discussed later in the summary 
sections of champions, citizens and cynics. 
As I started to write the position descriptions, it soon became evident that there could 
not be a unified form in describing the positions, because the interviewees in different 
positions clearly addressed different kinds of issues when describing their social 
positions. Some interviewees clearly spoke of the kinds of responsibilities they 
thought they had in the strategy process, the kinds of aspirations they had and the 
kinds of actions they were involved in, corresponding to a variety of role descriptions. 




Other interviewees, however, did not discuss actions, responsibilities and aspirations, 
but instead gave a variety of accounts of why they were prevented from acting in the 
roles they would have wanted.   
As I sought to give a thick enough description of each social position, I had to 
characterize, within each position, the commonalities and variations between 
individual accounts. As agents in different positions had different types of factors 
distinguishing and unifying between them, no ‘template’ could be formed to act as a 
background for position descriptions. Some positions could be accounted for by 
giving a listing of role descriptions, while others had to be described by categorizing 
obstacles the agents felt they were facing as willing agents in the strategy process. 
I realize that the following section may be demanding to read at times because the 
position descriptions are structured differently. I will try to address the problem by 
keeping my reasoning as transparent as possible. To contribute to the transparency of 
the text I will start each position description with a summary of one micronarrative I 
have written of a member of that position. I will also display the data and my 
categorization principles in summary tables wherever possible. This is the stage in the 
thesis where the data will be let to speak in as many situations as possible, opening a 
variety of paths. I will seek to link the different paths in the third encounter. 
Each position description will also be supported by an illustration. I wish to stress at 
this point that the role of the illustrations is to help to begin the sensemaking of the 
reader, not to end it. While the illustrations are based on interviewee accounts, the 
reader must be careful not to let the picture narrow down how she reads the text, i.e. 
not to let the symbolism contained in the picture to overwhelm interpretation.  
6.1 Strategic champions 
A champion can be defined as ‘an ardent defender or supporter of a cause or another 
person’18. The group of strategic champions consists of those individuals who report 
activity on their part in terms of trying to influence strategic issues larger than their 
                                                
18 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. New York: Houghton 
Mifflin. 




own immediate sphere of work19. A champion is an individual who feels strongly 
about an issue or a set of issues she regards strategically important and reports taking 
action in trying to influence the organization to affect those issues. What makes an 
issue ‘strategically important’? In essence, those issues the individual regards as 
important for the organization at large: for its success, survival or completion of its 
mission. This definition excludes the promotion of such individualist issues such as 
individual pay and rewarding. Reports of taking action to develop one’s own 
immediate work do not suffice being a champion either.  
My analysis of strategic champions will consist of descriptions of each of the 
categories identified using the schema formulated in the first encounter (Figure 9).  
                                                
19 The concept of the sphere of work is somewhat complicated when reflected against different formal 
levels in organizational hierarchy. It can be argued that the operative personnel more often have 
spheres of work that do not include affecting other people and the organizational systems, whereas 
those of the top management often do include those issues. It is true that top managers are often 
supposed to be strategic champions. There is, however, no contradiction. The scheme I am offering 
does not seek to rule out issues determined by official position, but to treat them as a part of the whole 
that the individual social position is composed of.  





Excluded champion  
 
Interviewee1 is a male technical expert in a sales unit of a firm. He has a work history of over 
ten years in the organization, with a few years of full time tenure behind him. Confronted 
with the strategic theme chosen for his organization, he immediately recognizes it. He regards 
it as a very important because of the potential benefits for the customers, with whom he is in 
direct contact. He reports trying to come up with ways of implementing the theme in the sales 
unit, but feels he has not had the formal authority to really influence issues. He is also unsure 
of the functional relations within the unit, which increases his feeling of powerlessness in 
implementing the strategic theme. When asked to name issues that he would want to change if 
he could, he feels at a loss, trying very hard to identify something practical. He ends up 
dissatisfied with his inability to identify a real change area. The undeniable willingness to 
champion the strategic theme, coupled with the feeling of a lack of formal influence and 
knowledge, constitute the essential characteristics of an excluded champion. 
 
An excluded champion is an individual who feels strongly about an issue she regards 
strategic, yet feels excluded from the strategy process. She reports having too little 
information to make sense of strategic issues and is also unhappy about her 




possibilities of influencing the strategic issues she would like to influence. This 
doubled unhappiness has not, however, quenched her reported desire to affect the 
issues she wants to. 
How does she, then, go about in trying to accomplish the things she regards as 
important? One possible way is by using unofficial social networks. This option is 
open to those champions who have been in the organization for a longer period of 
time, long enough to form a sufficient number of personal relationships and make use 
of them by raising issues they regard as important. The unofficial connections these 
excluded champions described were typically horizontal in organizational hierarchy, 
but often spanning multiple functional units. People in customer relations could get 
their message through to people in production, etc. 
These individuals often pictured themselves as free agents, having enough experience 
to know how the organization really works, even if they had been excluded from the 
official strategy process. These individuals often conveyed an image of the “good old 
times” nearing an end, and also reported feeling their own influence diminishing as 
newer structures took over the old. 
One central demarcation line drawn by these individuals lies between some 
traditionally valued issue – e.g. caring for the customer or being thorough in one’s 
work – and newer structures and ways of working. The thing that makes these people 
champions is that they reported a genuine conviction that these traditional issues were 
central for the organization’s survival. As one senior organizational member 
described her concerns:  
(Q10) “It [the strategy process] does not seem natural to me. I only have some partial 
image of what is coming next from reading internal information bulletins and such 
things. Everything is fast nowadays, I think […] Our whole set of values has totally 
changed […] It is only money making the decisions at every turn”. 
Excluded champions who had had time to develop a personal social network for 
influencing issues had, in effect, created an “unofficial sphere” to replace the too 
small a sphere they perceived the official strategy process as offering.   
Those excluded champions who gave blame for the opacity of their organization 
usually did not have the possibility of building an unofficial sphere. They reported 
being something like lost ghosts in a complex machine, with few possibilities of 




influencing anything and little understanding of the roles they were expected to play 
in the strategy process. Such was the case of our interviewee1. Some of the 
interviewees reported that strategic issues are business secrets that are not revealed to 
people “without clearance”. Some felt that nobody took the responsibility of 
communicating where the organization was going. 
A typical reason that such excluded champions had for being champions was a 
perceived body of information they felt they possessed that would, if knowledge of it 
reached the right person, be beneficial to the organization on a larger level. Some 
organizational members close to the customer, such as our interviewee1, felt that they 
had an understanding of what the customer wanted that the decision-makers did not 
possess. Some even felt that they were more competent in defining objectives for their 
own work, that they had a more intimate understanding of the possibilities and 
challenges, than the managers making the decisions. One general message these 
excluded champions wanted to convey was to “get real”, usually directed at decision-
makers. 
All in all, these excluded information possessors often expressed a conviction that 
they should have more knowledge about the strategy process, both because they felt 
they needed the knowledge for completing their work successfully, and also because 
they felt they had something to contribute to the process. 
(Q11) “I think I should… or at least I want to know more [about the strategy process] 
and yes, I think I should have access to more information.” 
How did these excluded possessors of information go about trying to get their 
message heard? Solutions varied from trying to get a foothold on relevant projects, to 
representing one’s viewpoint in as many relevant project group meetings as possible 
and acting as an expert voice in different contexts. Another possibility was simply 
“going and telling the manager”, often underlined by emotional outbursts, such as 
described by one junior organizational member: 
(Q12) “[…] these balanced scorecards they send us…  well, this is the first one I have 
seen that you can actually take back and tell them that this and this really sucks. Until 
now we have had scorecards sent to us that were so altogether weird that you could not 
find one item in them that was connected to the real world…” 




The one connecting factor between these ways of trying to influence the organization 
in key issues was that no pre-set pathway to a solution existed. The excluded 
champion in an opaque organization reported having to find her own way, to 
improvise, or to “use force”, e.g. to use powerful rhetoric to twist the arm of one’s 
superior, etc. This is in strict contrast to the senior organizational members who had a 
stable channel through their informal social networks, discussed earlier in this section. 
In some cases, the interviewees reported having found no channel yet, yet they 
expressed a strong conviction to keep trying. 
Two general types of excluded champions would seem to have emerged. One is the 
social class of senior organizational members using their social capital in the form of 
unofficial networks; the other, the class of members in opaque organizations “ghosts 
in machines”, who feel they have the right and the potential to contribute to the 
strategy process. The two classes are summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6. Summary of excluded champions 
Class Characteristics Channel of influencing 
/ championing 
Typical message 
Senior Too small official sphere, 
compensated by a an unofficial 
sphere 
Unofficial social network E.g. “We are 
losing our values” 
Ghost Lost in a opaque organization, 
unconnected to the strategy 
process 
No pre-set channel, 
seeking a foothold in 
projects, trying to twist 
the arm of a superior, 
emotional outbursts 





Characteristics shared by the accounts of all excluded champions include firstly, the 
emphasis on the marginality of the agent’s personal position in the strategy process. 
Excluded champions often made comments about the stark demarcation between their 
personal position and the strategy makers, i.e. the top management. Secondly, all 
excluded champions communicated a conviction that they had something to 
contribute and thus regarded their marginal position in the strategy process as 
unjustified.  







Interviewee2 is a professional in a large public organization. Her work is heavily customer-
oriented, and she feels she has a large amount of freedom in her work. She feels passionate 
about the strategic theme of her organization, regarding it as a central component of her 
work. While she is quite well versed with the intricacies of implementing the strategic theme, 
the overall strategy process seems very far away. On the other hand, she feels that she is not 
provided with reasonable support from her organization in the form of guidelines on how to 
implement the strategic theme. She feels as if she were abandoned to cope with her own 
devices, a solitary decision-maker with too-large issues on her hands. The interviewee is 
simultaneously passionate about the strategic theme, isolated from the strategy process, and 
feels she has to make too-tough choices in her work, i.e. has too much power in her hands. 
This complex condition constitutes the social position I shall call the abandoned champion. 
 
Interviewee2 was the only interviewee to fall under the category of abandoned 
champion. The abandoned champion is therefore quite a rare condition – even though 




multiple individuals with very similar working conditions were interviewed, only one 
abandoned champion was discovered. The abandoned champion is a position in which 
a great responsibility is linked to an exclusion from the sphere of official strategy. 
This indicates a high level of independence in one’s work, linked to a high level of 
professional expertise. 
The abandoned champion was an individual who simultaneously felt she has had too 
little information about strategy and yet bore too great a responsibility over carrying 
out issues in her work that she deemed responded to strategy. Despite all of this she 
was trying to bring about fruitful changes in her organization. 
The abandoned champion felt that she was unaware of her organization’s strategy 
process, yet strongly echoed its main content in the description of her own goals. She 
felt that she had not had enough support to carry out the objectives set for her work, 
and even felt somewhat isolated and undervalued. 
She claimed to have no knowledge of the official strategy process of her organization 
and attributed this lack of knowledge to the notion that nobody had asked her to 
comment on it. She also reported a lack of time due to the challenging nature of her 
own work. Yet she felt she had enabled other people to work more efficiently by 
communicating the need she had encountered among customers, thus bringing about 
small changes in her organization. The changes she had brought about emphasized the 
same things emphasized in her organization’s strategy. 
The abandoned champion felt helpless in many aspects of achieving the objectives set 
for her work. She felt that the challenges were too great and that she could not have 
control of all the aspects of her work. Yet she reported having carried out many active 
attempts to meet the objectives. She felt that her organization's strategy did try to 
emphasize objectives by giving numeric guidelines, yet failed to do anything else. 
(Q13) “I guess I should read through the whole strategy document again. As much as I 
have read through it, I think it dictates that we should reach [a certain numeric 
objective]. I don’t know how we could do that.  How do we find the resources needed?” 
In essence, her complaint went beyond just complaining of a lack of resources and 
noted a deeper distrust in the whole goal-setting procedure. She felt that there was no 
real connection between the execution of strategy and the numeric objectives. She 




reported that this lack of connection reflected both the management’s lack of 
understanding of the real methods used for executing the strategy and a lack of 
organizational connection between the goal-setting and the resource allocation 
processes. 
As a result she had no great interest in official strategy statements but worked in 
bringing about changes she felt fruitful for better execution of strategy by inducing 
small organizational changes through political maneuvers, and finding new ways of 
reaching customers. 
From the structuration viewpoint (see Figure 3 in Section 3.3), the abandoned 
champion is an interesting position in which the individual has a legitimate position to 
act as a strategic agent, yet she is excluded from communication regarding 
organizational strategy on the macro level, and little or no organizational interest is 
centered on providing her with the facility to exercise power within the organization. 







Interviewee3 is a department head and member of a top management team in a public 
organization. Having served in his organization for a long time, he feels he has a very good 
hold on the organization’s strategy. He feels highly responsible for directing the organization 
into the right direction. At one point, he even comments that he “should be hanged” if he is 
not able to bring about the direction he sees as right. Interviewee3 is at odds with the official 
strategy process of his organization. He feels that the new management trends that have been 
implemented in the organization are clouding the real strategic issues, as every member of the 
organization is let to have her say in strategic matters. The top management team should sit 
down for a few days to decide on organizational strategy and that’s that. The problem is that 
there is dissent in the top management team on whether this is the right way to handle the 
strategy process. Interviewee3 has particular problems with one of his colleagues in the top 
management team who promotes a more participatory approach to strategy. The feeling of a 
good understanding of strategy, a feeling of responsibility for promoting the right strategy for 
one’s organization, combined with the feeling of lacking control in strategic matters, is what 
characterizes a discontent champion. 
The discontent champion has a clear issue she regards as strategic she would wish to 
change, yet is unable to do so since her sphere of influence is too small. The 




discontent champions in the interview text represented a variety of job descriptions, 
and so did the issues they wished to influence.  
A remarkable issue concerning the discontent champion is her willingness to give 
reasons for her successfully having made sense of the strategy. This is a specific 
feature of this social position, indicating that the discontent champion regarded her 
understanding of strategy as noteworthy. The reasons given involved referring to an 
elite position of some sort: being chosen to a planning group, being granted access to 
volatile strategic information after a recent promotion, having a strategically 
significant position, being the workers' union representative on a management board. 
Some discontent champions reported actively searching for information in order to 
make sense of organizational strategy. 
(Q14) “The policy of sharing information in this organization is rather hysterical… I 
read [the strategy] last week, I was granted access to read it on the Intranet because I 
am [names an official title] now…” 
Every discontent champion had a clear issue she regarded as strategic and wished to 
influence. Every discontent champion also reported having to face a major obstacle in 
her attempts of influencing the organization, resulting in her regarding her sphere of 
influence as too small. The accounts given by discontent champions centered on the 
discussion of these obstacles. I will therefore use the different obstacles to categorize 
the discontent champions.  
The first type of obstacles described was related to difficulties in influencing other 
functional units in the organization. Many discontent champions facing this obstacle 
were employed in various support functions and had a major objective of 
disseminating a strategic theme throughout the organization. The problems they 
described were related to a formal role with large amounts of responsibility and little 
formal authority. As one planning officer characterized the lack of conviction among 
the members of an operative organizational unit: 
(Q15) “I think that they are so busy that they just notice some of the zillion messages 
that they receive. I guess they don’t think about them as being important because they 
disregard them so many times, which is unfortunate. Or in some cases they may note 
the message and even try to implement it, but […] they don’t know how. And they don’t 
have that much time to really think about the issue, or maybe they just don’t care…they 
think that one can get by without trying.” 




The problem of borderlines between organizational units did not only affect 
discontent champions in support positions, however. Some discontent champions had 
strategic objectives that depended on collaboration between functional units. The 
tools the discontent champions reported using in overcoming this gap were often 
related to unofficial communication and political maneuvers. 
The second type of obstacles the discontent champions were faced with was related to 
organizational culture. One middle manager regarded the organization as old 
fashioned and stagnant, unable to face the new economy, a notion that he regarded as 
a central issue for his organization’s survival. One top manager regarded the 
organization under his direct authority to be composed of units with too much 
independence for centrally guided strategic action. One planning officer in an 
organizational unit felt that while he had enough influence over strategic planning in 
his own unit, other functional units, the collaboration of which he needed to reach his 
objectives, were culturally corrupt. A sales manager in one organization saw the 
strategic value of a change in organizational structure, yet criticized the organizational 
bureaucracy for slowing the change process down. The functional obstacle could also 
transcend the organization. In an organization trying to execute an imposed strategy 
(Mintzberg, 1995), one secretary noted that nobody within the organization could 
influence strategy, but that it was dictated from outside the organization. 
On the other hand, stagnation and bureaucracy were not the only cultural obstacles 
that were criticized. Interviewee3 regarded the newer management trends taking over 
the organization from more traditional management principles as a harmful 
phenomenon. He reported fighting a futile war over the issue for many years. He 
perceived, for example, the extension of the discussion about strategy to cover 
employees as unnecessary and even harmful. 
(Q16) “[…] everybody is being promised everything, an atmosphere is created saying 
“you have had representation, so you have had possibilities to influence [strategy].” If 
we really want to have effective planning, which is connected to strategy… well that 
isn’t a job for the layman. We will be needing the best boys and girls who are regarded 
as future promises and resources, from within the organization.” 
The third type of obstacle that discontent champions were faced with related to 
decision-making hierarchy. The obstacle of hierarchy was typically faced by 
champions who wanted to influence the strategy process in a more continuous 




fashion, bringing feedback from customers, questioning practices, giving 
development ideas about products, etc.  They did not feel that their attempts were 
taken seriously - typically by their superiors. One interesting case was that of the 
representative of a workers' union who felt that neither the employees she represented 
were willing to implement a strategic issue she regarded as important, nor did the 
management show enough leadership to address the issue convincingly. The common 
notion of the discontent champions facing a hierarchy gap was that they reported 
different amounts of fatigue caused by continuously trying. Some seemed to be on the 
verge of becoming cynics because they felt this had all amounted to nothing, while 
others seemed to hold on, no matter what. 
(Q17) “[…] they say: “thanks for the feedback”, but you can read “no more feedback” 
between the lines. But that is a situation in which you have to give more feedback, of 
course. There has to be something wrong when one asks for feedback but cannot 
handle criticism. But what is it that is wrong? That’s a good question. I would have to 
say 'uncertainty'.” 
The fourth type of obstacle facing discontent champions involved the large 
organizational size and the difficulties of influencing strategy on a large 
organizational level. This obstacle usually involved the solution of “thinking big, 
acting small”. The discontent champions envisioned their organizational units as 
“small businesses with entrepreneurial spirit” who sought to coexist peacefully with 
the mother organization. They also reported an interest in influencing the mother 
organization’s strategy process to account for “real problems”, through seeking a 
foothold in committees, projects, etc. 
(Q18) “I think an organization this big is just stupid. I actually once said to [the 
manager of her unit] that I would like to have a training course on entrepreneurship 
for our unit, what internal entrepreneurship really means. So that we would take this 
work as we would if we were working in our own firm. How differently people would 
do their jobs if they were working like that.” 
The discontent champion is an agent who feels that she has made sense of her 
organization’s strategy, but faces an obstacle in trying to influence it. The obstacles 
are summarized in the table below (Table 7). 




Table 7. Summary of obstacles faced by discontent champions 
 Obstacle Issues Solutions 
Unit borders Difficulties in influencing other 
organizational units, difficulties in 
collaboration between units 
Political maneuvers, unofficial 
communication 
Culture Difficulties in achieving change in stagnated 
culture, difficulties with too great a value 
on management trends in culture 
Various 
Hierarchy Difficulties in getting  ideas across Trying again with the risk of fatigue 
Size Difficulties in influencing a large 
organization’s strategy process 
Resorting to entrepreneurial actions 
on the micro level, getting a 
foothold in committees, etc. 
 
All in all, the discontent champion is an agent on a mission: she has made sense of the 
strategy and is therefore concerned about the issues she is advocating. This narrative 
quality of sensemaking preceding a willingness to influence an issue is clearly present 
in the interview text. This seeming linearity is a typical quality of narrative knowing 
(Polkinghorne 1988). The order in which sensemaking precedes championing is in 
some cases described as temporal/causal (“I have access to strategic information, now 
I know what I wish to influence”), justificatory in some (“I have spent ten years 
making strategies, I can judge for myself what is important”), and deontological in 
some (“my being the union representative in the executive board is a show of trust 
from my voters, I need to make sense of the strategy in order to be able to influence 
the issues they regard as important”).  







Interviewee4 is a logistics specialist in a large firm. She feels she is quite well versed in 
organizational strategy in general and the strategic theme in particular. This is due to what 
she refers to as her “curious nature”. She has explored the company intranet for strategy 
documents and discussed her findings with a variety of colleagues and superiors. She 
understands that in a large organization it is hard to reach everybody through official 
communication and thus the individual has quite a responsibility to find out about issues 
herself. She regards her role as an implementer of the strategic theme, but goes beyond her 
immediate working sphere by “nosing around”, asking questions and making suggestions. She 
is fairly enthusiastic about implementing the strategic theme and feels both her 
understanding of strategy and ability to exert influence are good enough. Interviewee4 
represents one variety of empowered champions. 
 
The intuitive definition of a person regarded as a strategic champion is somebody who 
brings about strategic changes in the organization. Empowered champions are people 
who can bring about those changes without major intrusions. The interviewees falling 
into the category of empowered champions constituted a large and varied class. I 




suspect few readers will be surprised to know that most of the top managers 
interviewed regarded themselves as belonging to this category. 
Since there is no fundamental “pebble under the mattress” of the empowered 
champion, they can most fruitfully be characterized not by the issues they wish to 
champion (these are quite varied), but by the roles they wish to see themselves 
playing in the strategy process. 
The prophet is an empowered champion who feels her main function is to convey a 
clear strategic content to her fellow organizational members. This is reflected in the 
rhetoric she uses in the interview situation. Prophets tend to distance their own roles 
from their talk altogether, speaking on behalf of the organization, using normative 
rather than descriptive language. Prophets are so intent on changing people’s attitudes 
that they seem to want to convince even the interviewer that they are right. The 
language in their interview texts is thick with phraseology directed to capture the 
affect of the listener. 
(Q19) “We have been working hard on defining [the strategy], doing the physical work 
and now we need sparring. But the implementation, it has to do with training, ensuring 
commitment, making sure that the issue has been properly understood. We need to 
ensure an understanding to reach a better tomorrow.”   
The strategist is a role bearing the similarity with the prophet in the sense that she 
emphasizes issues, making her personal position almost disappear. Whereas the 
emphasis of the prophet is on emotional convincing, the strategist is an analyst, giving 
fact-like statements about the organization and its environment. Whereas the 
prophet’s rhetoric is mainly collectivist (“we must”) and idealist (“build a better 
tomorrow”), the strategist employs naturalist and realist rhetoric (Lindstead, 2001).  
The teacher has some similarities with the prophet, but she is somewhat more 
pragmatic in her goals. In the interview text acquired from a teacher, the main 
narrative is not about the issues themselves but more about the responsibility of 
making people realize that strategic issues are important. While most teachers had a 
group of subordinates as “pupils”, there were some personnel members who had 
found a strategic content, which they actively promoted to their peers in a manner 
basically indistinguishable from their managerial counterparts. 




As the strategies of real life teachers are varied, so were those of the strategic 
teachers, some of whom placed an emphasis on two-way discussions, some reported 
employing a stricter set of speech acts (e.g. commands, reprimands), while some 
reported almost a behaviorist stance. 
(Q20) “I have asked my [subordinates] to quote [a group of official strategic slogans] 
and tell me what they’re about. The one who has managed to do this first has received 
a voucher of 100 marks [approximately 17 €].” 
Some empowered champions showed an attitude towards their subordinates 
comparable to that of a parent to a child. This attitude was emphasized in some 
accounts by a genuine concern for the fates of the subordinates under the empowered 
champion's authority. In others, a more belittling stance was emphasized. The 
communication of strategy and its adoption by subordinates was regarded as a task 
that reflected the best interests of the subordinates, whether they realized this or not. 
(Q21) “Well, the first thing I have tried [to communicate] in this […] change situation 
is that the best life insurance for any of us is that we must do our job as well as we can, 
and this is directly connected to [a strategic content][…] the [strategic content] is just 
the thing […] and of course the motivation to do one’s job as well as one can.”  
Other empowered champions who were managers regarded themselves more as 
facilitators than teachers or prophets. They saw themselves as acting in a kind of a 
service function toward their subordinates, answering questions about the 
organization’s direction, helping their work by creating structures and removing 
obstacles, helping the willing subordinates to regard themselves as active parts of the 
organization. The methods they emphasized dealt expressly with two-way interaction 
with the subordinates, discussions, being accessible.  
The facilitator role was not only adopted by managers, but also by those empowered 
champions acting as strategic support. They were typically agents employed in 
support functions (communication, quality control, etc.) or assistants to top managers 
in strategic issues. They regarded their main function to be the provision of new input 
to strategic decision makers, or to provide services and ways of working to facilitate 
the adoption of strategy in different parts of the organization. The interviews of such 
support champions were often somewhat critical towards the state of the strategy 
process at the moment of the interview, yet the personal responsibility of the agent of 
the criticized issues was also emphasized. It was as if they regarded the strategy 




process to be their concern and therefore the posed critique was directed to 
themselves as much as anybody else. 
The knight in shining armor is an empowered champion who is championing for a 
certain issue, much like the prophet. Unlike the prophet though, the knight 
emphasizes her own role in fighting the battle, i.e. the discussion is on the knight’s 
deeds and plans as much as on the championed issue. The battle is not simply about 
influencing the attitudes of certain people, but righting injustices in the culture, 
structure and systems. 
(Q22) “The person who preceded me as the head of this department thought he was the 
expert on every field. I try to divide the responsibility to different people in such a way 
that it will be easy to find a replacement to every expert. When I get this done in my 
department, the next step will be to implement the system in the [whole organization].” 
The position of the empowered champion often included the position of an insider of 
some sort. Being an insider proved to be quite a varied position in itself. Some 
insiders associated their position with being in a privileged position of some sort: 
having the ear of one’s superior, being a member in a special group, being given 
access to restricted information about strategy, being given special training by the 
organization, etc. On the other hand, being an insider seemed to indicate being a 
special person in some other accounts: being specially trained, being superior to 
others in terms of ingenuity, strategic vision or daring, etc. 
(Q23) “You cannot make strategy in away that forty people believe in it in the 
beginning. Those strategies are simply talk, and not worth executing. A situation like 
that does not exist. It suffices that me and a couple of others believe in the strategy. 
That is a situation I am after. Then you get one success and the others will start 
believing in it.”   
It was notable that this attitude of superiority was most often backed by accounts of 
having earned the top management’s trust, implying that the attitude was typically 
portrayed by middle managers. Some insiders went quite a long way in portraying a 
cynical position towards others in organizations. This was followed either by 
expressions of despair or accounts of manipulating others to reach desirable goals. 
The manipulation could take form in Machiavellian politics or simple rewarding and 
punishing. As an exact counterpart to the superior position, there was a group of 
humble top managers who felt that they themselves were the ones to blame if the 




strategy process was not successful, and even expressed doubt about their ability to 
communicate strategy as well as it should be communicated. 
A position often interlinked with insiders is the position of venerability. A venerable 
champion regarded herself as a strategic resource because of her experience. 
Venerable champions typically reported that their expertise was often required in 
strategic issues and some even reported a willingness to rid themselves of some of the 
duties associated. Many venerable champions emphasized that strategic change is a 
very gradual process and that instead of quick solutions the emphasis should be 
placed on gradual development work.  
Many of the empowered champion roles described thus far reflect the strong 
assumption that the strategic issues championed originated from the champions 
themselves. This was not the case in all empowered champion roles, especially those 
to found on lower organizational levels. In many cases, the strategic issues the 
champions worked hard to implement by influencing the organization nearby were 
officially sanctioned, pre-set issues the champions had adopted as important. 
A good sport is a role in which the agent gives an account of herself as an active 
follower of organizational policy. A good sport uses her own initiative to influence 
others to follow suit and finds issues in her local organization that can be made to 
better serve the official strategy process. The attitude of a good sport is typically 
supportive of one’s superiors, as well as rather uncritical towards official policy. As 
one middle manager stated: 
(Q24) “They [my subordinates] are committed well enough to the execution of what is 
decided together, and also to the commands that we are given from above… in our unit 
things generally get done the way we are told to do them.” 
Some empowered champions were so enamored with their organization that they 
could be labeled as devout believers in the organization and its strategy process. They 
were not simply in agreement with strategy because that was what was expected of 
them, but they were “in love” with their organization, i.e. regarded the organizational 
identity as something very attractive. The devout believer is somewhat similar to 
Schultz’s (1991) definition of political ministry officials’ acting as disciples to a 
political minister, yet the believers here do not have a clear teacher/master they would 
have referred to.   




The free agent is the final empowered champion role I discovered. This is the role 
performed by our interviewee4. The role is characterized by the agent’s formal 
position not being connected to organizational strategy in any pre-set way, but the 
agent herself gives an account of building all kinds of channels through which she has 
managed to make sense of the strategy as well as influence issues accordingly. One 
shared characteristic common to all free agents is that they were members of large 
organizations, in which the organizational strategy process seemed rather far away to 
many.  As interviewee4 explained: 
(Q25)  “I actually got acquainted with these [strategy process diagrams] by 
adventuring on the intranet. But I haven’t really seen these in any ready-made 
information sessions I have been to, but have just dug for information myself… This 
organization is quite big and it’s therefore good to have all kinds of contacts and 
networks and so on… and it’s good to have a curious character like mine, because by 
chatting and asking around one can find out about a lot of things.” 
The empowered strategic champion is a social position in which the agent can think 
(Mintzberg, 1994) and act (Eccles & Nohria, 1992) strategically without encountering 
major obstacles. Empowered champions act in a variety of different roles and while 
most managerial interviewees were located in this position, middle managers and 
personnel members were also identified among their ranks. All in all, being located in 
this position would seem to implicate a formal leadership position of some sort. The 
roles and their common associations with formal positions are summarized in Table 8. 




Table 8. Summary of roles for empowered champions 
Role Characteristics Commonly associated 
formal position 
Prophet Emphasis on the importance of key issues, 
convincing people 
Top management 
Strategist  Emphasis on stating facts Top & middle management 
Teacher Emphasis on assuring adoption of 
strategically important issues  
Middle & top management 
Parent Responsibility for subordinates Middle & top management 




Changing a key issue All  
Insider Having a privileged position / being a 
significant resource 
Middle management 
Venerable  Sharing one’s experiences, offering insight All 




Devout believer Being in love with one’s organization Middle management, 
personnel 





Many of these roles, no doubt, seem attractive ways of positioning oneself in the 
strategy process. I wish to strongly contest a view that regards the empowered 
champions as the only relevant type of strategic resources, however. Indeed, one of 
the few points I want to make in this thesis with explicitly normative connotations is 
that there are people in the organizations who are ignored as the strategic resources 
they are.  





Champion under stress 
 
Interviewee5 is a middle manager in a large public organization. He is responsible for strategy 
implementation in his unit. The unit’s working force consists of highly expert professionals, 
who have very little time for discussing strategic issues. Interviewee5 regards the strategic 
theme as a crucial issue, and is motivated in promoting it in his organization. Having a long 
work history in his organization he feels he has a good grasp of the organization’s strategy 
process. The problem is that he understands on the one hand that his subordinates do not 
take interest in strategic issues, resources being as limited as they are, while, on the other 
hand, his attempts to get more resources for implementing the strategic theme have not been 
supported by the strategy process, which he regards as rigid and uncompromising. 
Interviewee5 feels he is being asked too much with too little support from both below and 
above. This notion of too great a responsibility, coupled with a genuine willingness to promote 
strategic issues if given the chance, is what characterizes a champion under stress. 
 
The champion under stress is an individual who feels she has made sense of the 
strategy, and feels that the burden of responsibility she has to bear is too great. There 
is a similarity between the champion under stress and the discontent champion, but 
the two classes are not identical. Whereas the discontent champion feels that there is 
an obstacle preventing her from influencing issues she deems strategically important, 




the champion under stress feels that there are simply too many expectations of her 
influencing issues. Yet, as the discontent champion tries to overcome the obstacle, the 
champion under stress seeks to fulfill the strategic expectations.  
While there are no clear-cut obstacles to be found for champions under stress, 
narrative analysis does help to identify issues the champions under stress report as 
sources for their spheres of influence being too large, describing their conditions.  
Some champions under stress reported suffering from lack of support of various 
kinds. Some reported organizational decision making not showing enough conviction 
to support the agent in her task of influencing strategic issues. Agents giving such 
accounts often reported that there was “too much talking and too little walking”. 
 (Q26) They [strategy statements] are just rhetoric designed for building an 
enthusiastic atmosphere. You have to think for yourself about what you actually do and 
it is really rare to get some real input on how to do things better […] We have to think 
of the better ways of doing things ourselves. Sure, our objectives are dictated from 
above […] But real, implementable actions, no way…  
Another form of reported lack of support was directed towards the organization 
structure. Some champions under stress criticized the design of the organizational 
structure as blocking them from accomplishing those strategic actions they were 
supposed to carry out. One such object of criticism was a matrix organization, which 
simultaneously placed a great responsibility on a top manager, yet did not provide the 
legitimate means to carry out the strategic tasks.  
(Q27) “The top management on a whole is committed well enough [to strategy 
implementation], the problem is the middle management. They are like little kings in 
their small lagoons. They seem to be thinking, “let the guys in the headquarters hassle 
all they want, I will go on doing the things I’ve been doing all along.” This 
phenomenon is one significant problem. The commitment of the personnel level is a 
smaller problem, they are more willing to change.” 
Some middle managers, on the other hand, felt that they had been “caught between a 
rock and the hard place”, as was the case of our interviewee5. They felt they did not 
receive the support they needed from either their superiors or subordinates. 
Interviewee5 reported feeling frustrated because he felt employee level participation 
was the best way to adopt strategic ideas, yet his subordinates felt participation as 
“extra work” in their already too tight schedules.  




Not all champions under stress reported feeling an external lack of support, however. 
Some were unsure of their own capabilities of carrying out those strategic actions 
they were expected to. Some managers, for example, felt they did not have the 
necessary leadership competencies to facilitate the adoption of strategy among their 
subordinates.  
To summarize, champions under stress felt discontent with the size of their sphere of 
influence in the sense of “having too big shoes to fill”. Most reasons reported to 
account for this situation were external, yet some champions were simply critical of 
the current status of their relevant competencies. The reasons are summarized in 
Table 9. 
Table 9. Summary of conditions for champions under stress 
Condition  Characteristics Origin 
Lack of support From decision-makers, from 
organizational structure 
External  
Between a rock the hard 
place 
E.g. lack of support from both 
subordinates and superiors (middle 
management) 
External 
Critical of own capabilities E.g. whether has the leadership 
qualities to facilitate adoption 
Internal 
 







Interviewee6 is an operative employee in a product development team in a large firm. She 
regards the strategic theme as a central issue, being motivated to implement it as well as she 
can because of the benefits the theme brings to the customers. She feels that she does not have 
a grip on the organizational strategy process, because she does not have “the brass on the 
collar”, i.e. the official position warranting access to information. On the other hand, she feels 
that her team is being bombarded with strategic information, but the information is so 
diluted, that no strategic direction can be inferred from it. While she is enthusiastic about 
developing organizational systems to better facilitate the strategic theme, she feels 
disregarded as a strategic agent. Nobody seems to expect much from her in terms of strategic 
action.     
 
The disregarded champion is in a sense an opposite of the abandoned champion. 
Whereas the abandoned champion is left to her own devices with few cues to make 
sense of the strategy, the disregarded champion is given a load of information about 
strategy, with little expectation of any strategic action on her part. Disregarded 




champions are active in influencing issues they regard as strategic, however, and 
would like to make sense of the strategy on a larger organizational scale than just the 
sphere of their own work. 
The disregarded champions regarded strategy as they had encountered it, as a 
phenomenon with too many bits of information for successful sensemaking. 
Moreover, the failure of sensemaking was reported as the main inhibitor of the ability 
of these champions to influencing strategic issues. This notion reflects well the theory, 
as authors on power as distinct as Lukes and Foucault have identified the linkage 
between power and knowledge. If an individual does not have the knowledge of an 
institution, she will have little chance of influencing that institution the way she would 
like - furthermore, she may not even have had the possibility of forming a conception 
as to what she would like to influence. 
As the source of the problem lies in sensemaking, the major perspective to analyzing 
the differences between disregarded champions should be found in the problems the 
champions associated with strategic sensemaking. The content of strategy was one 
identified problem. Some disregarded champions reported that the strategy was so far 
from everyday life on a conceptual level that it was impossible to make sense of how 
the strategy should be transformed into everyday actions. This meant that the strategy 
was either regarded as too abstract or even unpractical.  
(Q28) “It [a strategic theme] is a terribly difficult issue – wide-ranging and difficult.” 
Some disregarded champions noted that there were obvious inconsistencies in how 
certain strategies should be interpreted. This issue often seemed to be linked with a 
strategy that was imposed, i.e. dictated from outside the organization. 
Many of the disregarded champions, such as our interviewee6, who criticized the 
content of strategy for not making sense also reported suffering from a lack of 
facilitation of strategic sensemaking. This critique was typically attributed to the 
superiors of the interviewee, either the top or the middle management, depending on 
the interviewee’s position. The interviewees noted that their superiors did not spend 
enough time explaining what the strategy meant for individuals, and what they should 
do differently in their work activities. Some interviewees even criticized their 
superiors for not believing in the strategy they were supposed to communicate. 




 (Q29) “Our team manager has informed us of our organization’s strategies. He has 
gone to these [strategy sessions] and then explained it to us in his own words, backed 
up by 50 pages of Power Point slides – here is our strategy… I think the problem was 
that our manager really did not take it very seriously himself. If you present strategies 
backed up by that attitude, you end up saying that “they made this strategy and you can 
make the most of it if you want to”. On the receiving end, you really cannot end up 
taking strategy very seriously… you end up thinking that making strategies is just a 
way of killing time for those who make them…” 
Some disregarded champions reported that they simply were too busy in their 
everyday work activities to make sense of all the information about strategy. They 
reported that they would have liked to influence more issues and be more “on top of” 
where the organization was heading, but claimed that there simply was too little time 
to spend on strategy. This did not mean, however, that they were contented to carry 
out only their own work activities, but took part in a variety of activities they regarded 
as strategic, but under a “layer of fog” they would have wanted to avoid. 
The notion of being too busy might on first glance seem a question of setting 
priorities, yet the disregarded champions reported that the content of their work did 
not allow for immersion into strategic issues. Given some thought, this notion of 
being too busy is a typical factor linking power and knowledge. The blockages to 
successful sensemaking that the disregarded champions reported are summarized in 
Table 10. 
Table 10. Summary of disregarded champions 
Blockage Characteristics 
Strategy content Abstract/separated from practice, inconsistent  
Facilitation of sensemaking Superiors not spending enough time to explain what 
strategy means, lack of faith in strategy from the part of 
superiors 
Lacking time resource Too busy to immerse oneself in strategy as deeply as one 
would want 
 






Interviewee7 is a top manager and head of a large unit in a large firm. He emphasizes his role 
as a leader and promoter of organizational strategy and the strategic theme among his unit’s 
employees. He relates the strategic theme to a general transitional stage of the organization 
and regards himself as one of its architects. He regards communication as one of his main 
tools in strategy implementation. When asked about his perception of the realization of the 
strategic theme at the current moment, however, he falls silent. He notes that he simply does 
not have the knowledge of how the theme has actually been realized on the grassroots level. 
On the other hand, he notes, maybe he is not supposed to know this. He has subordinates who 
he trusts with the details of implementation. In a complex organization there are areas that 
are likely to stay from his gaze in the shadow areas. He has to lead the change in a state of 
partial uncertainty. 
 
The puzzled champion is an agent who feels that her sensemaking task is too 
complex, due to there being too many cues from which no sensible conception can be 
constructed. The puzzled champion is distinguished from the disregarded champion 
by the simple notion that the puzzled champion does not regard her puzzlement to be 
a source of disempowerment. She does not feel that her chances of influencing 
strategic issues are insufficient. The reasons distinguishing the two types can be 
understood by looking at the reasons the puzzled champions identified from the 
interviews reported the failure of their sensemaking. 




The overall most typical reason given was complexity. Many puzzled champions 
reported that some aspect of the strategy process was simply too complex to 
comprehend fully. There were a variety of aspects of the strategy process that the 
complexity was attributed to. The environment was one typical source of complexity 
especially emphasized by those puzzled champions who were intimately connected 
with the creation of strategy, i.e. the top managers. These puzzled champions reported 
to having no clear-cut answers to strategic questions, because there was, for example, 
“no way of predicting what the future will hold for our business”, where the 
legislation would go, etc. A major environmental complexity issue reported was 
posed by the customers. 
(Q30) “If we had at our disposal information of a different kind, concerning the 
person, what she is like and what kinds of things she does, we might be able to make 
use of that information to think about, what kinds of things would really benefit that 
client. Our information systems could work a bit better to facilitate that kind of 
activity.” 
While the environment is an external source attributed to strategy formation, many 
puzzled champions also reported internal sources of complexity affecting the strategy 
process, especially strategy implementation. A common way of looking at internal 
complexity was the difficulty of linking the micro level plans and activities with the 
organizational-level strategy. Some interviewees noted that the organization itself was 
simply too complex for a single agent to form a coherent understanding of how 
strategic issues get implemented. While many did regard this as a problem of sorts, 
they did not accuse this phenomenon of “robbing” them of their possibility of acting 
as strategic agents, but, rather, regarded this as quite a natural phenomenon. 
(Q31) “One problem we are faced with is that it is hard to form an understanding of 
how the strategies of the different parts of the process form a coherent whole. This is 
probably linked to the fact that our whole strategy process is a very parallel process 
and this can lead to a lot of inconsistencies taking place between different strategies. I 
guess this could be one area that should be developed…. how we could link those parts 
together more easily, how it would be easier to get the information required and how to 
get knowledge about strategy more easily accessible.”  
Another way of looking at internal complexity was reported by top managers 
responsible for the implementation of organizational strategies in their own units, 
such as our interviewee7. These puzzled champions reported not having exact 
knowledge as to how the strategy was implemented. Some of them regarded this as 
natural – they trusted the subordinates responsible for implementing their respective 




areas and therefore did not even need to know all the details. As our interviewee7 put 
it: 
(Q32) “Sure I can influence them [the strategic objectives], because I am the one who 
sets them. That’s not the interesting question. The interesting question should be posed 
to X [a direct subordinate, name withdrawn], whether she has gotten enough support. 
One might say maybe not, that she has been forced to do a whole lot of construction 
work, but she is a strong person, she does it nonetheless. I just try to open doors for 
her.” 
Aside from internal and external complexity, there were other reasons the puzzled 
champions reported as sources for their puzzlement. The conceptual apparatus of 
strategy, i.e. the language of strategy was one major source of puzzlement. Many 
champions did not feel comfortable discussing organizational issues in a strategy 
framework, feeling that the terms used were uncomfortable, unnecessarily grandiose, 
etc. This resulted in hesitation with interview questions concerning the strategy 
process.  
(Q33) “Question: How do you communicate strategies? 
Answer: Strategies…  
Question: Or how do you communicate strategy in general, you could say… 
Answer: How do I communicate [the organization’s] strategy… I don’t know whether I 
communicate much else apart from saying that [the organization] made a strategy 
and… Well, if you think about it, it’s quite far away, the [organization]-level, you 
know. You talk more of the strategy of your own unit…” 
Some puzzled champions went further and noted that the definitions given for 
strategic concepts were somewhat limited. They expressed a need for more 
thoroughness in definitions to facilitate sensemaking.  
(Q34) “I try to translate what I have been told from above, because that stuff is more 
or less management jargon. Of course I know well enough that those words have been 
thought over time and time again […] I have circulated [the strategy documents] in my 
teams, so that anybody who is interested can read them, but I haven’t demanded that 
anybody reads them. I pick issues that concern us from the text. I have asked my team 
managers to read the documents and pick issues in a similar manner […] Most of all I 
think of my role as a translator.  
Question: Is it easy being a translator? 
Answer: Of course it’s not easy. When we were making our marketing strategy, I had to 
read it through quite a few times and we went through it a number of times, before we 
started realizing what was beneath it all. You had seen some of those things six years 
ago.  Now I know what they mean. But if they changed them, they would typically just 
give the paper to us middle managers and explain it once. After that, you are supposed 




to distribute information and tell people what [the strategy] means. That takes a whole 
lot of thinking. It just doesn’t happen… The way I see it, if we the middle management 
don’t understand them, we can be quite a block in the flow of information. None of our 
subordinates will understand it if we don’t.” 
Some puzzled champions responsible for implementation were puzzled by how they 
could motivate other agents in the organization, especially their subordinates. They 
reported having difficulties with convincing people, and were somewhat at odds with 
how to do this. The puzzled champions did not report this as an issue of a lack of 
influence, but more like an issue of figuring out the right way to motivate people. 
That is, puzzled champions regarded the motivational issue as an intellectual 
challenge. 
A final reason for puzzlement reported were the agent’s personal competencies with 
strategic issues. Some puzzled champions felt that they did not have the required 
experience to form a strategic conception of organizational issues while some 
expressed reservation about their skills in implementation. 
(Q35) “I guess this is mostly a problem with my personal working practices. A person 
is never fully ready for anything and if he is, that’s great, but at least I feel that I need 
to learn new things every day. When I was preparing for this interview this morning I 
started thinking about my [strategy implementation] practices. Communication and the 
sharing of information, that’s one area where I can learn more and so can others in 
our department.”  
The distinguishing factor between the disregarded champion and the puzzled 
champion is clearly that the puzzled champion is above all critical about strategic 
sensemaking in the sense that she places quite tough criteria for such notions as 
‘understanding strategy’ or ‘having knowledge about strategy’. The objects of this 
critique are summarized in Table 11 below.  
Table 11. Summary of puzzled champions 





E.g. inability to predict future events, uncertainty about customers 
Internal complexity Internal 
factors 
E.g. inability to report implementation specifics, inability to link 
micro-level plans and strategy (organizational direction) 
Strategy concepts Language 
used 
E.g. strategy concepts being regarded as abstract or grandiose, 
lack of definitions, lack of support in sensemaking 
Strategic abilities The agent E.g. self-criticism about own practices or competencies 
Motivating others Others  E.g. intellectual puzzlement as to how to motivate other agents  







Interviewee8 is a top management team member and head of a functional unit in a firm. She 
has been just promoted to this position after a 17-year tenure in the organization, her last 
position being head of a department. In her account she refers to her background as a middle 
manager, responsible for strategy implementation on the department level. While enthusiastic 
about the strategic theme, which she regards as a possibility of renewal for her organization, 
she is quite critical towards the actions of both the top management strategists as well as the 
grassroots implementers. She feels the top management has made implementation very tough 
at the grassroots level because of the strategy jargon they have employed, which is almost 
impossible to interpret at the operative level. On the other hand, she regards the operative 
employees as often too conservative towards the new ideas strategy could provide. She is 
overwhelmed in the face of the multiple challenges she has to meet in her new position, yet 
she's ready and willing to meet them. She identifies very positively with her long-term 
employer. 
 
The overwhelmed champion is an active agent, working at her level of the 
organization to bring about change she regards as strategic. Somewhat similar to the 
abandoned champion, she is left to her own devices with too much sensemaking to 
do. The overwhelmed champion, unlike the abandoned champion, is left with too 
many options to influence issues and too little support to make the appropriate 
choices. 




The overwhelmed champions did not pinpoint a single source for their state. They 
expressed a situational description that was composed of a complex set of issues. This 
description concerned the social position of the agent, emphasizing the problems 
involved. Several overwhelmed champions expressed a feeling of disconnection from 
the organizational strategy process. They reported feeling responsible for a host of 
issues, yet they felt they could access neither the necessary interpretations to facilitate 
sensemaking of the mass of information they were subjected to in their work, nor the 
guidelines they needed to make decisions. 
(Q36) “We don’t even have on paper how to act according to [a strategic issue]. It is 
one of those issues we have thought very hard about, suggested forming committees 
and we've done a lot of things, but we end up with nobody taking responsibility for the 
issue… The people who initiate the discussion end up banging their heads against the 
wall. That’s when you know we are adrift here at the grassroots level.” 
Some overwhelmed champions, on the other hand, felt that they had all the ‘official’ 
possibilities of influencing issues that they needed. The trouble was that the task set 
by strategy itself was so complex that overwhelmed champions occasionally felt 
helpless in trying to influence it, as was the case of our interviewee8. In these cases, 
this was not an instance of mere puzzlement, but involved deeper issues, resulting in a 
feeling of having ‘too big shoes to fill’. The sources identified as having this feeling 
of complexity were similar to the ones in the accounts of puzzled champions: the 
unpredictability of the environment and the peculiarities of having to rely on other 
human beings to accomplish one’s goals. 
(Q37) “Well… I know some of my direct subordinates go through [strategic issues] in 
their own unit meetings, but I also know that not all of them do that.”  
Some overwhelmed champions reported that the overwhelming position was only 
temporary. This was the case in which a strategic change effort was unfinished and 
therefore lots of questions were left unanswered. Another was the case of a 
strategically enthusiastic new employee who had tried out a lot of things but felt she 
had not yet fully made sense of all the relevant possibilities.  
The notion of being left to one’s own devices was present in more than one account. 
The agents felt that their activities in the strategy process were not sanctioned in any 
way. They felt that all information had to be dug up and all influence had to be 
exerted through the methods that one could think of oneself. One unique position was 




that of a strategic lonely wolf, an experienced agent who felt that an issue he regarded 
important had to be influenced, yet did not trust many of his colleagues, nor the 
management. He reported having his own networks through which he could influence 
issues, but he was not sure whether he was making the right decisions, because he did 
not feel confident with strategic concepts. Some agents attributed these problems to 
organizational culture, feeling frustrated because the organization was unwilling to 
facilitate relevant change. 
(Q38) “I have tried to tell people the reasons why [the processes] should be developed, 
but where’s the use, where does work like that show? It is important to them [the 
customers]. In my experience, however, in a rich and safe atmosphere such as ours, the 
personnel doesn’t think much of how to get better results. Results are not a great 
source of concern for us, because we don’t have a knife on our throat.” 
One can notice that there were similarities between the puzzled champion and the 
overwhelmed champion. The difference lies in the notion that the overwhelmed 
champions feel inhibited in influencing issues in addition to mere puzzlement. Also, 
the sources causing the overwhelmed champions’ situation were more complex. 
Another linkage can be made to the disregarded champion who also suffered from a 
gap both in sensemaking and influence. The factor distinguishing the two is that while 
the disregarded champions regarded the basic problem in their situation to be based 
on a sensemaking gap, the overwhelmed champions could not determine any clear 
precedence between sensemaking and influence. The situation descriptions given by 
overwhelmed champions are summarized in Table 12 below. 
Table 12. Summary of overwhelmed champions 
Described position Characteristics 
Disconnection Responsibility of strategic issues, need for sensemaking 
facilitation and guidelines 
Complexity Strategic issues being tough in themselves 
Temporary lack of direction E.g. strategic change unfinished, new employee 
Left on their own devices No sanction for strategic activities 
 




Strategic champions: a summary 
The strategic champion is a person in the strategy process, actively trying to influence 
issues she regards strategic. Eight varieties for strategic champions were discovered in 
the analysis of the interview texts. As I have discussed each position in detail, certain 
characterizations can be made of the positions as a totality. In a sense, the empowered 
champion position can be regarded as a gravitational center, with all the other seven 
positions being pulled toward it. By this I mean that the seven other positions are all 
characterized by lacks or problems whereas the empowered champion consists of a 
variety of role positions for different agents. The lacks and problems are issues that 
prevent the other positions from acting as empowered champions. The other 
champions are in some way not empowered to act the way they would like to in the 
strategy process. 
There is a possibility that the puzzled champion is an exception of sorts. It would 
seem that not all puzzled champions regard their puzzlement to be a problem, but 
something inherent to either their thinking or strategy itself. They do not think the 
complexity of strategy is something that can or should be explained away. In this 
sense, at least some puzzled champions are content where they are, and are not 
affected by the gravitational pull of the empowered champion described above. 
The varieties of strategic champions are depicted in Figure 10 below, along with their 
frequencies in the total mass of interviews. 
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Figure 10. Varieties of strategic champions  
The strategic champions constitute the largest of the three activity groups, amounting 
to more than half of the interviewees. There were more interviewees who thought of 
themselves as champions than there were citizens and cynics together. The 
empowered champions were the largest group of champions, with puzzled champions 
being the second largest. As noted above, puzzled champions can in a way be 
regarded as empowered champions who are unwilling to claim that they have formed 
a full understanding of strategy, on account of the world and their organizations being 
too complex to be completely understood. What can be learned from the frequencies 
of the other positions is at least that there was a relatively large group of champions, 
amounting to almost a fifth of the interviewees, who were unable to champion 
strategic themes even though they would have been motivated to do so. 




What of the one category of champions hinted at by the scheme, yet not 
supported by data? No champions were discovered who would have been content with 
their possibilities of influencing strategic issues but felt they were prevented from 
making sense of what the strategy was. Indeed this would seem to be an unlikely way 
of seeing one’s position. As noted many times before, the Foucauldian notion that 
knowledge and power go hand in hand would seem to make an account like the one 
above inconsistent from the beginning. Yet the abandoned champion, another unlikely 
position, made perfect sense in the account of the one individual who fell under that 
category. So, it’s difficult to imagine what an account corresponding to the empty 
category would look like, but I would not label it as impossible. 
Each position was categorized according to the issues the interviewees falling into 
each category raised. As noted in the beginning of the chapter, this prevented me from 
creating a unified structure representing the positions. A conceptual summary of the 
different positions may clarify things a bit before I move to analyzing strategic 
citizens. In Table 13, the different champions are summarized along with the 
distinguishing factors used in determining the microstructure of each class, i.e. how 
the different members of each group were classified. 




Table 13. Summary of strategic champions  
Champion Sensemaking 





Excluded Too small / too small Kept in the dark Channel of 
influence 
Seniors, ghosts 
Abandoned Too small / too large Kept in the dark 
with too much 
responsibility 
N.A. (1 case) Professional 
agent cut of 
from strategy 
process 





Obstacles Unit borders, 
culture, 
hierarchy, size 
Empowered Enough room / 
enough room  





Under stress Enough room / too 
large 
Too many things 
on one’s hands 
Reasons for 
stress 
Lack of support, 
own capacities 








Puzzled Too large / enough 
room 
Unable to make 







Overwhelmed Too large / too large Too much to do, 









As I look at the table, the first thing that comes to mind is the variety of criteria that 
were used when categorizing the different champions. This is, however, how the data 
guided me. Each criterion of categorization makes sense with the micronarratives in 
each distinct category. Excluded champions were generally angry about being left out, 
but, being champions, they had found channels to influence things. Discontent 
champions felt that they understood their respective organization's strategy, but felt 
they were unable to execute their role in it, due to some obstacle blocking them, etc. 
The lack of a general schema for analyzing the microstructure of each subclass just 
says that the stories the different champions told were different.   




6.2 Citizens of the strategy process  
A citizen in common parlance is ‘a person owing loyalty to, and entitled by birth or 
naturalization to the protection of, a state or nation.’20 As noted in Section 5.1, the 
discussion of organizational citizenship behavior has transferred the notion of 
citizenship to organization studies. The notions of ‘feeling loyalty’ and ‘being 
entitled’ are transferred to organizations as well. Organizational citizens are entitled to 
a certain level of authority and are expected to show a certain loyalty to their 
organization in their actions. Feeling loyal does not imply being active above a certain 
level, however. Organizational citizens are not expected to be organizational 
champions any more than state citizens are expected to be politicians or activists. In 
the strategy process, an organizational citizen is somebody who does her best to do 
what strategy guides her to do. She may be active in developing herself and her own 
work practices to better execute strategy. She does not, however, report actively 
trying to influence the organization and its other members.   
Seven categories of citizens in the strategy process were discovered using the schema 
in Figure 9 in Section 5.2. As with strategic champions, each category will be 
discussed in turn. 
                                                
20 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. New York: Houghton 
Mifflin. 







Interviewee9 is a technical specialist with tenure of over thirty years in the firm. He used to 
know the strategy process a lot better in “the old days” when the firm was much smaller and 
“everybody pretty much knew each other”. He feels that the strategic theme, centering on 
internal process development, is a relevant issue to everyday work and customer satisfaction. 
Yet the organization does not support any action to implement the theme because the top 
management keeps the employees in the dark. Worse than that, there is constant rivalry and 
mistrust between different functional units. While he thinks the strategic theme is a 
worthwhile pursuit, he does not feel that the people in his unit can do much about it.  
 
The recluse citizen feels a gap both in sensemaking and her possibilities of 
influencing strategic issues. Whereas the excluded champion found unofficial ways of 
influencing the strategy process, the excluded citizen reports doing no such thing. Her 
response is withdrawal into her personal sphere of work. She does not, however, 
regard strategy as meaningless or express disinterest towards strategy in general, as a 
cynic would do.  




The general feature in the accounts of the recluse citizens is how they describe their 
isolated social position, e.g. what they identify as its source, what caused it, what it 
resulted in, etc. The title ‘recluse’ is appropriate, since the reasons given generally 
have something to do with a feeling of not being respected or given proper attention, 
and not being included in the strategy process. The identified types of disrespect are 
varied. 
The first typical description of a recluse citizen’s social position has to do with 
membership in a disrespected group, as was the case with our interviewee9. The 
interviewees reported that the group they belonged to, be it a profession or a function, 
did not enjoy the same respect as other groups in the organization. This social 
injustice resulted in the agents having information withheld from them, and their 
chances of influence limited. While they regarded the strategic issue under discussion 
as important and felt a need to influence them, they felt that they were not given the 
chance, due to a lack of respect. 
(Q39) “You know, there is a division among our personnel, into those who implement 
things and those who [make decisions]. I can’t explain it, but there is this split. I don’t 
know if it’s just our feeling of inferiority or what, but there is a barrier of sorts in place 
[…]” 
Many of the agents reporting social injustice in the form of disrespect also reported 
that the culture of their organization had stagnated, and authority locked in ancient 
positions. They felt unable to change issues, even if they felt that the changes would 
have had strategic value to their organizations. Some agents reported that their 
superiors were doing the best they could but they were also affected by the same 
issues. 
(Q40) “I think a lot is being expected of us at the employee level, to tolerate almost 
everything. They don’t think of us at all. We’re like pawns in a game.” 
It was notable that the recluse citizens who reported disrespect reported it as being 
directed towards a group of individuals. It was common for these citizens to blame 
groups other than their own as partial sources of their respective group's excluded 
positions. Another complaint from the recluse citizens reporting social injustice was 
that that strategy had no face. As it was untypical to place blame to their direct 
superiors, this concern was generally directed towards the top management in general, 




or some top manager in particular. The interviewees reported that they did not know 
the person making the decisions, what she was thinking, etc. 
(Q41) “He [the top manager] only comes in once a year to give his Christmas speech. I 
don’t know anything about those strategies. Our own [department] manager […] he 
does all the management we need here, there’s no complaining here. But when we 
move upwards in the organization, then…  
Question: What are the issues you would like to hear about? 
Answer: Well, I don’t know anything about his [the top manager’s] opinions on issues.  
Question: And he makes decisions affecting your work? 
Answer: Yeah, I’m sure he does. What I’m saying is that there is no interaction, we 
only say hello.” 
A different source for exclusion reported was the case of those citizens whose direct 
supervisor did not regard strategy as important. This resulted in the agents not 
receiving knowledge and sensemaking support from their own supervisor, whom the 
interviewees thought should have been the most important source. The interviewees 
reported that the supervisor regarded strategy as a secondary issue to everyday work. 
What was noteworthy was that the citizens did not think strategy as unimportant 
themselves, and would have wanted to make better sense of it in order to let 
themselves feel full members of the organization. 
(Q42) “ […] we would be interested in these [strategic] issues, like this Balanced 
Scorecard –model […] but actually we are not doing much of anything to implement it, 
I mean our team, because our supervisor is not interested in such issues. As employees, 
it’s a bit difficult for us to go and say that we are interested in this, because I think that 
should come from the management, I mean, the direction that we are supposed to be 
taking.” 
Another type of description of a strategic recluse position was presented by those 
agents who felt the narrowness of their job description prevented them from active 
participation in the strategy process. This description was typically given by agents in 
support functions, such as secretaries. These agents did not, however, report this as an 
outright social injustice, but reported feeling regret that their positions did not entitle 
them to a greater degree of participation. It seems that all parties regard the agent’s 
job description at least as a moderately legitimate issue. The agents with this 
complaint of narrow job descriptions expressed regret rather than anger towards their 
situation. The case of the disrespected groups does not have similar explicit structures 
of legitimacy to lock people into their positions. 




The final type of description given involved a simple lack of knowledge about 
strategy. The interviewees gave no further analysis of the reasons for this lack. The 
interviewees who regarded the lack of knowledge to be the source of their exclusion 
from the strategy process reported this lack as “unsatisfied customers” by noting that 
more training on strategic issues should have been made available, and more 
information given out on organizational strategy. 
(Q43)  “There was no training given [about a strategic theme] – we just talked the 
issue through [with my colleagues] […]” 
The recluse citizens did not report ways of responding or rectifying their situations, 
even though they agreed that the strategic issues they were excluded from were 
important to the organization, and often of interest to themselves. The reactions to the 
interview questions concerning their positions in the strategy process ranged from an 
air of sharp criticism to quiet resignation. The reasons the recluse citizens gave for 
their exclusion are summarized in Table 14. 
Table 14. Summary of recluse citizens 
Reason for reclusion Characteristics Typical reaction 
Member of a 
disrespected group 
Feeling of social injustice, blaming 
other groups, feeling uncertainty due 
to the strategy having no face 
Criticism, bitterness 
Direct supervisor 
neglect / disinterest 
Feeling of being left out Helplessness, frustration 
Narrowness of job 
description 
Not being entitled to participate Regret 
Lack of information Not enough training, not enough 
communication of strategy in general 
Dissatisfaction 
 
The recluse citizens seem to be found on the grassroots levels of organizations. While 
some of those identified in the interview texts were placed in expert positions, none of 
them had direct subordinates. 







Interviewee10 is a service employee in a large firm. She has tenure of 33 years in the firm. She 
feels that her team’s objectives are clear enough to be implemented and are determined as a 
part of the firm’s strategy process. When confronted with the strategic theme it seems at first 
that she is avoiding the question, but as the discussion progresses it becomes clear that she is 
in direct opposition to the strategic theme. She regards it as threatening to the things that 
make her work worthwhile, as well as being in opposition to what she regards as a central 
part of the firm’s mission. While she understands the central content of strategy, she feels 
unable to turn such a large ship around.  
 
The neutralized citizen feels that she understands the content of strategy, but cannot 
fulfill her role in the strategy process due to some “stonewall” blocking her from 
doing this. In this sense, she is similar to the discontent champion, the difference 
being that the discontent champion reports actively trying to influence strategic issues 
despite the obstacles, whereas the neutralized citizen does not. Furthermore, the 
neutralized citizen does not have a single strategic issue she would wish to influence. 




Her critique of the possibilities of influencing strategy is much more general. The 
actual obstacles keeping the neutralized citizens from participating in the strategy 
process were also dissimilar from those reported by discontent champions.   
The lack of legitimacy in their position was an obstacle commonly reported by 
neutralized citizens. The agents did not feel that their positions entitled them to take 
strategic action, or influence organizational strategy. The reasons for this were varied: 
one agent reported to being “an old-timer”, who shouldn’t get in the way of fresh 
ideas. This is clearly a case in which legitimacy is dealing with symbol systems – new 
symbol systems taking precedence over old ones. Another agent reported that the 
organization was too slow in warranting her taking over newly discovered areas that 
should be influenced. Another agent reported a lacking time resource. 
(Q44) “Well, we haven’t had much say in my view [at our department]… at least I 
haven’t influenced the [strategic objectives]. 
Question: Would you have wanted to? 
Answer: In my line of work you don’t have much time. The ones who can plan those are 
totally different people.” 
The strategy content was reported as another obstacle by some agents, such us our 
interviewee10, who stated that the whole strategy was wrong in the first place. She 
could not, for instance, accept the notion of inequality between customers the strategy 
seemed to promote. Another citizen felt the strategy was biased, thus neglecting the 
support function he represented. This agent felt that his unit’s task of upholding 
infrastructure was a key task for the organization’s survival, yet it was denied 
resources due to a bias in organizational strategy in favor of more “fashionable” 
topics.  
Other agents felt that their right to use voice was limited in some way. A typical 
account for this was that strategic objectives were dictated from above with little input 
from the level represented by these agents. The overall atmosphere in these accounts 
was a feeling of loss of control over one’s work. 
(Q45) “… I don’t see eye to eye with all of our [strategic objectives], and I couldn’t 
have influenced any of those that I don’t agree with.” 
Other agents reported that cultural issues limited their use of voice. One agent noted 
that, while she was in agreement with what she regarded to be the main content of 




strategy, she was uncomfortable with the whole manner of how her organization’s 
official strategy process was carried out. She felt unable to influence strategic issues 
because she did not know how to approach the official process in general. She 
reported, for example, a deep mistrust toward goal-setting discussions, a relatively 
new practice in her organization. Another agent complained that organizational 
culture inhibited discussion in general in her organization. 
(Q46) “We need a more open atmosphere, facilitating open discussion. 
Question: Discussion - about what? 
Answer: About anything. We need more openness. So that people would have the guts 
[to pose their opinions]… So that you could communicate ideas about developing 
things and they might even ask for those ideas sometimes. I think that would be really 
important… that it wouldn’t be the same people all the time… making all the 
definitions.”  
The different obstacles reported by neutralized citizens are summarized in Table 15. 
Compared to obstacles reported by the discontent champions, the ones in the accounts 
of neutralized citizens were much more vague and less defined. Even if their accounts 
were somewhat grim, the neutralized citizens generally felt that strategy was a 
worthwhile project and they would have wanted to have a more active role in it. They 
did not, however, report to actively trying to change their social positions. 
Table 15. Summary of neutralized citizens 
Obstacle Source Characteristics 
Lack of legitimacy Agent position E.g. “old-timer” in the way of new ideas, no time 
resource for planning in current job  
Wrong direction Strategy content E.g. wrong strategy, biased strategy 




E.g. culture inhibiting discussion 







Interviewee11 is a department manager trainee in a large firm. He functions as the right hand 
of the department manager. His current position is a salesman. When asked about the 
strategy process he reports the main objectives set for his department in a confident manner, 
also reflecting on the general emphases he has observed in organizational strategy of late. He 
regards the strategic theme as central to the organization as well as to the client. He has 
assisted the department manager in the setting of objectives for the department, while the 
actual decisions about objectives are made higher up in the organization. Interviewee11 
characterizes his own role as an implementer of strategy, and notes that nobody on his level 
has ever influenced the actual strategy process in ways other than implementing the 
objectives set for them. And that’s how it should be. 
 
The satisfied citizen is characterized by the connection she attributes between strategy 
and her work activities. Her motivation is directed to carrying out her work. She feels 
she understands organizational strategy and the part she plays in it, and feels she can 




influence issues accordingly. Her strategic activities are limited to her personal sphere 
of work and she does not seek to influence the organization or its other members.  
The satisfied citizens assumed a variety of roles, as did the empowered champions. 
While there are some similarities, the roles assumed by agents of the two positions 
differ substantially from each other. 
Many satisfied citizens, such as our interviewee11, thought of themselves as 
implementers of strategy. They regarded strategy to be a natural guiding factor in their 
work, and their work as an activity directed toward the execution of organizational 
strategy. The implementers were in general agreement with strategy and did not 
problematize or criticize strategic content. The general lens through which they 
regarded strategy was their own working sphere, the size of which they felt content 
with. While all of the implementers accepted the importance of strategy and saw the 
motivation to its implementation to their organizations, some did not feel very 
comfortable about it at the personal level. 
(Q47) “It is a sign of the times. If it were just up to me, I would not force myself to 
work this hard [on implementing strategy], having been as long in working life as I 
have – over 30 years that is […] Of course I have nothing against hard work but for a 
person my age, it would be enough just to come to work every day…” 
A rule-follower is a satisfied citizen who works very hard to execute strategy as 
complying with an order. The rule-followers emphasized the notion that the best 
results are made by everybody following official procedures and guidelines. These 
citizens were mainly concerned with identifying relevant official procedures and 
following them.  
(Q48) “In our bi-monthly team meetings the official house policy is communicated to 
our level in the organization […] They try to communicate it as clearly as they can so 
that we can adopt that policy and be a part of it, so that we would be committed to 
follow it […]”  
The student is a satisfied citizen who is committed to finding out as much as she can 
about strategy. Her interest is learning organizational strategy through training and 
gathering information. As implementers and rule-followers, she is willing to adopt 
official strategy as it is; yet she feels she is in the process of discovering strategy 
through her learning process.  




(Q49) “I have tried to figure out what the Balanced scorecard means in my personal 
time, because I got involved in it after the process had already begun. I have managed 
because I have studied these issues in my own time so that I could get involved and also 
to understand what this [strategy] is about[…]” 
The participant is a satisfied citizen who does not perceive her role from the frame of 
strategic issues or orders, as the previous examples, but through her participation in 
the strategy process. This communion can be reached through various means, e.g. 
membership in a planning committee, setting objectives in a team, giving one’s 
opinion in strategic matters to a superior. Instead of discussing strategic content, 
interviewees belonging to this category emphasized a feeling of contentment due to 
having a role in the strategy process. 
Whereas participants were not very concerned with specific strategic issues in their 
accounts, philosophers placed their emphasis on the reflection of strategic issues. The 
philosophers did not give much insight into their personal roles but concentrated on 
reflecting on the direction the organization should take. Unlike the strategists 
mentioned as a type of the empowered champion, the philosophers did not report 
taking any action to implement the issues they discussed. It was, in a way, as if they 
had been waiting for somebody to ask about their opinion, and interpreted the 
interviewer as that somebody, reflecting on issues both external and internal to the 
organization. They felt content with their role in strategy and chances of influencing 
the organization. 
(Q50) “Sometimes they introduce old issues using new terms and claim to have 
invented something completely new in organization theory. In the 60’s and 70’s they 
had ‘management by objectives’, which is nothing more extraordinary than later 
models for setting objectives. They are all variations of the same theme: having the 
employees do the things the management wants them to do.”  
The roles that satisfied citizens assumed are summarized in Table 16 below. I have 
distinguished the roles through the frames of reference (Goffman, 1974) the 
interviewees adhered to in their accounts. The implementer would seem to look at 
strategy from within his sphere of work, whereas the philosopher has just the 
opposite, conceptual sphere, from which strategy is regarded as an ‘objective’ 
perceiver might perceive it. Rule-followers looked at strategy as a source of policy, 
whereas students regarded it as a source of learning. Participants regarded strategy 
from the perspective of communion, through membership in the strategy process. 




Table 16. Summary of satisfied citizen roles in the strategy process 
Role Frame Characteristics 
Implementer Work Work is executing strategy 
Rule-follower Orders, policy Strategy is a source of official guidelines and 
policies for work 
Philosopher Conceptual Strategy can be used to reflect on the 
organization’s direction 
Student  Learning, strategy Strategy is something to be learned in active 
interaction 
Participant Communion The strategy process is defined through one’s 
own membership 
 





Citizen in need 
 
Interviewee12 is waiting for something. She is a service agent in a firm, in the service of 
organizational customers. She has tenure of over 20 years in the organization and she used to 
be a manager. She feels she has quite a good understanding of the “workings of the strategy 
process” due to her long tenure. Her department is in a transitional phase as the old 
department head has retired and a new one has not yet been found. While Interviewee12 sees 
the relevance of the strategic theme, she feels that it will not be implemented in her unit until 
a new decision-maker with recognized authority is chosen. She also regards this as a wider 
problem in the organization, as more decision-making and influencing would be needed in 
order for the strategic theme to be fully realized. 
 
A citizen in need is an agent who feels she has made sense of strategy, but feels that 
her sphere of influence is too large. She is in need of support in some form, in order to 
fulfill her role in the strategy process. The role she envisions herself to be in varies, 
that is, in some cases, support of the reported kind may result in the agent becoming a 




champion, in others, in acting as a satisfied citizen. Three forms of support were 
reported as needed by the interviewees. 
Further instructions were the first type of support that was reported as being needed. 
The interviewees reported that they could not cope well enough in everyday 
application situations without further instructions as to how the strategy should be 
interpreted as guidelines for action. This need would seem to indicate a need to act in 
a rule-follower role, described in association with satisfied citizens. 
(Q51) “Well, I guess I have sort of a wide conception of the issue [a strategic theme], 
but I guess it should be more detailed, at least when there are so many of us working 
here, it would seem that we would need more specific guidelines in quite a few issues.” 
Other agents, such as our interviewee12, reported that more managerial decisions were 
needed regarding strategy implementation. Strategy implementation seemed to slow 
down at times due to managerial decision-making being sluggish or non-existent. 
Interviewee12 reported that since a former department manager retired there had been 
no one to make the important decisions, resulting in delayed strategy implementation 
in the department:   
(Q52) “The implementation [of a strategic theme] stumbles somewhat. It hasn’t really 
started out very fast. It’s not very easy to implement it. The process has slowed down.  
Question: What have been the biggest difficulties involved? 
Answer: The department manager retiring and no successor being found. We haven’t 
had anybody making the decisions.” 
Leadership and communication skills were the third need, reported by one top 
manager. He felt competent in his department’s field of specialty, but was highly 
critical toward his own capabilities of communicating organizational strategy to his 
subordinates. It was as if the agent was prevented from being the strategic champion 
he was expected to be, resulting in his being drawn to his private sphere of work. 
(Q53) “About communicating strategy: I at least feel a pang of guilt about 
communication. I think strategy has not been communicated well enough; there have 
not been enough strategy discussions. I don’t think strategy can be communicated by 
writing it down and saying that’s it. I think communication breakdown is a big 
problem.  
Question: Where, exactly does the breakdown occur? 




Answer: I think somewhere between my department’s employees and myself. I think 
that my personal communication, as well as that of all the others who were supposed to 
be communicating strategy, has been quite poor.” 
The three needs experienced by citizens in need are summarized in Table 17. In 
addition to the needs, the ideal roles for the agents, i.e. those roles that the fulfillment 
of the reported need would help to facilitate are also reported. 
Table 17. Ideal agent roles for citizens in need 
Need Characteristics Ideal agent role 
Further instructions Need for guidelines of 






Need for management decisions to 





Need to learn how to communicate 












Interviewee13 works as a secretary in a public organization. The manager of her department 
has just retired and a new one chosen to take over. The former manager did not pay attention 
to communicating strategic issues to his subordinates, but the new one has given much more 
attention to this. Still, interviewee13 feels she has not really managed to understand the 
content of organizational strategy. Furthermore, she feels devalued, as she is still not allowed 
to use voice in the discussion of strategy. She simultaneously reports a willingness to 
understand more and a feeling of inferiority due to the limited nature of her work content.   
 
The troubled citizen is an agent who feels she cannot make good sense out of the 
organizational strategy she is faced with. She also feels her possibilities of influencing 
strategy have been lacking in some way. This troubles her, because she regards 




strategy as a phenomenon relevant to her organization. Unlike the neglected 
champion, the troubled citizen does not in all cases trace the source of her 
predicament to failed sensemaking. In some cases the predicament is what is causing 
her failure in sensemaking. 
The first type of predicament reported was a personal guilt trip felt by the agent. The 
agent reported that she felt her attempts to make sense of the strategy had been 
insufficient, and so had been unable to find ways of influencing the strategy process 
more actively. The agent thus traced the source of the problem back to herself. The 
general mechanism of the problem seems to be that the agent had not been active 
enough in her attempts at making sense of the strategy, and thus the question of how 
she would have wanted to influence it seemed irrelevant to the agent. Reasons given 
for this inactivity included being too busy, not having had the courage and/or just 
generally being too passive. 
(Q54) “These [strategy documents] are accessible for everyone to read on the 
[Intranet][…] all the strategies and such, they are detected first when you open the 
Intranet. They are accessible to everybody, but of course it is up to the individual 
whether she reads them or not […]” 
While the guilt trip predicament was traced back to the individual herself, other agents 
reported two kinds of external suppression.  Some agents reported that the 
organizational culture blocked them from participating in the discussion of strategy, 
giving feedback, etc. In the case of interviewee13, the new manager had not yet broken 
the culture of suppressing discussion of strategy among the employees that had been 
cultured by the former department manager. These agents also gave an account of not 
having made sense of the strategy due to this inability to participate in the process. A 
typical response seemed to be to rely on a trusted, direct superior, who was regarded 
as “a representative” in the process. 
(Q55) “ […] in some ways I think we have a hierarchy of the kind we see in hospitals, 
and while I think [her organization] is a very nice place to work in, it is kind of old 
fashioned in some issues […] they have tried to lower the steps in the organization, to 
some degree, yes. And of course the CEO has to have the guts and the ability to lead. 
That’s his job. But when I think what’s going on here, lower in the organizational 
staircase, I don’t see any reason why [strategic] things couldn’t be done or managed 
more openly. I wouldn’t see any harm in that, personally.” 
Another form of external suppression reported was traced to organizational systems 
of various kinds, which were regarded as being too bureaucratic and thus prevented 




the agent taking strategic action interpreted as actions belonging to the official 
strategy process. Agents reporting this predicament generally tended to stick to their 
personal working spheres, avoiding the officially sanctioned strategy process, even 
though they regarded strategy as an important phenomenon.   
 (Q56) “A year has gone by with me not knowing what to… you know, I have done 
things the way I have always done them, but I haven’t really known what you can do 
and what you are allowed to do and with all these new organizational structures […]”  
Some agents were in need of nothing less than another strategy, or at least a careful 
explanation for the current strategic direction they perceived. The agents perceived 
themselves as unable to prevent the strategic direction it seemed to be taking, e.g. 
consciously neglecting certain customers, moving into a market area in conflict with 
the organization’s mission, etc. This problem of influencing the organization’s 
direction resulted in deficiencies in making sense of the strategic value of one’s 
everyday actions. The result of this predicament seemed to be to do one’s work as 
well as one could (in the practical sense) and avoid giving the strategy too much 
thought.   
(Q57) “ […] you know what the [organization’s] strategy is right now […] I really 
can’t have much influence on that, but I simply cannot sell the customer a product that 
doesn’t fit her needs.” 
A related concern was faced by agents who felt that the strategy was vague and in 
need of elaboration. These agents would have needed more clear-cut interpretations 
and definitions to be able to act strategically, implementing strategy in their work. 
The lack of definitions made them feel like their hands were tied in terms of 
influencing strategy as well.  
(Q58) “The whole process [of strategy-making] has been kind of cute. The 
organization has in a way defined, I don’t know on what grounds, this major goal, and 
associated figures, how they should be in 2005. That in a way is the goal that we are 
striving towards, but no thought whatsoever has been given on how that will be 
accomplished on the [operative level].” 
All in all, the citizens in need reported being in situations in which they could not 
make sense of organizational strategy, and were also unable to influence strategically 
important issues in their work activities. The types of predicament the citizens in need 
reported being in were somewhat complex situations. They are summarized in Table 
18 below.  




Table 18. Summary of troubled citizens 
Predicament Characteristics Need Mechanism Outcome 
Guilt trip The agent feels that she 
is the main cause of the 
gap in her 
understanding, i.e. her 
being too busy, her 
being too passive, her 
not having had the 
courage 
To take a more 











The agent feels 
organizational culture 
does not encourage her 











superiors with this 
System 
suppression 
The agent feels the 
organizational systems, 
e.g. bureaucracy, inhibit 
her from making sense 
of the strategy 





Trying to avoid 






The feeling of the 
organization going into 
the wrong direction 
inhibits the agent from 
determining the right 
actions 
The strategy to 
change or at least 
good grounds given 
for current strategy 
Influence => 
sensemaking 
Trying to work 













Being unsure of 
the warrant for 
actions 
 







Interviewee14 works as a sales agent in a large firm. She notes that her work has been quite 
stable and unchanging for the last few years and that is the way she likes it. When confronted 
with the strategic theme she gives a few cautious comments, revealing that she is not fully 
certain of its significance. She notes that strategy is not an “everyday topic of discussion 
around here”. She thinks she could influence the organization if she noticed that something 
was wrong, but to date this has not happened. All in all, she identifies very positively with her 
employer, considering the firm a good place to work in. Strategy is not a part of her job 
description and that is the way it should be.  
  
The unenlightened citizen feels that she is where she wants to be in terms of influence 
in the strategy process. Confronted with questions about organizational strategy, 
however, she reports that the sensemaking challenge the interviewer is posing with 
her questions of strategy is too great. The interviewee, put face to face with strategy in 
the interview situation, thus responds to the challenge by replying that the discussion 
about organizational strategy is too much for her to handle. What is remarkable about 
the unenlightened citizen, however, is that in many cases she does not regard her 




unenlightenment as a negative issue. In many cases, the unenlightened citizen is 
where she wants to be. It is not that she does not care about the organization’s 
direction, indeed, she wants her work to be directed toward the realization of 
organizational strategy. It is just that she has not made sense of the organizational 
strategy as a whole. 
The obvious criterion for classifying unenlightened citizens is the type of reason that 
they give for not having made sense of the strategy. Many of the citizens interviewed 
simply felt that they were out of their league with strategic issues. It was not a part of 
their work to make sense of strategic issues and that is how it should be. This was the 
case with our Interviewee14. Some of these citizens were simply too preoccupied with 
their own field of specialty and did not want strategic issues to conflict with the 
completion of their specialized tasks. They felt that it was the job of the strategic 
planners to think of the strategic issues and their job to do the daily work, an 
arrangement that suited them just fine. One interviewee felt that she was not a 
“researcher-type”, but wanted to work on practical issues. Somebody else noted that 
he would participate in strategic issues if “ordered to do so”. All in all, these 
interviewees felt that strategy fell out of their job descriptions, which were what they 
signed in for. 
(Q59) “I have chosen this field because I like working in it. In my work there is a clear 
emphasis on problem solving.     
Question: Do you feel that you have had the chance to influence objectives related to 
[a strategic theme]? 
Answer: You bet I have had that chance. Here we can talk directly to the vice president. 
If you can base your arguments well enough, you can influence all the things that you 
want.” 
Furthermore, some agents reported not having the time to enlighten themselves about 
strategy. This was not regarded a major obstacle, however, but more like a natural 
state of things. Some interviewees, when confronted, simply could not remember the 
strategic issues they were confronted with. Because the interviewees were provided 
with but a few key strategic documents during the interview, some felt that they 
simply could not bring the strategic issues to mind well enough. It was not that they 
felt that they were not provided with enough materials or sensemaking facilitation to 
back them up, but simply that the issues could not be found recalled from memory. 




They did not seem to blame anybody about this lapse of memory, although seemed to 
report a small amount of guilt. 
(Q60) “Well, I don’t think… on one hand they write all sorts of things… I suppose I 
don’t read all the stuff that is published and distributed […] I guess it would have been 
good to read our human resources development strategy, I suppose I might have found 
some of the answers [to a question about strategy], I think in that document I might 
have found the answer in a condensed form […] maybe I don’t have a holistic picture 
of what that means.” 
A related answer was given by those interviewees who felt that they knew what 
organizational strategy was all about but could not put it down in words. One reason 
given for this was that the interviewee felt somewhat uncomfortable using strategic 
concepts, yet had understood what they meant nonetheless. While this may have been 
an excuse in some cases, I think in most cases this was simply an issue about tacit 
knowledge that was internalized (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995); yet the interviewee did 
not feel she had the conceptual tools to explicate the internalized content. 
(Q61) “A general image of sorts has probably remained in my memory, but of course 
the smaller details are always tricky […] For instance, in the final stages of production 
planning, actually some rules just fit right into  our activities, which has never 
happened before. Instead of general orders, we had something that we could implement 
right away. The next thing you are going to ask is what this thing was, which I don’t 
remember. But anyway, I remember that because it was the first time something fit 
right away.” 
Some unenlightened citizens felt that the strategy documents were too abstract to be 
made sense of. What was curious, however, was that the citizens did not report doing 
anything about making them more understandable. These agents felt that the 
documents were not that important in themselves and that they could do without them. 
This did not mean, however, that they would have shown neglect for strategy in 
general.   
(Q62) “[…] of course it’s a bit utopist when the top management creates [a strategy 
document] such as this and expects the content to be real clear to the  practical worker, 
at least it doesn’t happen immediately. But anyhow, one thing that is clear is that the 
customers constitute our main objective, and into that we will put our every effort. One 
thing that is nice about this organization is that the organization makes sure that the 
people implementing the strategy have the strength to do it.” 
A final type of enlightened citizen was revealed in the form of an agent who felt that 
she simply could not form a coherent conception of strategy, considering the amount 
and quality of information available. It was not, however, that these citizens felt that 




they were denied the right information or the explanations were lacking on behalf of 
the top management, it was more like the agents were pessimistic about their own 
abilities or simply regarded the issue of strategy itself to be too complex for 
comprehension. The types of unenlightenment discussed above are summarized in 
Table 19.  
Table 19. Summary of unenlightened citizens 
Variety of 
unenlightenment 
Source  Characteristics 
Out of their league Job description E.g. not a part of their job, not the right type, 
not ordered to participate, preoccupied with 
own specialty 
Too busy Perceived time 
resource 
Too busy with other, more important, things 
to acquaint themselves with strategy 
Unable to repeat 
strategy 
Strategic concepts Do not know how to explicate strategy, even 
though they feel that they have made sense 
of it 
Do not remember Personal memory Cannot bring strategy to memory, would like 
to look at the strategy documents 
Strategy is too 
abstract 
Strategic documents Do not comprehend the content of strategic 
documents, but feels that is not the most 
important issue 
Cannot form a 
coherent 
conception 
Amount / quality of 
information 
Information available does not warrant 
sensemaking 
 
The unenlightened citizen is a person who is content with her influencing the 
organization, including the possibility of gaining knowledge about organizational 
strategy, but who does not feel she has made sense of strategy. The issue 
distinguishing unenlightened citizens and puzzled champions is the citizens’ general 
state of contentment about their unenlightened status, whereas the champions 
generally reported doing something about resolving issues to gain a better 
understanding. The unenlightened citizen is no cynic, however. She wants her work to 
service strategy; it is just that it is somebody else’s job to do the thinking about 
strategy. 







Interviewee15 is a freshly appointed team leader in a public organization. He notes that he is 
still in the learning stages of being a leader, though he regards it as a worthwhile challenge. 
He is generally positive about the strategic theme, yet does not give an account of why it is 
important to the organization. He has participated in his unit’s strategic planning, but has 
largely been contented to just listen. He admits that he really has not had so much time to 
form an understanding of strategy, but is more concerned about the everyday leadership 
skills he is learning. If he wanted to, he would surely be allowed to contribute to the strategy 
process, but he feels uncertain as to whether he would be able to offer something worthwhile. 
 
The final type of citizen discovered simply feels lost. Confronted with strategy by the 
interview situation, she raises her hands and surrenders, to use a metaphor. She feels 
that the sensemaking and action challenge set by strategy is simply too great. She is 
not overwhelmed by strategy, because she feels that this feeling of being lost is more 
like a sign that the choices and interpretations have to be made by other people than a 
challenge to be overcome, as would be the typical champion response. 




The situational descriptions by lost citizens of their social positions were complex in a 
manner similar to the descriptions given by overwhelmed champions. The first type of 
description was that there was simply too much responsibility to be borne by the 
agent, both in terms of understanding strategy and making strategic decisions. One 
agent felt that the organizational strategy planning process was “a huge bulk that falls 
on top of you each year”, thus reporting being unable to comprehend the heavy 
machinery of the process and making the correct decisions. Another agent felt that she 
was left alone with too much responsibility over subordinates who were too 
inexperienced. One agent reported that strategy was simply moving too fast to keep 
track. 
(Q63) “My [ideal] way of working would be to first take a look at my slice of the pie 
and turn it around, wondering what I should do with it […] What happens in reality is 
that I end up jumping onto trains that are already moving […]” 
Another type of complaint was that the strategy process allowed too much freedom to 
the agent. The interviewees reported that they would have needed guidelines and rules 
to help them determine which actions were to be prioritized over others. The agents 
felt that they needed to be told if the things they were doing were the right things in 
terms of organizational strategy. In some cases, the interviewees themselves even 
questioned the practice of always asking for input in strategic issues and wanted input 
and decisions from the management instead. 
(Q64) “At times you think whether all this is really worthwhile.” 
Or as commented by our Interviewee15: 
(Q65) “ […] this is a good place to work because you get to be involved if you want to, 
that’s no problem. A bigger problem has been my feeling that I have not had so much 
to contribute myself.” 
One agent clearly emphasized the need to find clear measuring instruments to link 
performance to strategy. She felt this was the only way for the management to give 
the relevant kind of feedback mentioned above. 
(Q66) “ […] [the strategic objectives] cannot be linked to our measurement 
instruments. You can make assumptions and say that hey, you did a great job and 
reached all your objectives, but how that is related to the realization of our strategy-
vision, that’s the problem, I mean, those linkages.” 




Some agents simply were struggling with the strategy process. This meant that the 
position that they had been given was simply too large for their comfort. They 
reported problems dealing with strategic language. Some participated in strategic 
planning, did not understand what was discussed and were embarrassed about this. 
One agent participated in planning sessions in her team and simply did not understand 
why.  
Some agents reported that they had willingly withdrawn to the confines of their own 
units. They felt that strategic issues were expected of them but felt that the workload 
they (and their subordinates) had was already too great.  
(Q67) “Question: Is the strategy reflected to your team’s goals? 
Answer: No. I would not have agreed to that, that’s obvious to all my superiors, that we 
simply don’t have the time. That sounds outrageous and cold, but when there is no 
time, then there is no time.” 
The lost citizens in their situations are summarized in Table 20. One can clearly see 
that the situation descriptions they give are somewhat static. They do not report ways 
out of their situations nor actions directed to take them out. It seems that they will be 
lost at least a while longer. 
Table 20. Summary of lost citizens 
Situational description Characteristics Cases 




E.g. alone in the planning 
process, too many inexperienced 
subordinates 
Too much freedom Need guidelines E.g. unable to prioritize, would 
like to know when they have 
succeeded and when not 
Struggling Unable to understand 
strategy process and act 
in it 
E.g. unable to deal with strategic 
concepts, unable to participate in 
discussion 
Locked themselves into 
their chambers (with 
strategy banging on the 
door) 
Determined to stay out of 
the strategy process and 
limit their action to a 
closed sphere 
E.g. refusing to reflect strategic 
issues in objectives until they 
have the resources to implement 
them  
 




Citizens in the strategy process: A summary 
The strategy process citizens discovered in the interviews were people who reported 
wanting to be loyal to their organizations and caring for its future. They were 
generally motivated in the good completion of their work for the good of their 
organization. They did not show any active interest in influencing the strategy process 
in any manner transcending the personal spheres of their work activities. They were 
not active in changing people’s attitudes or the organization.  
Those citizens who were satisfied assumed roles that made them act as co-operative 
members of the strategy process, if not expressly influential ones. They were 
implementers, rule-followers, students and the like. Six categories were discovered in 
which a satisfied citizen role in the strategy process was not possible. The recluse 
citizens found asylum in their personal spheres of work because they did not regard 
themselves as invited members of the strategy process. The neutralized citizens 
understood what their organization’s strategy was all about, yet were prevented from 
doing anything about it. The citizens in need felt that they needed more support in 
carrying out their responsibilities in the strategy process in order to succeed. The 
troubled citizens were in various sorts of predicaments, not understanding what 
strategy meant, unable to break free from the chains that kept them from coming to an 
understanding and finding their roles. The unenlightened citizens did not feel that they 
understood organizational strategy yet did not feel they needed more chances of 
influencing strategy. The lost citizens wandered aimlessly in the process, not 
understanding it all, and not knowing whether they were doing the right things (see 
Figure 11 below). 





































N =  3; 1,0 % of all N =  11; 3,7 % of all
N =  24; 8,0 % of all N =  42; 14,0 % of all
N =  15; 5,0 % of all N =  9; 3,0 % of all N =  14; 4,7 % of all







Figure 11. Citizens of the strategy process 
The group of citizens was somewhat smaller than that of champions, still amounting 
to almost 40 percent of all interviewees. The citizens were more evenly distributed to 
different positions than champions, most of whom were either empowered or puzzled.  
In the case of strategic champions, the center tile in the schema seemed to act as a 
gravitational center. With strategic champions, some puzzled champions did not 
regard strategy as something to be completely sure about and thus regarded their 
puzzlement as something natural. This phenomenon was much starker with citizens. 
Indeed, the group of unenlightened citizens was the largest of all, amounting to about 
one seventh of all interviewees. Most unenlightened citizens were content with their 
unenlightened state, being completely willing to let others worry about making sense 
of strategy. The group of satisfied citizens was smaller, but still the next largest group. 
The fact that more citizens regarded themselves as unenlightened than satisfied in 
terms of a position in the strategy process would seem to indicate that there were 
more citizens who wanted to exclude themselves totally from the strategy process, 




regarding it as somebody else’s business, than those who wanted to play a more 
compliant role in the process as members of the process.  
Two tiles in Figure 11 are empty, not supported by data. It is not surprising 
that the inhibited sensemaking / enough influence tile left empty of strategic 
champions is empty here as well. The discussion that applied to the tile in association 
with champions applies here as well – while an account corresponding to the tile 
seems very prone to inconsistencies, its existence cannot be altogether denied. 
Another tile left empty in Figure 11 is the tile corresponding to abandoned 
champions. This should not be a surprise either, since only one abandoned champion 
was discovered.   
Whereas the center tile of empowered champions acted as a gravitational center of 
sorts for strategic champions, it is by no means certain where the citizens in other 
positions from satisfied citizens would want to be. While they were inactive at the 
moment, it is uncertain whether some citizens were prevented from being, not 
satisfied citizens, but empowered champions, for instance. In some cases, hints can be 
collected, as I have done in association with citizens in need (Table 17). In most 
cases, it remains a mystery as to whether the citizens were potential champions in 
some cases, or worn out champions, in others. The varieties of citizens in strategy 
processes are conceptualized and summarized in Table 21 below. 




Table 21. Summary of citizens of the strategy process  
Citizen Sensemaking 




Recluse Too small / too 
small 
Retreated back to 
doing their work  
Reason for 
reclusion 




Neutralized Enough room / 
too small 




Lack of legitimacy, 
limited right to use 
voice 
Satisfied Enough room / 
enough room 
Content their 
position in the 
strategy process 
Role played Implementer, rule-
follower, student 
Citizen in need Enough room / 
too large 
In need of support 
in activities 
Kind of need Further instruction, 
management 
decision making 
Troubled  Too large / too 
small 
In trouble, unable 
to get out 
Type of 
predicament 
Guilt trip, cultural 
suppression, wrong 
strategy 
Unenlightened Too large / 
enough room 
Unable to make 
sense of strategy 
Variety of un-
enlightenment 
Out of their league, 
too busy, does not 
remember 
Lost Too large / too 
large 











6.3 Cynics of the strategy process 
The cynic is a person who has given up on the very notion of the strategy process. She 
regards it with occasional scorn, occasional disinterest. While citizens felt that the 
strategy process was important, and in some cases not their responsibility, the cynic 
feels that it is unworthy of her attention altogether. The cynic may not regard her 
organization with a similar scorn, however. Indeed, in most cases the cynics reported 
positive identification with their organizations, but did not feel anything useful could 
come out of organizational strategy. Five categories of cynics were discovered using 




Interviewee16 is a secretary in a public organization, with tenure of more than twenty years. 
She comments that she has had no reason to acquaint herself with the organizational strategy. 
During the years she has lost all faith in the top management who use lots of fine language but 
produce few results. On top of that, the top managers have been arguing among themselves 
for years now. Interviewee16, on the other hand, is left alone with too much work. The 
strategic theme could provide a change to that but she doesn't believe this will happen. The 
strategic theme has, again, been just talk with no action taken. 




The hopeless cynic feels she has no access to information required for making sense 
of the organizational strategy. She also feels dissatisfied with her possibilities of 
influencing strategic issues. Yet she does not feel there is anything that she can do 
about it, and has lost all hope of trying to change even her own situation, not to 
mention issues transcending that. 
It was notable that the group of hopeless cynics represented quite a homogenous 
population – all being operative personnel with a long service record in the 
organization. All the hopeless cynics gave complaints concerning strategic issues in 
their organizations. Many agents noted that lots of different development projects had 
been initiated but no real change ever took place. This kind of complaint was directed 
to the organizational level of analysis, implying an expectation that change should 
happen in the organization at large, i.e. change was regarded as a macro-, not a micro-
, level phenomenon. Some said that true strategy was hidden from them. Some noted 
that nobody ever asked their opinion on strategic issues. Many agents also complained 
that human beings were not treated as such but as parts of a machine, to be measured 
in money. 
(Q68) “The people upstairs should realize that people have other things in their lives 
than just work. That you should treat people as… more like human beings […] to 
regard people as human being the same way that customers are being treated. And not 
always just as workers who do the work. I think a spirit of humanity is lacking in this 
organization.”  
Four typical roles emerged from the accounts of the interviewees, reflecting the 
hopeless cynic social position. Some interviewees were disillusioned realists. They 
felt that the true nature of their organization was such that nothing good ever came out 
of strategic efforts, no matter how many promises were made. This they had come to 
know from real-life experience. 
(Q69) “… it feels like nobody really listens to our opinions and suggestions. You 
always hit a wall at some point. Nothing ever changes.” 
The critics were people who managed to find a large number of issues that should be 
corrected, wrongs to be righted, but reported doing nothing about these issues. They 
did not feel any responsibility to correct the issues themselves, but usually directed 
the critique in a general, upward direction toward strategy makers. It would seem that 




the critique posed was mainly triggered by the interview situation and not freely 
offered in many cases. 
(Q70) “We talked about it [a strategic theme] in the [official strategy process], but I 
am not convinced about it in any way. On the surface the theme is just a change of 
terms, the risk being that they may change the names of existing units.” 
The hero is an individual who emphasizes her own worth, or the worth of her team, to 
her organization, but nobody seems to notice. Her agenda is her own and not 
connected to strategy, nor does she have any intention of changing strategy through 
her action.  
 (Q71) “I myself think that we, as a unit are highly essential to [the organization], and 
competent, and ambitious, and proud. These are the principles behind my work. As a 
team I think we should enhance our profile. To be more credible. To be seen. But this is 
just my view. At this point I think we are all working on different fronts. If I would 
exaggerate it a bit, I could think that I work as a freelancer.”  
Some interviewees, such as our interviewee16, were tired ghosts, disregarded, 
abandoned, alone. This is where hopelessness reached its highest plateau. Unlike their 
champion counterparts who found unofficial channels to influence strategic issues, the 
tired ghosts did no such thing but instead placed blame on other people for their 
predicament. 
(Q72) “Two people from my team have already left […] the managers tell me that 
nobody will be hired in their place, “just try to find somebody to cover for you during 
vacations”[…] they don’t take the responsibility, that tells a story about their attitudes. 
All that matters is that things get done, but when some small thing goes wrong, then 
they remember your existence. Doesn’t this say something about management, and 
about the managers?” 
Whereas the excluded champions in general tried to find unofficial channels to 
channel their energies, influencing the strategy process, it would seem that the 
hopeless cynics used coping methods to bear their situation. Disillusioned realists 
formed a rationale based on pessimism, critics criticized everything but did nothing, 
heroes formed a belief of themselves as irreplaceable, and tired ghosts blamed other 
people. The roles and these methods are summarized in Table 22 below. 




Table 22. Summary hopeless cynics 
Role Characteristics Coping method 
Disillusioned realist Has encountered too many 
disappointments to believe in 
strategy 
Abandoning hope about 
finding a strategic role 
Toothless critic Criticizes strategic issues, but does 
nothing to change issues  
Voicing critique when asked, 
no action 
Hero Regards herself to be irreplaceable, 
works her own agenda, not 
connected to strategy 
Emphasizing her value to her 
organization, even if not 
recognized by others 
Tired ghost Feels lonely and secluded in her cell Placing blame on other 
people 
 
It was interesting to notice that hopeless cynics can be distinguished according to the 
roles they attribute to themselves. In the case of champions and citizens, roles were 
described by agents who felt relatively content with their positions. This makes 
perfect sense. The hopeless cynic is a person who has no expectations of ever 
changing even her own social position. Therefore that position becomes perfectly 
clear in the interview text. The citizen and champion have not lost all hope. If 
something is wrong, they seek to change it. 







Interviewee17 is a sales manager in a large firm, with tenure over 10 years. He has a university 
background, which is not typical for people in relative positions. He feels he has a better 
understanding on organizational strategy  “than many others”. He is highly skeptical of the 
strategic theme ever being realized, because of the stagnated culture of his firm. He notes that 
the organization is being managed “like the Soviet Union”, i.e. as a rigid bureaucracy. The 
organizational members are unwilling to change to facilitate the realization of any change. He 
does not even want to try to influence the organization or strategy anymore. He has 
surrendered to the thought that nothing even happens in his firm.  
 
The surrendered cynic feels she has made sense of strategy, yet faces an obstacle in 
her attempts to influence strategy in key issues. Her response is surrender. She has 
decided that strategy is not worth fighting for. While hopeless cynics represented a 




homogenous population, the group of surrendered cynics was quite varied – from top 
management to operative personnel.  
Some agents reported their main obstacle to be the impossibility of influencing people. 
One top manager related this to organizational politics, which was simply too hard to 
be overcome when introducing key strategic issues. His organization consisted of two 
main sections with conflicting interest, and tackling them both was a hopeless task. 
Our interviewee17 reported that his organization’s management culture was simply so 
stagnated with people holding to their own small territories, that nothing useful could 
be done in terms of strategic change.  
(Q73) “ […] sometimes it feels as if we didn’t need customers at all, from the way there 
is a constant humdrum of “change processes” and internal meetings and strategic 
planning going on and so on […] In a way this is like the old communist party from the 
Soviet Union who had what, thousands of employees and one day, all of a sudden it 
was terminated. All of a sudden it was decided that it was not needed any more and so 
it wasn’t. But they had their humdrum going on all that time. I think, in our worst hour, 
our organization is a bit like the communist party.”  
One surrendered cynic reported that he was simply too tired of fighting. He had had 
one fight too many about an issue that he understood perfectly well was harmful to 
the organization. He was simply too tired to fight a useless fight championing an 
issue. The trouble was that he was the leader of a group of operative personnel who 
were forced to reorganize according to a procedure decided on the organizational 
level, yet which suited the team in question very badly. The leader had championed 
against the change for a long time, yet had not reached his goal. Talking about the 
whole issue seemed to make him angry. 
(Q74) “Many things look good in theory, but fail in practice. I have a long working 
experience here and if I could just share some of that with others, who have less 
experience […] I just don’t think that we used to do everything wrong before. It feels as 
if we have to change just for the sake of change […]” 
One surrendered cynic reported that it simply did not pay off to act strategically. He 
felt that acting strategically did not give him the benefits he wanted, in terms of 
monetary rewards and other benefits. It was as if he felt he had made an implicit deal 
with organizational strategy, one that the organization had fail to hold on to. His 
response was to find another employer. 
(Q75) “Question: Do you think [the strategic theme] will be realized in [your 
organization]? 




Answer: If they manage to keep certain key personnel in the organization, then yes.  
Question: Would you like to specify, which key personnel you are referring to? 
Answer: Well, those kind of people, for which it is very hard to find suitable 
replacements, either because they would demand such a high compensation for their 
work that the [employer] cannot afford it, or because the tasks themselves are so 
demanding and specific that you cannot really train for them in any other way than 
through long working experience.” 
The surrendered cynic is a person who has lost the fight to be either a citizen or a 
champion. She has surrendered to an impenetrable obstacle of some sort. The 
obstacles and their sources are summarized in Table 23 below.  
Table 23. Summary of surrendered cynics 
Obstacle Source Characteristics 
Impossible to influence 
people to adopt strategy 
Organizational politics / 
culture 
E.g. politically stagnated decision 
making culture, people clinging to 
their positions 
One fight too many Experiences of championing E.g. tired of trying to fight for a 
cause, decided to give up 
Strategic action does not 
pay off 
Benefits of acting 
strategically  
E.g. leaving the organization 
because it does not pay to act 
strategically  
 







Interviewee18 is a middle manager leading a sales team in a large firm. He has less than two 
years of tenure under his belt. Confronted with strategy he comments that strategy plays no 
role in his work, because “it’s just routine”. While it may be nice to draw strategy process 
diagrams (which he thinks resemble Christmas decorations), they amount to nothing. The 
only goal is to make as much money to the organization as possible. Furthermore, this is the 
only kind of reasoning that his subordinates, the salespeople, “who are lazy by their very 
nature” really understand. 
 
The disinterested cynic does not feel any gaps in her understanding of strategy and her 
possibilities of influencing it. Yet she does not feel not think the strategy process has 
anything to do with her work. The agent who’s simply regarding strategy as useless 
explains the fact that there would seem to be no tension between her happiness with 
her position and her seeming inactivity. 




One interviewee explained her disinterest by arguing that his organization's strategy 
process was just talk with no real intent of actually realizing any strategic intent. He 
felt confident he understood the rules according to which the organization functioned. 
He noted that those rules had absolutely nothing to do with the notions of strategy that 
were conceptualized in the official strategy process. 
(Q76) “[Yawns expressively], yeah right, I’m really moved by this [strategy diagram]. 
But these things don’t work in practice. They are all very fine, you could decorate your 
Christmas tree with these, but in reality you can say right ahead that there's no chance 
[…]” 
Another agent felt that the formal planning tools used in his organization’s strategy 
process were harmful to creativity. He felt that the management was enamored with 
tools that tried to chain people’s creativity to service some sort of managerial 
planning rationality. More freedom was needed.  
(Q77) “ […] the way they make strategy in this organization… It seems that the 
managers have adopted some pre-made conceptions on how organizations are 
managed and developed. These conceptions stem from management philosophies 
learned from outside the organization. They are easy to cling to in order to be assured 
that ‘now I used this and this formula’. I would like the managers to be more creative 
in what they are doing, to use more spontaneity in the way they do their work.” 
In a sense, the group of disinterested cynics is the paradigmatic, scornful image of the 
cynic that is upheld by certain writers (Dean & al. 1998, Reichers et al. 1997). There 
were only two of these cynics discovered in the interview texts, which meant that they 
were not a very substantial group, although they do provide insights into why some 
people have lost their faith in strategies. 







Interviewee19 is a top management team member and unit head in a public organization. He 
notes that he participates in the real strategy process by “thinking and communicating”, 
while the formal strategy process of the organization is “a bunch of theoretical hooey”. He 
initiated the execution of the strategic theme in his own unit, getting good results, after which 
the strategic theme was adopted into the official strategy process. He is happy about the 
development in of his own unit, but is openly critical, even hostile towards the organization as 
a whole. He notes that the only party benefiting from the current status quo are the 
management consultants. There should be a wide-ranging discussion involving a large group 
of stakeholders. 
 
The dislocated cynic is an agent, who feels she has not made sense of the strategy due 
to it being incomprehensible to her in some manner. Furthermore, she feels that she is 
unable to influence the strategy process to the extent that she would wish to. She is in 
a position that is dislocated in the strategy process in some way.  




There were two kinds of dislocation identified in the interview text, radically different 
in nature. The first of these is a position of oppression. The agents felt that they were 
exploited by their organization, i.e. not given the proper say in strategic issues, 
controlled, made to work under too much direction. The agents all either expressed or 
reported a variety of strong negative emotions such as anger, frustration and 
bitterness, as well as some mixed mental states such as suspicions. Some agents 
reported that strategies were just a way for the management to get “feathers in their 
caps”, taken out of the blood, sweat and tears of the employees. Other agents felt that 
the management was not candid with their subordinates, manipulating them and 
withholding the whole truth about organizational issues from them. One agent even 
expressed suspicion that the interview itself might be monitored through a 
surveillance camera. 
(Q78) “ […] the reason why I asked you whether we could talk safely in here is that 
there are cameras all over the place. I know some things that have not been publicly 
discussed.  
Question: Sounds kind of alarming… 
Answer: I don’t like being watched. Having to show that you are really efficient all the 
time. It is a part of human nature that you cannot work on full steam all the time. Some 
days are just not as good as others.” 
Most interviewees usually related their oppressed state to some event in their personal 
working history in the organization. Some events referred to contained an episode 
where the agent had been denied an opportunity in the organization: repositioning, 
management training, etc. Others had just ended up in conflicts with their supervisor. 
The notion of procedural justice has a strong presence here, as the agents did not 
regard the practices of dividing goods among individuals as fair and justified (cf. 
Greenberg, 1990). 
(Q79) “In the beginning, we had a load of team spirit, the feeling of acting as a team 
and being one, but we have ended in a situation in which you cannot earn your way 
with good work. That is, if you are not best buddies with [the manager]. 
Question: So your work does not influence how you can progress in the organization? 
Answer: At least I feel that way, yes. Some people get rewarded and others don’t.” 
Some agents did not report any historical event as a cause of their dislocation from the 
strategy process. They simply complained about the practices connected to strategy, 
getting into detail, but not personalizing the issues by linking them to their personal 




histories. It was as if they were angry customers, unsatisfied with the services the 
management offered them in terms of the strategy process. 
(Q80) “At the operative level we don’t get much time for adjusting [to strategic 
changes][…] it is rarely that I get around to going [to the intranet] to look at these 
[strategy documents]. They do departmental plans every year, and of course plans on 
the higher level as well. We go through them at least once a year. But I don’t pay much 
attention to them, unless they apply to me.” 
One interesting notion uniting all the agents was that the agents reporting oppression 
could not characterize the ways in which they would have wanted to influence the 
strategy process. Their answers were typically quite confused and even self-
contradictory. This can be understood when one remembers that knowledge and 
influence are related, as was noted in Section 3.3. 
While oppression was a type of dislocation, another possibility was disconnection 
from the strategy process altogether. While all oppressed agents were operational 
personnel, cynics reporting dislocatedness were from all organizational levels from 
top management downwards. What was typical for these agents was that, while they 
described that they could not make sense of strategy and that their possibilities of 
influence were too limited, they also reported a phenomenon of reclusion similar to 
the recluse citizens discussed in the previous chapters. Cynics reporting dislocation 
emphasized a contrast between their own unit and the organization, describing the 
organization in a variety of unflattering terms, yet regarding their own unit as a 
pleasurable, safe and comprehensible sphere. 
The interviewees gave a variety of criteria for the organizational level. Some 
interviewees, such as our interviewee19, described it as a bureaucratic inferno, in 
which decisions were made in random, following all sorts of management fads and 
fashions or the will of external stakeholders. For these agents, their own unit was 
conceptualized as a safe haven of rationality and cooperation, whereas the 
organization represented political games and summary judgments. 
(Q81) “I am just so tired with all this strategy mumbo jumbo. We have been planning 
and planning the organization for five years and made strategies and talked on and on 
at  an extremely theoretical level. All this is totally alien to our employees and a  new 
organization has still not been accomplished. New consultants come in all the time and 
bring in their theoretical models that are totally alienated from practice. It just doesn’t 
work this way. All this could have been accomplished by putting the [top management 
team] in our [PR-facilities] for one or two days, to design the new organization, 
because we know well enough what our objectives are. We could have fought about it 




long enough for the “white smoke to come out of the chimney”. Then we could have 
announced that the new organization has been born.  
Question: Why hasn’t this been done? 
Answer: Well, apparently our [CEO] has been somewhat weak by not interfering, but 
we have one of our inside organizational units […] working this system and at times I 
feel that this unit is just looking for justification for its work from this constant process, 
and this process has gained a life of its own with no intention of ever reaching a 
conclusion.” 
In a sense these disconnected cynics were “rebels without a cause”. They had chosen 
not to operate as parts of organizational strategy, and not doing anything about 
changing the issues they had grown tired of.  
While the two types of dislocation, namely oppression and disconnection, may seem 
to be radically different, they both reflect a dislocated social position in the general 
framework of structuration (see Figure 3), discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Oppression 
is clearly an issue directly related to the processes of domination, whereas 
disconnection is more a communicative type of dislocation – isolating oneself from 
communicating in the strategy process, integrating strategy into one’s personal 
structures of meaning, etc. The two types of dislocation, along with their structuration 
linkages, are summarized in Table 24 below. 
Table 24. Summary of dislocated cynics 
Type of dislocation Structuration dimension Characteristics 
Oppression Domination E.g. being bitter about current 
status in relation to some past 
event, being an “angry customer” 
Disconnection Communication Regarding their own unit as a safe 
haven in contrast to the 
organizational level 







Interviewee20 is a clerk in a large firm, with tenure over 10 years. She thinks she has quite a 
good hold on organizational strategy, but feels unable to characterize its main points, or 
define the relevance of the strategic theme. She feels that some objectives have to be set for 
her team, but only in the hopes of a reward. She has not influenced any strategic objectives, 
but does not regard this as a problem, since she simply is not interested in influencing the 
strategy. When asked about the firm’s future she notes that it will probably do as well as 
always and she will probably hang along.  
 
The passive cynic does not understand the organizational strategy, nor does she show 
much interest in changing this situation. In this sense, she resembles the 
unenlightened citizen, but, whereas the unenlightened citizen regarded strategy as 
something beneficial to the organization, yet better handled by others, the passive 
cynic thinks that strategy is either outright harmful or at least fails to bring about 
anything of value. 




Three distinct frames of mind could be discerned from the interview text. These 
frames of mind reflected the agent’s psychological position toward strategy, 
expressed both in explicit terms and in their manner of speaking. The ironic cynics 
portrayed a lot of sardonic wit in their answers, talking of the issues they felt worried 
or concerned about by ridiculing them, and also themselves, in the process. Some felt 
that the strategy was taking the organization in a harmful direction, while others were 
discontented because they were undervalued as members of the process. Yet all ironic 
cynics emphasized that they did not want any more influence in matters of strategy. 
(Q82) “Most of my communication [to my unit] consists of face-to-face discussions 
about things. 
Question: Do these discussions usually take place in official or unofficial situations? 
Answer: Både och [both]. In unofficial situations, we speak of things in their real, 
disgusting form and when we get all official we sing the songs the company wants us to 
sing.” 
Irony has been regarded as a useful channel for expressing perceived contradiction in 
organizational life (Hatch, 1997a). One may contest that viewpoint, however. In our 
context, it would seem that ironic cynics seemed to have abandoned strategy 
altogether. One is bound to think that humor may take the place of action in some 
contexts, i.e. the agent may not be motivated to face the trial of changing issues if she 
resorts to humor to alleviate the tension (Rodrigues & Collinson, 1995). This is 
related to the discussion of dissent in organizations. Dooley & Fryxell (1999) have 
discovered that dissent, in order to be fruitful, took the condition of trust in others and 
their competence as a prerequisite. 
Some agents, such as our interviewee20, were simply spiteful toward strategy and their 
own positions in the strategy process. They showed disregard of both strategy and 
their own role in it. In this frame of mind, the concept of taking action to influence 
strategy was regarded as not being very feasible and also as a source of extra work.   
(Q83) “… look, it’s quite a small button that I get to press in this organization.”  
Some agents were disbelievers in strategy. These agents felt that strategy was taking 
the organization in the wrong direction. They could not see the grounds on which 
strategy could be regarded as a sensible direction for the organization to take. 
Therefore they had ceased to take great interest in strategic issues. 




(Q84) “I very rarely go to them [CEO Q&A sessions], because they are you know… I 
think that they are, as other [strategy communication], kind of just for show.”  
The passive cynics were passive in terms of three frames of mind that are summarized 
in Table 25 below. They reported a situation in which they had not made sense of 
strategy with all its seeming contradictions, yet they reported no attempt to change 
this. 
Table 25. Summary of passive cynics 
Frame of mind Reaction to strategy Characteristics 
Ironic Sardonic humor Channeling paradoxes in strategy in 
humorous expressions 
Spiteful Disregard and disrespect Showing disrespect toward both the 
strategy process and their own position 
in it 
Disbeliever Disbelief and disregard (no 
expressions of dissent) 
Stopping attempts at influencing the 
strategy process due to a general 
disbelief in this ever working out 
 




Strategic cynics: a summary 
The cynics are individuals who reported a negative orientation toward their 
organization’s strategy process. They do not act as parts of the strategy process, yet 
they may have a positive orientation toward their own personal work and the 
organization in general. Five types of cynics were discovered in the interview texts; 
these are portrayed in Figure 12. 
Figure 12. The cynics of strategy 
Cynics were clearly the smallest activity group, amounting to less than 10 percent of 
the interviewees. The cynics are distributed quite evenly in the discovered positions. 
Whereas there were large groups among citizen positions and especially among 
champions, there are no such clearly dominant groups among cynics. What is striking 
about Figure 12 is that all the cynics are located on the lower portion of the grid, i.e. 
all of those individuals who had given up the strategic action felt that they either had 
too little or enough possibilities of influencing strategy. None of them felt that too 
much was expected of them. It would seem that responsibility and cynicism do not 
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 The two tiles left empty among citizens were left empty with cynics 
as well. Two more positions were left unsupported by the cynic data, i.e. those 
positions corresponding to champions under stress / citizens in need, and lost citizens 
/ overwhelmed champions.  These positions were just those in which the agents felt 
too much was expected of them in terms of independent decision making. No cynic 
felt too much was expected from her in terms of strategy. 
The interesting question concerning them is what each group of cynics would like to 
be. The very notion of cynicism would seem to indicate that there is no single 
comfortable position within that group - cynicism is not something a person usually 
strives toward. There was no gravitational center for the cynics, whereas with 
champions it was clearly the empowered champion position, and with citizens the 
satisfied citizen for the most part. The position of the disinterested cynic, however, 
was scarcely populated and did not entail any roles, but only accounts as to why the 
agents could not care less about strategy. 
There was a set of roles discovered in the group of hopeless cynics, however. These 
were agents who had been frozen in an uncomfortable and disregarded position, 
ending up being cynics such as toothless critics or disillusioned realists. The 
surrendered cynics had given up on the face of a large obstacle. The dislocated cynics 
felt they had not made sense of strategy and had too little influence, being either 
oppressed by strategy or disconnected from the strategy process. The passive cynics 
had not made sense of strategy, and did not even want to. The different varieties of 
cynics are summarized in Table 26 below. 












Hopeless Too small / too 
small 
Lost hope of ever 
having an active 
position 
Roles Disillusioned realist, 
toothless critic 
Surrendered Too small / 
enough room 
Stopped fighting  Obstacle Politics, one fight too 
many 
Disinterested Enough room / 
enough room 
Shows no interest 
in strategy, regards 
it as useless 
Grounds for 
disinterest 
“Talk, talk”, killing 
creativity 
Dislocated Too large / too 
small 






Passive Too large / 
enough room 
Not made sense 
and not interested 





6.4 Champions, citizens, cynics. A summary 
I have given a description of all the twenty social positions. I began each description 
with a summary of a micronarrative extracted from one person’s interview text, 
widening the scope to discuss all the individuals falling under the category. I have 
briefly discussed those seven categories hinted by the schema in Figure 9, but which 
were not supported by the data.  
As I warned the reader at the beginning if the section, multiple paths emerging from 
the data were to be encountered in this chapter. There are two ways the multiple paths 
can be summarized, a numerical viewpoint and a conceptual viewpoint. I will close 
this chapter with the numerical viewpoint. The conceptual viewpoint will be the task 
of the third and final encounter with the data, the topic of discussion in the next 
chapter.  
The frequencies of the positions are portrayed in Table 27 below.21 Champions are the 
largest group. There were not as many citizens, but the group is still quite large. 
                                                
21 A frequency table in the midst of a phenomenological discussion may no doubt raise a few eyebrows. 
I wish to point out, however, that I am only displaying my data in a different manner. No external 
variables have been introduced.  




Cynics are a minor group. The major individual positions were the empowered 
champions and unenlightened citizens. There were also quite a few puzzled 
champions. 
Table 27. Discovered frequencies of the social positions 
 Sphere of Sensemaking  Sphere of influence N % 
Champions   158 52,4
Excluded Too small Too small 10 3,3
Abandoned Too small Too large 1 0,3
Discontent Enough room Too small 20 6,6
Empowered Enough room Enough room 72 24
Under stress Enough room Too large 7 2,3
Disregarded Too large Too small 7 2,3
Puzzled Too large Enough room 29 9,6
Overwhelmed Too large Too large 12 4
Citizens   118 39,4
Recluse Too small Too small 15 5
Neutralized Enough room Too small 9 3
Satisfied Enough room Enough room 24 8
In need Enough room Too large 3 1
Troubled Too large Too small 14 4,7
Unenlightened Too large Enough room 42 14
Lost Too large Too large 11 3,7
Cynics   25 8,4
Hopeless Too small Too small 5 1,7
Surrendered Enough room Too small 4 1,3
Disinterested Enough room Enough room 2 0,7
Dislocated Too large Too small 9 3
Passive Too large Enough room 5 1,7
 
More than one in two interviewees were analyzed as strategic champions. This is 
somewhat striking. My experiences in talking with people responsible for strategy 
would not indicate such a wide championship. A somewhat banal yet common 
conception of strategy implementation in real-life organizations would seem to be that 
it is very problematic to motivate people to think outside of their immediate spheres 
of work. Yet the people gave accounts of something very different. On the other hand, 
only one fourth of the interviewees were empowered champions. The major groups of 
champions deviating from empowerment were puzzled champions who felt that the 
sensemaking challenge was too large, and discontent champions who were 
dissatisfied with their possibilities of influencing the strategic issues. 
With citizens the remarkable phenomenon seems to be that more citizens were 
unenlightened than satisfied. This would seem to indicate that there are more people 
out there who have not made sense of the strategy - and are content with that 




situation. Those who have made sense of strategy and are content fitting their own 
work practices to support strategy as satisfied citizens represent a smaller group in the 
citizen population. 
Cynics seem to be quite rare. Less than a tenth of the interviewees corresponded to 
that category. Yet I suspect that many more people are treated as cynics. There were 
citizens and champions who disagreed with the organizational strategic direction yet 
who regarded strategy as worthwhile and were willing to participate in activities to 
change strategy in a direction they deemed important. In real life, the line between 
cynics and strategic dissidents may have become blurred. 
 




7. Role-players, role-seekers and bystanders. Third 
encounters with the data 
In the last chapter, I described twenty social positions in the strategy process, falling 
under the categories champion, citizen and cynic. In a sense, one might think my task 
would be finished. My research question: How can an individual agent be socially 
positioned in the strategy process? has been answered through the description of the 
twenty positions. Yet there are questions that still remain unanswered.   
Many positions discussed have a lot in common between them. In writing descriptions 
of the social positions, I noticed that there were recurrent themes that ran through 
positions, and across borders between cynics, citizens and champions. Many positions 
contained a variety of roles, through the performance of which the agents acted 
strategically. Many position accounts contained descriptions of obstacles, prohibiting 
strategic action. These are just a two examples. I feel that the recurrent themes call for 
saturation of some sort. 
The discussion of positions in the last chapter was structured according to the activity 
dimension, discussing champions, citizens and cynics as separate groups. I did this 
because it I felt the activity categories were easier to comprehend in isolation than 
sensemaking or influence. The fact that there are recurrent themes would seem to 
stem from this structuring of the text; the recurrent themes would look different if the 
discussion were structured according to ‘too little – enough – too much influence’, for 
example. If a unified framework of positions is to be built, a fourth dimension from 
which the positions can be perceived should be found. 
In order to identify this dimension, I started recording themes that were relevant to 
various positions and then crosschecking the position descriptions in association with 
the themes to see which positions were interrelated through which themes. I relied 
heavily on the summary tables I had written for each position, trying to think of 
unifying factors. The answer was found as I started to look at the distinguishing 
factors I had used in characterizing individual accounts within positions, such as 
roles, obstacles and frames of mind. Looking at the distinguishing factors, I realized 




that the positions could be grouped in accordance with a performative dimension, 
reflecting Goffman somewhat (1959; cf. Chapter 3 of this thesis). 
The performative dimension helps me to move beyond champions, citizens and 
cynics, the basis for the structure of the second encounter. The performance 
dimension is structured in accordance with an actualized performance of an individual 
in the strategy process. As was noticed, not all champions, for instance, felt that they 
were able to perform the role they would have wanted to. The notion of 
knowledgeability explicated by structuration theory has justified them in describing 
their willingness and attempts to champion strategic issues, even if they were 
prevented from realizing their aspirations. In the light of the performative dimension, 
it is possible to group the positions into the following three performance categories:  
1) Positions in which agents performed roles in the strategy processes 
2) Positions in which agents sought for roles to play in the strategy process 
3) Positions in which individuals did not play, nor desired strategic roles.  
I shall use the term role-players for agents in the first group, role-seekers for agents in 
the second group, and bystanders for agents in the third group (Figure 13).  
 
Figure 13. Role-seekers, role-players and bystanders 




Empowered champions and satisfied citizens were clearly role-players. Empowered 
champions felt they had both the comprehension and the power to influence issues 
they thought strategic, and so they did. Puzzled champions were also strategic role-
players, but of a more cautious nature – they felt that issues were too complex for 
them to claim to have made full sense of them. Satisfied citizens were content with 
acting as members of the strategy process within their immediate spheres of work.  
All the cynics were bystanders. While some of their accounts contained roles, these 
were clearly set outside the strategy process. Cynics explicitly denied seeking or 
playing a strategic role. Unenlightened citizens likewise denied playing or wanting a 
strategic role, feeling strategy was best performed by others. They felt, however, that 
the strategy process was overall a beneficial and relevant phenomenon for their 
organizations.  
There was a group of champion and citizen positions in which the agents did not feel 
they were able to perform the strategic roles they should have performed. Individuals 
in these positions are role-seekers. The accounts of these individuals were typically 
characterized by their giving reasons for them not being able to perform strategically. 
Some positions, such as recluse citizens, seemed relatively static, but unlike cynics, 
all role-seekers expressed a willingness to be in some other position, even if they may 
have been pessimistic about their chances of being able to find a strategic role. The 
overall performative categorization of positions is summarized in Table 28 below. 
Table 28. Performative categorization of positions 
Performance Characterization Positions 
Role-player Acts in a strategic 
role 
Empowered champion, puzzled champion, satisfied 
citizen 
Role-seeker Aspires to act in a 
strategic role, but 
is prevented from 
realizing the 
aspiration 
Excluded champion, abandoned champion, dissatisfied 
champion, champion under stress, disregarded 
champion, overwhelmed champion, recluse citizen, 
neutralized citizen, citizen in need, troubled citizen, 
lost citizen 
Bystander Does not act in a 
strategic role, nor 
wishes to do so 
Unenlightened citizen, hopeless cynic, surrendered 
cynic, disinterested cynic, dislocated cynic, passive 
cynic  
 





A role-player is an individual who is able to perform in a strategic role. The 
empowered champion assumed a strategic role because she was empowered to do so. 
Empowered champions were individuals who typically had an official sanction to act 
strategically, and were often top and middle managers. These formal positions were 
associated with such roles as prophets, teachers and parents. Among empowered 
champions there were also free agents who were typically operational personnel 
members finding unofficial channels in which to participate. Empowered champions 
played an active part in influencing people and the organization in strategic issues. 
Puzzled champions tended to concentrate on discussing issues causing puzzlement, 
yet they also gave hints of roles similar to those played by empowered champions. 
The satisfied citizens assumed more passive roles in the strategy process, acting to 
support the process but not seeking to influence issues outside of their working 
practices. Satisfied citizens were typically content in following rules and belonging to 
the process, corresponding to such roles as implementers and rule-followers. The best 
way I could think of characterizing the role-types was by noting their orientation to 

























Figure 14. Roles and their orientations to strategy 




Implementers, rule-followers, good sports, knights and free agents had an action 
orientation to strategy. Their roles were performed through realizing strategy by 
acting strategically. Implementers, rule-followers and good sports correspond quite 
closely to Kelley’s conformist roles, discussed in Section 3.6. Conformists are the 
kinds of followers that have a high level of activity but a low level of independence. 
The free agent role was also characterized by a learning orientation, along with the 
student role. The strategy process is an abstract entity, especially in a large 
organization. To play a strategic role is a process of learning, as was emphasized by 
these two roles. The free agent is what I think most closely resembles Kelley’s 
exemplary follower. She is at the same time active in her attempts to act strategically, 
and independent and resourceful in finding out about strategy and learning a role in it. 
The free agent role is also sympathetic to Hamel’s notion of strategic revolutionaries. 
The parent, prophet and teacher are the kinds of roles usually associated with top 
managers and opinion leaders. Their orientation is towards communication and 
leadership, communicating strategic contents, influencing people, nurturing their 
growth as strategic thinkers, teaching them a new way of doing things. These roles are 
concentrated on the issues involved in Mintzberg’s interpersonal leadership roles. 
Pitcher’s artist leaders correspond to the prophet role, whereas teachers and parents 
are more closely related to Pitcher’s craftsman leaders. 
The knight has a strong communication orientation as well, but corresponds more 
closely to a more middle-managerial setting. This role emphasizes the activity of 
championing, identified by Floyd and Wooldridge on middle management strategic 
roles. The knight is attempting to change the organization from the middle, both 
upward and downward. The middle-managerial activity of facilitation, also identified 
by Floyd and Wooldrige is emphasized in the facilitator role. The facilitators 
encountered in my data were typically agents in support functions rather than 
operative middle managers, however. 
The insider and participant roles were characterized by the emphasis on the 
importance of participating, having a role in the strategy process. The insiders 
emphasized the preciousness of their privileged positions, whereas the participants 
portrayed a collectivist emphasis on acting in concert with others in the strategy 




process. The insiders were typically middle managers and their role corresponds 
somewhat to Floyd & Wooldridge’s championing role: having the ear of one’s 
superior and the possibility of championing issues. 
The strategist role places its emphasis on strategic content, making the right decisions 
and identifying strategy – i.e. thinking. As a champion role, the strategist role bears a 
certain emphasis on Pitcher’s technocrat leaders. Philosophers were also thinkers but 
in a more passive manner. Their reflections centered on retrospective sensemaking 
(Weick, 1995), whereas strategists had a more prospective emphasis. While the 
identification of puzzled champion roles was harder, they certainly had an emphasis 
on thinking as they sought to understand strategy.   
The venerable role is centered on sharing one’s wisdom and experiences, i.e. on 
communication. As such, it bears a resemblance to knowledge management notions of 
strategy, such as the idea of sharing tacit knowledge proposed by Nonaka & 
Takeuchi. The devout believer had a unique orientation towards enjoyment, being in 
love with her organization.  
7.2 Role-seekers 
In the end of the previous section, it was noted that a third of the middle managers 
interviewed and forty percent of the operative employees were role-seekers. This 
category also applied to a fifth of the top managers. The essence of being a role-
seeker is that something is keeping the agent from performing in the strategic role she 
would want to perform in.  
The theory of structuration is built on the notion of a constant process between action 
and structure, in which structure is reified, and from which action derives its meaning. 
The structures, such as a strategy process, exist in constant interaction between 
agents, consisting of power, communication and sanction (cf. Figure 3 in Section 3.3). 
Regarded from this frame, it would seem that role-seekers have yet to find a 
meaningful stance of interaction with the strategy process. It is as if there is a form of 
misalignment between the agent and the strategy process, as if the strategy process 
was not reified at all in the actions of the agent, because the agents’ social position 
failed to ‘lock’ in meaningful interaction with the strategy process.  




Needs and aspirations 
Some agents had identified what they needed to form a meaningful interactive stance 
with strategy. The citizens in need are the locus category here, to which several other 
categories are related. With citizens in need, the reported need was related to the 
agent’s ability to act in a certain strategic position. Some agents needed further 
instructions to act as rule-followers (satisfied citizens).  Some citizens wanted to act 
as implementers (satisfied citizens) and needed management decisions to legitimate 
their actions. A similar need for the legitimation of action was reported by some 
overwhelmed champions, as well as champions under stress. 
Many champions under stress needed help from others in things that were causing the 
stress, in order to act as empowered champions. Some middle manager champions 
said they were “between a rock and a hard place”, being denied support from both 
superiors and subordinates to make strategy work. Many recluse citizens felt that they 
needed something to get out of their excluded position. Some needed more help in 
terms of attention and support from their supervisors. Others needed more 
information and others looser job descriptions (legitimation of strategic action). 
Troubled citizens also reported needing more encouragement to participate in 
discussion. They also needed sensemaking facilitation in the form of better definitions 
of strategic concepts and more reasons given for strategic decisions. 
Some managers who were citizens in need or champions under stress needed better 
leadership skills to act as empowered champions. They were suspicious of their own 
leadership capabilities, but still did their best to act as strategic champions, aspiring to 
be better leaders. Some troubled citizens also reported an aspiration to adopt a more 
active attitude towards strategy in the future. 
These needs can be regarded in the light of the three types of interaction explicated in 
the theory of structuration (communication, power, legitimation). It would appear that 
all the three types of interaction were behind the needs of role-seeking agents. Some 
felt there was a lack in communication (lacking instructions, lacking sensemaking 
facilitation). Some felt they needed more legitimation for their actions (need of 
instructions and rules). Others felt a lack of power (help, superior decision making). 




Often multiple types were missed in concert. Some needs did not concern interaction, 
but could be better characterized as individual aspirations of bettering oneself. 
All in all the agents generally reported needing personal support through either co-
operation, decision making, information or sensemaking facilitation from other 
agents. Some needed structural support in the form of rules from the organization.  
Some needed to be something more themselves, i.e. aspired for better skills in, for 
example, leadership. The needs are summarized in Table 30 below. 
Table 30. Needs 
Need Form of interaction Reported by 
Further instructions Legitimation, 
communication 
Citizens in need 
Decision making Legitimation Citizens in need, overwhelmed 
champions, recluse citizens 
Sensemaking facilitation Communication Recluse citizens, troubled citizen 
Supportive actions (help, 
attention, encouragement) 
Power  Champions under stress, recluse 
citizens, troubled citizen 
Better skills N.A. (personal 
aspiration) 
Citizens in need, champions under 
stress 
More active attitude N.A. (personal 
aspiration) 
Troubled citizen 
Rules Legitimation Citizens in need 
 
Obstacles 
Many role-seeking accounts could best be characterized through the obstacles that the 
agents reported, the external forces that kept them from reaching a satisfactory 
position. These agents conceived their misalignment with the strategy process, not 
through a need or aspiration, but through a blockage or stonewall. 
Many role-seeking positions included notions that strategy content itself posed an 
obstacle, by being misguided in some way, by not being given proper grounds for it, 
or by not being comprehensible. Some troubled citizens felt that the organization was 
going in the wrong direction and that they were somehow unable to stop this. They 
needed the strategy to change or at least make better sense of it. Their reaction was 
going back to work, doing that well and trying not to worry too much. Similar 
concerns were voiced by some neutralized citizens. Some citizens in need who could 




not understand what strategy meant would have needed guidelines. Some felt that the 
strategic content was itself separated from practice and hard to comprehend. The 
complaint that organizational strategy was incomprehensible or even inconsistent was 
echoed by some disregarded champions.   
Some disregarded champions faced a lacking time resource that stopped them from 
immersing themselves in strategy. Neutralized citizens echoed them somewhat, 
feeling, furthermore, that they did not have the legitimate position to act as much as 
they would have wanted. Some felt that organizational culture limited their use of 
voice. Discontent champions echoed the complaint of culture, stating that it was in 
some cases too stagnated to facilitate change.  
The obstacles can be reflected against the three types of interaction as well as the 
needs described in the previous section (Table 31 below). The obstacles usually 
reflect a complex of interaction types. 
Table 31. Obstacles  
Obstacle Interaction Reported by 
Strategy 
content 
Communication (e.g. not understandable), 
power (e.g. wrong direction)  
Troubled citizens, neutralized 




Legitimation (position does not warrant 
the use of time) 
Disregarded champions, 
neutralized citizens 
Culture Legitimation (use of voice), power 
(stagnation opposing change), 
communication (hierarchy preventing 
information flow) 
Neutralized citizens, discontent 
champions 
 
Isolation of an individual of the strategy process 
Certain role-seeking positions did not contain a simple description of an obstacle or a 
need. Social positions that were based on a gap in both sensemaking and in influence 
were challenging, because usually there was no single dimension or issue in which 
they could be analyzed. Then it began to appear that the individuals addressed the 
very link between their position and themselves, the complex of interaction that 
constitutes structuration between an individual and the strategy process. These 
individuals gave an account of being isolated from the strategy process. 




Excluded champions stated their exclusion in terms of this isolation. Seniors were 
individuals who had too narrow an official sphere, but large amounts of experience 
that they sought to share through their social networks. Ghosts were individuals who 
had no real connection to the strategy process, but were angrily trying to create a link. 
Many recluse citizens also described their situation in terms of the isolation metaphor. 
Some felt that their whole unit or team was disrespected, as were they themselves as 
part of it. Some felt that their official job descriptions were too narrow to warrant 
strategic action, even if they wanted to take it. The type of isolation portrayed here is 
mainly a question of legitimation, and it could be called office isolation, employing 
the concept of office from Katz & Kahn (cf. Section 3.6). 
Many lost citizens echoed the notion of isolation, claiming that they were 
conceptually isolated from strategy, not being able to make sense of what should be 
done. Some chose to willingly lock themselves away from the strategy process, 
sticking to the completion of their work. The abandoned champion was a special case 
of an individual who had been left with a large responsibility for making sense of 
strategic issues in her work, with no real possibilities of comprehending the strategy 
process. Some overwhelmed champions were in a similar situation. They felt they 
were too inexperienced to handle the responsibility entrusted to them. 
Some troubled citizens described their predicament as being suppressed by systems 
and culture. Discontent champions differed in all the rest of the social positions 
presented in association with the connection theme in the sense that they presented 
only an influence gap, and not a sensemaking gap. Yet the obstacles they described, 
such as unit borders, culture, hierarchy, and organization size, are so vast and 
complex in nature that they are better presented as issues of connection between the 
individual and the strategy process, not as single obstacles. Those issues are mediators 
that link the individual and the strategy process, presented as reasons for the isolation 
of the individuals. This type of isolation could be called externalized isolation, 
because the agent presents her isolation as being caused by something external, and 
not being a property of the interaction itself.  
The three types of isolation are summarized in Table 32 below. 
 




Table 32. Isolation 
Isolation type Interaction Reported by 
Office isolation  Legitimation  Excluded champions, recluse 
citizens 
Conceptual isolation Communication Lost citizens, overwhelmed 
champions, abandoned champion 
Externalized Complex (e.g. culture) Troubled citizens, discontent 
champions 
Summary of role-seekers 
The role-seeker is searching for a strategic role, while feeling prevented from acting 
in it. Three types of accounts describing the misalignment between the individual 
position and the strategy process have been discussed. Many types of problems 
arising from the existence of an individual in an organization have been highlighted. 
From a structuration standpoint, the position of a role-seeker can be thought of in 
terms of misalignment between an individual and the strategy process, i.e. the three 
processes of interaction: communication, legitimation and power. I have illustrated 
the interaction processes with the misalignment types in order to display the issues 




























Figure 15. Summary of reasons for role-seeking in a structuration framework 




Figure 15 can be used as a summary for understanding the reasons preventing role-
seekers, agents intent on performing strategic roles, from performing as members of 
the strategy process. Some role-seekers could characterize what they needed in order 
to be able perform in a strategic role. Some others emphasized the kinds of things they 
were up against as they sought out their strategic role. Some agents could not give a 
clear description of either of the above, but instead gave a description of their isolated 
status.   
7.3 Bystanders 
Bystanders are those individuals who are not playing or seeking a strategic role. Some 
are openly critical or even hostile toward strategy, while others feel it is best dealt 
with by others. Unenlightened citizens, the largest group of citizens, were 
characterized by the latter attitude. While they gave a variety of reasons for not 
having made sense of strategy (does not remember, has not had the time, etc.), their 
accounts are characterized by a general willingness to let others worry about strategy. 
Some regarded this as a straightforward question of legitimation (strategy was not a 
part of their job description) while others also related communication aspects to it 
(e.g. no sense made of strategy documents). The overall spirit was, however, that 
unenlightened citizens did not want a strategic role. 
Cynics did not want a strategic role, not because strategy was best put into effect by 
others, but for the reason that strategy was not a worthwhile activity at all. Passive 
cynics had not made sense of strategy nor did they want to. They did not give any 
further explanations, but just communicated that strategy was not worthwhile. Some 
of them were ironic and resorted to their sardonic wit in discussing strategic issues. 
Some were spiteful towards the strategy process and themselves. Others 
communicated disbelief toward strategy and their own positions in it. Disinterested 
cynics had made sense of strategy and thought they could influence it if they wanted 
to. They just did not want to have anything to do with it. They gave grounds for their 
disinterest by stating strategy was either a killer of creativity or simply has no effect 
on real-life issues. Surrendered cynics had ceased to be active in affecting strategic 
issues, though they used to care about them in the past. After encountering an 
obstacle, they had stopped trying. Some felt that strategic action did not pay off in 
terms of personal benefits. Some reflected the large-scale notions of discontent 




champions (culture, hierarchy, organization size, unit borders, etc.) and noted that it 
was impossible to counter them. It seems that most surrendered cynics used to be 
champions who had been disappointed at some stage. Dislocated cynics regarded the 
strategy as an openly threatening phenomenon. Some felt that it was a mechanism of 
oppression that was used to trample their right to have a say in the organization’s 
future, or even of their right to control their own destiny. Some felt that it was a 
mechanism best avoided altogether. They tried to stay disconnected from the strategy 
process. 
Reasons why bystanders refrain from seeking a strategic role are summarized below 
(Table 33). It seems that in some cases bystanders regard their stance towards strategy 
as preferable (unenlightened citizens, passive cynics), but in other positions the 
passive stance towards strategy stems from frustration or otherwise unpleasant 
experiences with strategy. 
Table 33. Summary of bystanders and their reasons 
“Strategy is…”  Elaborations Reported by 
Somebody else’s business Position does not warrant 
participation, no time to participate 
Unenlightened citizens 
Not worth knowing Not interested in giving strategy 
further thought 
Passive cynics 
Not worth doing Strategy does not warrant action Disinterested cynics 
Disappointing Lost faith in strategic action Surrendered cynics 




7.4 The link of social positions to strategic performance 
The discussion in this chapter has dealt with the issue of whether individuals perform 
strategic roles or not. Role-players could and wanted to, role-seekers could not yet 
wanted to, and bystanders did not want to, regardless of whether they could or could 
not. The essence of this discussion is the question of whether individuals enact 
organizational strategies. If an individual envisions herself playing a role in the 
strategy process, then strategy is being enacted, at least from her point of view. One 
can therefore argue that role-playing is a condition for strategic performance, at the 
individual level of analysis.  




Role-playing social positions (free agents, prophets, implementers, etc.) provide 
strategic agents with role-models to choose from, whereas the discussion of role-
seekers has provided us with a viewpoint on the problems that people encounter in 
trying to play strategic roles. These problems need to be dealt with in order to 
facilitate strategic action: obstacles removed, needs fulfilled, etc. Bystanders are 
something of an enigma – some of them seem to regard strategy as someboldy else’s 
business, which may even work in some contexts, but the ones portraying open 
hostility towards strategy are problematic. We have gained insight on the reasons why 
strategy can make somebody cynical. The understanding of those reasons should 
enable champions to avoid creating more cynics.  
What is the relation of the condition of role-playing to the fulfillment of the 
organizational strategy in general? The complete execution of organizational strategy 
is a very difficult question; yet role-playing is a partial answer to this. Other answers 
have been given in classical strategy literature: answers mainly related to structure 
and systems. All in all, the weight that is given to role-playing as a condition is based 
on what strategy is. The structuration model presented here makes social positions 
and role-playing a central question. A rational planning model regards these as less 
important because all that a rational model needs from operative individuals is 
compliance. An environmental determinist model would perhaps not regard role-
playing as very important because organizational strategy is already determined from 
the outside, no matter what roles the individuals play22.  
Strategy process authors generally admit that individual actions do matter in most 
cases. Mintzberg and Waters (1985) have argued that strategic planning models exist 
de facto only in special cases such as some military organizations. Most non-emergent 
strategies are umbrella strategies that set general guidelines for action, process 
strategies that create structural boundaries for action, or ideological strategies in 
which a collective vision is shared – i.e. models in which individuals have an 
interpretive capacity. Hart (1992) has argued that strategy processes that allow 
organizational members the role of active players produce higher performance due to 
a greater balance between the contributions of top managers and organizational 
                                                
22 The more I think of this, the more curious the thought becomes. I have always had a difficulty 
comprehending determinist ecolological models.  




members. In literature, few authors are willing to counter arguments such as those 
presented above, yet as noted many times earlier, curiously little research has been 
done on the level of the individual organizational member.  
One of the main determinants for the expected role of the individual is her formal 
position. To conclude my discussion on individual strategic performance, I will relate 
the discussion to the formal positions held by individuals to their performance 
categories. 
Role-playing and formal position 
As I described the different positions in the second encounter, I did not discuss the 
interviewees’ formal positions except in the situations in which they mentioned them 
themselves. In reflecting the roles against literature (section 3.6), I have raised the 
issue of formal positions, because this is the way the literature is structured: people 
write on middle management roles or top management roles. 
While I have been cautious of discussing official positions due to the 
phenomenological paradigm represented by this thesis, there is quite a strong logical 
relation between formal and phenomenological social positions, because 
organizations do have a formal dimension to them. Furthermore, no doubt many 
readers will ask themselves how formal positions are reflected in the social positions 
categorized here. Moreover, according to its basic definition, a role is constituted of 
the expectations directed toward an individual. Formal position certainly affects what 
is expected of an organizational member. 
The distribution of top and middle managers, as well as operative personnel members 
in the activity categories (champion, citizen, cynic) and the performance categories 
(role-players, role-seekers, bystanders), is presented in Table 29 below. It should 
come as no surprise that almost all top managers were analyzed as champions. What I 
think to be the most important lesson in Table 29 is that only half of the middle 
managers and less than a third of the operative employees performed roles in the 




strategy process. A third of the middle managers and forty percent of the operative 
personnel are role-seekers, unable to perform the roles they would like to.23 
Table 29. Formal positions and performance categories 
 % Champions % Citizens % Cynics 
Top managers 92,3 2,6 5,1 
Middle managers 78,3 18,1 3,6 
Operative personnel 31,8 57 11,2 
 % Role-players % Role-seekers % Bystanders 
Top managers 74,4 20,5 5,1 
Middle managers 54,2 36,1 9,6 
Operative personnel 28,5 40 31,8 
 
What is striking about these results is that quite a few people in operative and middle 
management positions are seeking to play a strategic role yet are prevented from 
doing this. While individual role-playing may not be a determining factor to the 
realization of strategy in all models of strategy, it is a determining factor in many 
models. Concerning the models worrying about individuals enacting strategy, it must 
be sadly noted that in real life, strategy is certainly not an everyday phenomenon in 
the work of many potential strategic agents.  
                                                






The research question set for this thesis was defined as: 
In what ways can an individual agent be socially positioned in an organizational 
strategy process? 
I have first explored this topic by building a theoretical link between the individual 
agent and the strategy process in two encounters with theory. In the first encounter I 
moved from the strategy downward toward the individual (Chapter 2) and then in the 
second encounter from the individual to strategy (Chapter 3). I then conducted a 
three-encounter, iterative analysis of the data consisting of 301 semi-structured 
interviews, first building a schema for analyzing the data, then using the schema to 
understand and describe 20 social positions in the strategy process, and giving a final 
structure to the answer by presenting three performance categories: the role-players, 
role-seekers and bystanders. 
The answer to the research question can be summarized as follows:  
Individuals can be socially positioned in the strategy process as role-players, role-
seekers or bystanders according to their performance in the strategy process. Three 
varieties of role-players were discovered: empowered champions, puzzled champions 
and satisfied citizens. Eleven varieties of role-seekers were discovered: excluded 
champions, abandoned champions, discontent champions, champions under stress, 
disregarded champions, overwhelmed champions, recluse citizens, neutralized 
citizens, citizens in need, troubled citizens and lost citizens. Six varieties of bystanders 
were discovered: unenlightened citizens, hopeless cynics, surrendered cynics, 
disinterested cynics, dislocated cynics and passive cynics. The three performance 
categories have been investigated in Chapter seven, while the twenty varieties have 
been discussed at length in Chapter six.   
8.1 Contribution 
The phenomenological ontology underlying this thesis implies a willingness to treat 
strategy as a ‘flesh and blood’ phenomenon, as experienced by a variety of 





therefore on the individual and not office. This meant that the individual’s account 
of her social position, not her function, was regarded as ontologically and 
epistemologically primary. 
This contributed to a more varied chorus of voices to be heard about strategy, 
consisting largely of operative personnel members and middle managers. This has 
rarely been done before, at least in mainstream literature. Gioia & Chittipeddi (1991) 
wrote of a university strategy process, including multiple voices. Pettigrew et al. 
(1992) described strategy process in a health care context, and multiple voices were 
heard. But I have not encountered a study on strategy that would have gone as deep as 
this one into the organizational grassroots level. Furthermore, the studies mentioned 
above discussed one organization each, whereas this study had a wider range of 12 
organizations.  
I regard the emphasis on the individual as an attempt at answering the criticism of the 
paradigm of organizational strategy, offered by many (e.g. Hardy, Palmer & Phillips 
2000; Knights & Morgan 1991; Lilley, 2001; Shrivastava, 1986; Whipp, 1996), of 
strategic management being ideological and quite non-reflexive about it. Since the 
main critique of this position is managerialism, I think it is fair to say a large number 
of non-managerial voices have been heard, promoting issues from a variety of 
viewpoints. 
Furthermore, the focus was set on the individual and not the organization. There 
have not been many studies of strategy process at the individual level of analysis. 
Those that do exist, have largely been concerned with strategy creation, from, for 
example, an entrepreneurial or a cognitive viewpoint (cf. Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & 
Lampel, 1999), again concentrating on the managerial framework. 
The normative literature on strategy implementation has been concerned with 
prescribing the right managerial actions for executing strategies. The authors with an 
emphasis on leadership tend to emphasize the need for a dialogue between leaders and 
followers (see Chapter 3.1). Associated notions such as ‘open, fact-based discussion 
with the lower levels’ (Beer & Eisenstat, 2000), a ‘partnership among all relevant 
stakeholders’ (Beer & Eisenstat, 1996), a ‘pan-organization team process of 





(Hambrick & Cannella, 1989), to name a few, communicate a norm of a wider 
dialogue in the strategy process and strategic leadership. The notion of dialogue 
requires more than one standpoint, however. Dialogue cannot only be about one party, 
i.e. the strategist or the leader, communicating with a follower or an implementer. In 
order to understand and prescribe dialogue, the multiple positions participating in the 
dialogue must be taken into account. The elaboration of social positions conducted in 
this research can be regarded as an attempt to widen this discussion to cover a 
multitude of stakeholders.  
Social positions, the locus of this research, have been conceived from the frame of the 
theory of structuration, another stream of research in organization studies, not widely 
discussed in empirical terms. Through this positioning I wish to add a small 
contribution to the emerging stream of research of ‘strategy as practice’, reviewed by 
Whittington (1996, 2000).  
Summarizing the main results of this study, roughly three can be identified, 
corresponding to my three encounters with the data. First of all, a three-dimensional 
schema was created to facilitate understanding of social positions in organizational 
strategy processes. The schema is general enough to be applied to other research 
settings concerning social positions in organizations, perhaps, for example, in more 
context-specific studies of strategy processes.  
Secondly, using this schema, twenty social positions were identified and described. 
This is where the data was allowed the greatest freedom of speech, with a variety of 
themes and issues emerging. This is where I think the greatest chance of a 
hermeneutical interplay between the reader and the data can be established. This data 
set can also be further investigated and reinterpreted in terms of particular interpretive 
lenses: organizational culture, systems, management, etc. 
Thirdly, the themes in the position descriptions were discussed in a more 
conceptualized frame. The performance categories of role-players, role-seekers and 
bystanders were created. The first category was opened up in terms of the roles played 
by individuals. These roles contribute to the scarce literature on roles in the strategy 
process. The discussion of the second category also entailed the reasons that role-





relevant for themselves. The third category was discussed in terms of the attitudes 
bystanders portrayed towards the strategy process and reasons they did not want to 
function in associated roles. The conceptual discussion was reflected against literature 
on structuration and roles. 
8.2 Implications for practitioners 
What is the relevance of my research to practitioners in organizations? First of all, 
being faithful to the spirit of a constructivism, I would like to see practitioners making 
their own interpretations about the normative paths leading out of this text. 
Furthermore, I wish to stress that by ‘practitioner’ I am not referring just to 
management consultants, organization developers or managers – the first potential 
practitioners for reading a text such as this – but all organizational stakeholders.  
Realizing these wishes as somewhat unrealistic, I will point out a few things I regard 
as holding normative notions. All in all, it is extremely difficult to create clear-cut 
norms out of, for example, the obstacles and needs the role-seeking individuals 
reported. These are better reflected against each unique organizational context by each 
stakeholder. I think the normative suggestions that can come out of a text like this are 
conceptual in nature and must be reinterpreted by each reader to suit her context.  
First of all, the complexity of the everyday concepts of ‘cynic’ or ‘dissident’ has been 
illustrated. At first glance, it might be easy to label whomever disagrees with official 
strategy statements as a ‘dissident’, ‘troublemaker’ or ‘cynic’. The leadership of such 
individuals is easily conceptualized as the business of overcoming resistance to 
change. However, resistance of change can be regarded as misguided and outdated 
(Dent & Goldberg, 1999; Piderit, 2000). Instead, a question must be asked on how 
ambivalent attitudes can be cultured in organizations (Piderit, 2000). Consideration of 
the conceptual categories created here could be useful in answering the question of 
ambivalent attitudes. Is the person really a bystanding cynic, or might some of the 
role-seeking categories be more appropriate to describe her position? In such a case, 
the business of leadership becomes the business of empowering the individual to act 





The suggestion above was mainly directed to leaders. Yet I feel it has been clearly 
shown that the strategy process is a two-way street in many cases. Individual agents 
themselves also carry the responsibility of creating the right social position for 
themselves in the strategy process. The conceptual categories can be useful here as 
well. “Am I really a role-seeker or have I let myself become a bystander? Should I be 
a bystander or should I seek for a more active position?” These are the kinds of 
questions that can be asked by each individual organizational member. They are, after 
all, knowledgeable agents, capable of reflecting and molding their own positions.  
Care must be taken to ensure the understanding of the position of bystanders. As was 
noted in the discussion of followers in Section 3.6, the activity of the follower is as 
much determined by the organization as herself. Many strategy processes encourage 
the position of the unenlightened citizen. When thinking of prescriptions for 
bystanders, it would seem the first question relates to what each party is really after. If 
all parties want to keep strategy as the business of a small circle, bystanding is 
certainly no problem. 
The descriptions of roles given by role-players can be used as a starting point by any 
agents who regard their organization’s strategy process as relevant. Role-players can 
reflect on their own roles in the strategy process, looking for new elements in the 
variety of possibilities described by role-players. Role-seekers can reflect on a role 
they would like to be in and the kinds of actions that would take them there.  
On a wider note, the notion of role-seekers as disempowered strategic resources could 
be useful, at least as a practical guideline. The viewpoint of social capital as a 
strategic resource is relevant to current discussion (e.g. Yli-Renko, Autio & Sapienza, 
2001). This discussion does not entail the empowered individual as a strategic 
resource, accounting for the notion of social capital in terms of organization-level 
‘dimensions’ (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  If a micro-level standpoint were included, 
the viewpoint of social positions would become relevant. I would argue that role-
players are a strategic resource that should be cultured, regarding role-seekers as 





8.3 Limitations and the Issue of Credibility  
Before the credibility of research can be assessed, the overall ontological and 
epistemological principles on which the assessment can be built must be explicated, 
i.e. the paradigm of the research is located in. I have already noted that the ontological 
basis here is phenomenology. I have also expressed sympathy towards symbolic 
interactionism, which also bears quite a strong relation to constructivism (cf. Chapter 
4). Lincoln & Cuba (2000) note that constructivism involves a relativist ontology, 
subjectivist epistemology with created findings, and a hermeneutic/dialectical 
methodology. The constructivist researcher acts as a “passionate participant”, 
facilitating multivoice reconstruction. 
In discussing social issues in a microsocial framework such as this, I strongly feel 
there is no such thing as the truth of a matter. Since we are dealing with issues in the 
individual Lifeworld, we are involved in a constant process of interpretation, where 
there is no static reflection point against which the research text can be assessed as 
true or untrue. So, while I am an ardent believer in truth as a measure of ‘brute natural 
facts’, I am in favor of a process ontology (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002) in terms of first-
person ontology (the term ‘first-person ontology’ is borrowed from Searle (1995)). 
The concept of truth loses some of its edge when the individual Lifeworld is under 
scrutiny. 24  The epistemology here is subjectivist, because the data are based on 
interaction between interviewee and interviewer, interpreted by me as an analyst. I do 
not think there is a detached, objective frame of analysis, but multiple interpretive 
choices have to be made. This is what I refer to as a hermeneutic standpoint, where 
the analyst is always attached to her personal interpretive horizon (Gadamer, 1993). 
Yet I am a fervent believer in logic and reasoning, in the sense of a general common 
sense shared by human beings, at least within wide cultural contexts. That is why 
grounded theory was assumed as the approach here.25 I wanted to convince both the 
                                                
24 I dislike the notion of relativism because it would seem to imply a non-scientific ’anything goes’ 
attitude. Truth is a problematic concept in discussing  the Lifeworld because the Lifewold is dynamic 
rather than static. If truth is regarded as a correspondence between statements and reality, it is very hard 
to measure correspondence with a dynamic entity.  
25 Glaser and Strauss have in their latest work sought out to create grounded theory as a post-positivist 
methodology of sorts. This is in something of a conflict with constructivism. That is why I used their 





reader and myself of the credibility of my reasoning by structuring it as well as I 
could. I created frameworks, categories and all the models to help myself and the 
reader to follow the line of interpretation from beginning to end. I did this to 
contribute to the transparency of reasoning. As to whether or not my analyses have 
been ‘reliable’, this is left to the reader to decide as she follows my arguments. 
Credibility 
Patton (1990) notes that the discussion of the credibility of a qualitative study will 
need to address three questions26: 
1. What techniques and methods were used to ensure the integrity, validity and 
accuracy of the findings? 
2. What does the researcher bring to the study in terms of qualifications, 
experience and perspective? 
3. What paradigm orientation and assumptions undergird the study? 
The third question concerning paradigm-related assumptions has been discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter as well as in other parts of the thesis. Beginning to address 
the first question, the interviews were conducted with a wide variety of interviewees 
in twelve organizations, using a common interview outline (Appendix 1). The four 
researchers conducting the interviews agreed on a shared style of interviewing, in 
which no personal opinions were expressed to the interviewee. A general stance as 
neutral as possible was maintained towards the interviewee. The interviewer did, 
however, retain the possibility of asking the interviewee to elaborate on issues. Each 
interviewer may have had biases in terms of which she explored issues further, yet the 
interview outline was created to accommodate all the interests. So, while there may 
have been variations on the general structure of themes discussed, the interview 
outline was specific enough to ensure that these were just variations. Furthermore, the 
concept of social position is general enough to facilitate small variations caused by 
multiple interviewers. 
                                                
26 I think Patton has managed to condense the main issues in few, discussable questions, so I used his 
questions as a basis for the discussion of credibility. Those looking for a more detailed list of questions 





Some may regard the phenomenological approach of treating interview accounts at 
face value with suspicion. How did we make sure that the interviewees did not lie to 
us? This is a tough question that comes back to the dynamics between interviewer and 
interviewee. The interview situation is a situation of data-production in which both 
persons participate. No doubt some interviewees may have painted the picture they 
themselves wanted to see. But I fail to see how phenomenological research would be 
more vulnerable to such biases than postpositivist research conducted with surveys, 
for example. At least it is harder to lie to a person sitting in front of you than writing it 
down on paper. The interview situation enables a process of interpretation that is less 
vulnerable to these biases than surveys. Furthermore, the number of interviews is 
quite large, which should prevent individual biases from dominating the text. 
Patton notes that the possibility of rival notions has to be accounted for in order to 
ensure the integrity, validity and accuracy of the findings. I tried to keep this in mind 
in particular when describing the social positions in the second encounter. While I 
categorized the accounts using the schema, I tried to discuss the richness of voices 
within each category, and also elaborate uncertainties by giving reasons why certain 
accounts belonged to certain categories, and why not to rival categories.   
The overall emphasis I have placed on tables and categorizations in this study reflects 
a willingness to keep my own reasoning as explicit and transparent as possible. I 
regard this to be the major answer to the question of integrity of the research in terms 
of the analysis of the data and writing the results. My analysis process was systematic 
throughout as I coded the interviews. There was an iterative stage as I formulated the 
schema of analysis, but as soon as the schema was ready, each interview was coded 
according to the same principles. My analysis path through the three encounters with 
data has been illuminated in this text. My progress as I conducted the analyses has 
been recorded in my notes. Secondary coding was conducted, with fair to good 
results, and is reported in Chapter 5.  
Answering the second question, in the early stages of my career as a scientist, I have 
very little to rely on in terms of my personal qualifications. The PhD process is built 
on critique and tutoring by a group of experienced colleagues, however. This research 
has been read and commented on by a group of people far more experienced than I 





strictest sense because it all comes down to my personal work ethics. On this, I can 
only note that I have been as rigorous in my analyses as I have had the ability to be. 
There is also another sense to question two, however. The question of what Patton 
refers to as the ‘evaluator effect’ is particularly important in a constructivist study. 
Since I am, in a sense, always trapped in my personal interpretive horizon, I must 
reveal as well as I can the personal biases that affect my judgment – and be aware of 
them. I have sought to account for my personal interest and history with the topic in 
the preface.  I have tried to keep these issues in mind during analysis and writing, yet 
the reader may be able to detect some hints of them in the text, since I don’t think a 
researcher can be freed of her biases in any final way. If any of these are detected, the 
reader may regard them as limitations to credibility, yet hopefully not fatal ones. 
Generalization 
Generalization is one of the major controversies in qualitative research. Schwandt, 
(1997) identifies four stances towards generalization among qualitative researchers. 
The postmodernists deny the possibility of generalization altogether, claiming that 
each situation is unique. The second position is a milder form of postmodernism that 
is based on critical examination of relations between unique instances. The third 
position is held by researchers who claim that qualitative inquiry produces a specific 
form of immediate knowledge, based on the Aristotelian concept phronesis. 
Generalization, for them, seems to be beside the point. The fourth position argues for 
simultaneous contextual thickness of a case, and transferability from case to case 
through analytic generalization. 
Looking at my results, the main question about generalization is very much about the 
transferability of the conceptual frameworks created. I cannot give conclusive 
predictions as to whether, for example, the number of empowered champions will be 
the same among the members of the next organization. What I have to offer are the 
frameworks, and conceptualizations themselves. I fall in line with the fourth position 
arguing for analytical generalization. As Geertz put it: 
“Our double task is to uncover the conceptual structures that inform our subjects’ acts, 
the “said” of social discourse, and to construct a system of analysis in whose terms 
what is generic to those structures, what belongs to them because they are what they 
are, will stand out against the other determinants of human behavior… The aim is to 





assertions about the role of culture in the construction of collective life by engaging 
them with complex specifics.” (Ibid.: 27-28.) 
While I think social positions are unique in a certain sense, there are also general 
properties to them. As Geertz notes, culture is social because meaning is social, as 
was noted in the description of Wittgenstein’s city of language in Section 2.5. I 
believe social positions are cultural symbols as much as they are an individual’s 
property. I have tried to keep the position descriptions thick enough to let individual 
voices be heard, and included more than eighty quotations to illustrate contextual 
specifics. Yet my overall goal has been to create a conceptual model for social 
positions general enough to be transferable to specific contexts. 
Limitations 
The data for this research was produced in interviews that were conducted in a one-off 
‘snapshot-type’ setting in each case organization. This approach did not facilitate a 
longitudinal analysis of the data, ruling out certain questions. I could not look at how 
social positions change over time. I did not, for example, have access to the processes 
in which role-seekers find positions for themselves, in which role-players lose their 
positions, becoming bystanders or role-seekers, or in which bystanders become 
interested in strategy, ending up as role-seekers or role-players. This would no doubt 
have been interesting. Yet, my research question was how individuals can be socially 
positioned in the strategy process, not how these positions change over time. The 
second question of the processes of position change is highly interesting and will no 
doubt be my next interest.  
The explorative stance in this research and the associated qualitative approach rule out 
the possibility of giving ‘if X then Y’ -type predictions. My major contribution was a 
typology of social positions, yet questions on how the positions come about cannot be 
answered in any final manner here. While certain issues discussed, such as the reasons 
that keep role-seekers from becoming role-players, or the reasons for disinterest given 
by bystanders, can give partial answers, my research question did not involve giving 
predictions. This is the price of an exploratory stance; explanations can be regarded as 





When generalization is discussed, the discussion inevitably turns to the discussion of 
the context in which the study was conducted. This is also the first item of discussion 
concerning the limitations of this study. The interviews were conducted in twelve 
Finnish case organizations located roughly in the knowledge and service sectors. No 
basic manufacturing-type organizations were present in the data. In many cases this 
meant that the operative employees were experts of some sort, and their work 
included at least a certain element of decision making. The organizations were either 
middle sized (100-200 members) or units of larger organizations. The interviewees 
were selected at random from all organizational levels. The interviews took place 
during the years 2000-2001, at which time Finland was reaching the end of a 
relatively strong economic period of growth. Had the interviews been conducted 
during economic recession, for example, the attitudes toward strategy might have 
been darker, i.e. had strategy been traced as the cause of firings, for example. 
The context has been a limiter to this research as it is, to some degree, in any study in 
social science. I think we had quite a rich sample of individuals in our interviews, yet 
they may represent a somewhat “positive” group, firstly because their organizations 
had willingly participated in a research such as this. Their organizations’ having 
agreed to participate in a study such as ours implied a basic assumption that 
organizational strategies are realized through the work of individual organizational 
members. Furthermore, a large majority of interviewees had a professional education.  
While there may have been limitations in this sense, their effect on the transferability 
of the conceptual tools I have created should not be great. A small worry is presented 
by the overall economic and social context of Finland at the time of the interviews, 
yet I suspect this may have influenced the potential weighting between social 
positions and not the content of the categories themselves. I believe there are 
empowered champions and recluse citizens in organizations at the time of economic 
recession as well. Their numbers may vary, but the categories would seem general 
enough to hold their plausibility, with moderate variations between the cultural and 
economical contexts. 
A research setting combining observation and interviews may have provided 
interesting insights. True, but that would have been time consuming, reducing the 





the other hand, some may have collected multiple accounts from the same 
interviewees, discussing their interpretations with the interviewees. Again, this would 
probably have reduced the richness of the positions discovered, as well as bringing 
action research elements into the research setting, which would have posed other 
challenges. All in all, it seems that “to win some, you lose some”. After the process, I 
still feel that a ‘snapshot’ type research setting involving a large number of 
interviewees suits an exploratory research task such as this quite well, providing rich 
variety to the data. 
8.4 Suggestions for further research 
One of the things I find nice about an exploratory setting such as this is that many 
possible paths lie open, many questions unanswered. The first question I would like to 
form a coherent view about is where the role-seekers would have ended up, given 
the possibilities. This is obviously related to the question of management actions to 
create possibilities of finding strategic roles. These two questions could be explored 
in concert in an action research setting, the researcher acting as a consultant in case 
organizations, understanding the obstacles and needs of role-seekers in that particular 
setting, and developing procedures to overcome them. These kinds of questions 
cannot be answered using the data in this research, because role-seekers usually did 
not discuss the specific roles they wanted to play, probably because they had never 
played them before. 
The organizational context provides a multitude of interesting questions. If one 
glimpses at the data in Appendix 4, there would seem to be variations between 
different organizations on the frequencies of role-players, role-seekers and bystanders, 
for instance, yet no great variations between public and private organizations in 
general. A single or multiple case study concerning social positions in specific 
organizational contexts would be intriguing, especially research was conducted in 
truly outstanding or peculiar organizations in terms of individuals in the strategy 
process.27 The social positions of agents in consultancies offering strategic 
                                                
27 Pratt (2000) studied identity formation in a network marketing organization, while Martin (1998) 






management services, for instance, could be interesting to study. Another possibility 
would be a network organization consisting of independent cells, such as Amnesty 
International. 
A case study setting would seem to be the most natural step toward a more 
explanatory research stance. Identifying the mechanisms that create, uphold and 
change social positions in the strategy process, including both official and unofficial 
actions would, no doubt, answer many questions. Further data has been collected from 
four of the twelve organizations present in this study.  
Organizational environment involves an interesting question, i.e. does the 
environment dictate an optimal distribution of social positions in a strategy process? 
Is there a contingency theory for social positions? Is it true that in uncertain and 
complex environments, the need for independent champions is greater, while in 
simpler and more stable environments a large number of implementer-type citizens is 
the basis for an optimal composition of positions? Hints of this may be found in such 
accounts as Emery & Trist (1965), Courtney, Kirkland & Viguerie (1997), Hatch 
(1997a), and Brown & Eisenhardt (1997). On the other hand, it might be interesting to 
test a hypothesis on whether there is a ‘golden proportion’ of positions in 
organizations. Is it necessary, for example, to have a supply of cynics to criticize 
things or should the criticism be provided by critical role-players only? 
Another contextual factor that is of great interest is strategy type. Are strategy 
processes behind environmental strategies, for instance, different from marketing 
strategies in terms of the social positions of agents? How about imposed strategies, in 
which even the top management does not have a strategic choice? 
An interesting question for managers responsible for communicating strategy involves 
the types of rhetoric that are needed to reach people in different social positions. What 
kind of rhetoric is needed to turn bystanders into role-players? How should rhetoric be 
designed to keep champions or citizens motivated? 
A path different from explanatory case study research would be the 
operationalization of the schema and positions into a quantitative research 
instrument. A larger number of interviewees in a small number of different countries 





conclusively. The data could also be reflected against various background variables, 
such as, for example, the use of various strategic management instruments. Does the 
use of balanced scorecards, for instance, correspond to the number of role-players in 
the organization? Furthermore, if a general research instrument is built, it may have 
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Appendix  1. The interview outlines 
Top management interview outline 
The interviewee 
1. Have there been changes in your work lately? What kinds of changes? 
The future 
2. How do you perceive the future of your organization28? 
Strategy process29 
3. What do you understand by the term 'strategy'? (What things do you associate with 
strategy?) 
4. What do you understand by the term 'strategy implementation'? (What things do 
you associate with strategy implementation?) 
5. How much time is used in strategy implementation? (working days/year) 
6. How do you participate in your organization’s strategy process? (with reference to 
strategy process diagrams) 
7. How do you define your role in strategy implementation? 
8. How do you communicate strategies? 
9. How well do you know your organization’s strategy? (What is associated with it?) 
10. Are there problems associated with strategy implementation? (Questionnaire 3; 
discussed with the interviewee) 
11. How do you perceive the ability of your organization’s personnel to participate in 
the strategy process? 
The strategic theme 
12. What is the strategic theme in your organization in your view? 
13. Why is the strategic theme important for your organization? 
14. What have you done to promote the strategic theme in your organization? 
(Questionnaire 1)  
Pick the five best methods in the questionnaire 
                                                
28 The underlined words were replaced with contextual words for each organization.  
29 If there was another name for the official strategy process, that name was used.  
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About these five methods:  
15. Why do they work well? 
16. Who has participated in the use of these methods? (In what way?) 
17. In what other situations and with whom  have you discussed the strategic theme? 
18. How has the understanding of the strategic theme been supported in your 
organization? 
19. How do you know that your organization’s personnel have adopted the strategic 
theme? 
20. Which matters associated with the strategic theme have been the most difficult to 
explain to the personnel?  
21. What have you done to ensure that the members of the personnel have interpreted 
the strategic theme in a parallel manner? 
22. What kinds of abilities (competences) are required from your organization’s 
personnel for implementing the strategic theme? 
23. On what level would you say that these abilities are at present? 
24. How is the strategic theme present in your organization’s objectives? 
25. In what way is the strategic theme present in your organization’s work practices 
right now? 
26. In what way should the strategic theme be present in your organization’s work 
practices right now? 
27. What is the most central content that you have communicated to your 
organization’s personnel concerning the strategic theme? 
28. What sorts of goals have been set for your work? Who has set them? How is the 
strategic theme present in these goals? 
29. How is the promotion of the strategic theme present in your work? Please provide 
an example. 
30. Do you feel that you have been given a sufficient opportunity to influence goals 
associated with the strategic theme? (If not: how would you have wanted to influence 
them?) 
31. In your opinion, what is the single most important thing that should be done to 
implement the strategic theme in your organization? 
Questions? Comments? Thank you! 
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Middle management interview outline 
The interviewee 
1. Have there been changes in your work lately? What kinds of changes? 
The future 
2. How do you perceive the future of your organization? 
Strategy process 
3. What do you understand by the term ‘strategy’? (What things do you associate with 
strategy?) 
4. What do you understand by the term ‘strategy implementation’? (What things do 
you associate with strategy implementation?) 
5. How do you participate in your organization’s strategy process? (With reference to 
strategy process diagrams) 
6. How do you define your role in strategy implementation? 
7. How do you communicate strategies? 
8. Are there problems associated with strategy implementation? (Questionnaire 3; 
discussed with the interviewee) 
9. How do you perceive the ability of your organization’s personnel to participate in 
the strategy process? 
The strategic theme 
10. What is the strategic theme in your organization in your view? 
11. Why is the strategic theme important for your organization? 
12. Are there unclear issues associated with the strategic theme? 
13. Where and when have you become aware of the strategic theme?  
14. In which other situations and with whom have you discussed the strategic theme? 
15. How has the understanding of the strategic theme been supported in your 
organization? 
16. How do you know that your organization’s personnel have adopted the strategic 
theme? 
17. Which matters associated with the strategic theme have been the most difficult to 
explain to the personnel? 
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18. What have you done to ensure that the members of the personnel have interpreted 
the strategic theme in a parallel manner? 
19. What kinds of abilities (competences) are required from your organization’s 
personnel for implementing the strategic theme? 
20. In what way is the strategic theme present in your team’s current objectives? 
21. In what way is the strategic theme present in your team’s work practices right 
now? 
22. In what way should the strategic theme be present in your team’s work practices 
right now? 
23. What have you done to promote the strategic theme in your organization? 
(Questionnaire 1; discussed with the interviewee)  
Pick the five best methods in the questionnaire 
About these five methods:  
24. Why do they work well? 
25. Who has participated in the use of these methods? (In what way?) 
26. What is the most central content that you have communicated to your team 
members concerning the strategic theme? 
27. What sorts of goals have been set for your work? Who has set them? How is the 
strategic theme present in these goals? 
28. How is the promotion of the strategic theme present in your work? Please provide 
an example. 
30. Do you feel that you have been given a sufficient opportunity to influence goals 
associated with the strategic theme? (If not: how would you have wanted to influence 
them?) 
31. Do you believe that the strategic theme will be realized? 
32. In your opinion, what is the single most important thing that should be done to 
implement the strategic theme in your organization? 
Questions? Comments? Thank you! 
Personnel level interview outline 
The interviewee 




2. How well do you know your organization’s strategy process? 
3. How do you participate in the your organization’s strategy process? (With 
reference to strategy process diagrams) 
4. Do you feel you have the necessary skills and knowledge to participate in the 
strategy process? 
The strategic theme 
5. What is the strategic theme in your organization in your view? 
6. Why is the strategic theme important for your organization? 
7. Are there unclear issues associated with the strategic theme? 
8. How have you become aware of the strategic theme? (Questionnaire 2; discussed 
with the interviewee)  
Pick the five best methods in the questionnaire 
About these five methods:  
9. Why do they work well? 
10. Who has participated in the use of these methods? (In what way?) 
11. In which other situations and with whom have you discussed the strategic theme? 
12. What has according to your perception been done to implement the strategic 
theme in your organization? 
13. Have formal objectives been set for your team? How is the strategic theme 
manifest in these objectives? 
14. Have formal objectives been set for your work? How is the strategic theme 
manifest in these objectives? 
15. How is the promotion of the strategic theme present in your work? Please provide 
an example. 
16. What is your motivation for promoting the strategic theme in your work? 
17. Do you feel that you have been given a sufficient opportunity to influence 
objectives associated with the strategic theme? (If not: how would you have wanted to 
influence them?) 
18. In your opinion, what is the single most important thing that should be done to 
implement the strategic theme in your organization? 




20. How do you perceive the future of your organization? 
Questions? Comments? Thank you! 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 130  
In what way have you contributed to the 
promotion of the strategic theme in your 
organization? 




 Letters and communications
 Notice boards 
 Internal magazines
 Intranet 
 Mailing lists (e-mail)
 Unofficial discussions
 With superiors 
 With subordinates












 Budget monitoring and control
 Business plans 
 Operational and performance objectives
 Operations/processes
 Project management systems
 Quality systems 
 Changes in organizational structure
 Networks and partnerships
 Something else (what)?
  
 
                                                
30 The interviewees were asked to comment on the issues in questionnaires as they filled them out.  
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QUESTIONNAIRE 2  
How have you become aware of the strategic 
theme? 




 Letters and communications
 Notice boards 
 Internal magazines
 Intranet 
 Mailing lists (e-mail)
 Unofficial discussions
 With superiors 
 With subordinates












 Budget monitoring and control
 Business plans 
 Operational and performance objectives
 Operations/processes
 Project management systems
 Quality systems 
 Changes in organizational structure
 Networks and partnerships






Problems in strategy implementation 
The problems presented in the list below are typical to many organizations.  Please 
assess the weight of these problems in strategy implementation in your organization. 



















Feasibility of strategy      
Strategy is not applicable in every part of the organization 0 1 2 3 4 
Different areas/issues in the strategy are in conflict with each other 0 1 2 3 4 
The organization’s environment hinders strategy implementation 0 1 2 3 4 
Awareness of strategy      
Strategy is being deliberately kept a secret 0 1 2 3 4 
It is assumed that strategy is already known 0 1 2 3 4 
The communication of strategy has been insufficient 0 1 2 3 4 
The communication of strategy to different organizational levels is not perceived as 
necessa
0 1 2 3 4 
The flow of information is disrupted at some point 0 1 2 3 4 
Strategy is not correctly understood  0 1 2 3 4 
Organizational systems      
There are not enough resources for strategy implementation 0 1 2 3 4 
Working procedures conflict with strategy 0 1 2 3 4 
The organizational structure conflicts with strategy 0 1 2 3 4 
The connection between strategy and rewarding system(s) is insufficient 0 1 2 3 4 
Different personal roles have not been adequately defined 0 1 2 3 4 
The concretization of strategy does not succeed 0 1 2 3 4 
Commitment to strategy      
The management does not sufficiently commit itself to implementation 0 1 2 3 4 
The middle-management does not sufficiently commit itself to implementation 0 1 2 3 4 
The operational personnel does not sufficiently commit itself to implementation 0 1 2 3 4 
There is not enough faith for the realization of strategy 0 1 2 3 4 
Strategy implementation conflicts with organizational culture 0 1 2 3 4 
Strategy implementation conflicts with certain personal goals or interests 0 1 2 3 4 
Other activities and events divert attention from strategy implementation 0 1 2 3 4 
Monitoring and development of implementation       
The implementation is not evaluated 0 1 2 3 4 
After any change the old direction of activities is soon regained 0 1 2 3 4 




Appendix 2. Coding guidelines for secondary coders 
Thank you for agreeing to act as secondary coder for my PhD thesis! By collaborating 
you are helping me to gain a critical look at the reliability of my analyses. This 
document is written to guide you during coding. Please feel free to ask me if there is 
something that you don’t understand about this schema or the details of the interview 
text, excluding of course my final analyses of the social positions. Please do the 
coding only after you feel you have fully comprehended the schema.  
General advice 
Your task is to look at the way the person herself regards her social position (role) in 
the strategy process. You are not allowed to make judgments on whether she has 
reason to claim what she claims or whether she is entitled to make the judgments she 
makes. Your only task is to interpret what she says about her situation, not try to look 
beyond her words into ”what’s really happening”.  
Reading the text you may encounter terminology specific to the organization and its 
strategy process, which may seem strange. First, try not to be distracted by this, try to 
concentrate on what the interviewee discusses concerning herself in the strategy 
process, her personal social position. If this does not work, I will gladly explain 
contextual details.  
As the interview progresses, you will note that the interviewer questions the 
interviewee regarding a specific strategic theme. This theme is an area of the 
organization’s strategy that is regarded as important, and is discussed to gain a 
viewpoint on how the interviewee is connected to the strategy process on a more 
concrete level. 
I would ask you to keep a separate .txt file open while you read the interviews, 
making a note whenever you feel the interviewee comments on her social position. 
After you have read the whole interview, making notes as you go along, please 
proceed to coding the interview in three dimensions: activity, influence and 
sensemaking.  
Coding categories 
1. Sphere of sensemaking 
There are three possible categories, or ”spheres” of sensemaking. Think of the sphere 
as the “sphere of understanding” around the interviewee. The interviewee comments 
on whether she has made sense of the strategy and her role in it, describing the sphere 
of sensemaking around her. Does the sphere fit? Is it too tight or too large for 
comfort? 
Too small:  
If the interviewee feels that she has gained too little information about strategy, 
she not been told where the organization is going in terms of strategy, “too small” 
is the right category. Using a metaphor, the interviewee feels that her sphere of 
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sensemaking is ”too cramped”, i.e. she does not have the information to make 
sense of the strategy.  
Enough room:  
The interviewee feels content with her possibilities of sensemaking about strategy.  
Too large:  
It is as if the interviewee is lost, with too much sensemaking to do. She does not 
feel she has made sense of strategy, but does not claim that there is too little 
information. It is as if the task of sensemaking is simply too immense.  
Please pay in mind that what you are looking at is the interviewee’s personal 
viewpoint. If she seems confused, this does not warrant a coding, look at what she 
says about whether she has made sense of strategy. If she feels she has made sense of 
strategy, the enough room –category is in order. If not, does she feel left out, 
uninformed (too small) or simply confused, with too much thinking to do for her own 
comfort (too large)?  
You may encounter difficulties if the interviewee seems to differ on her comments 
regarding the strategy process in general and the strategic theme on the other hand. 
Again, your final analysis should be based on how the interviewee regards her 
strategic role herself as a whole: is she content or discontent with the way things are.  
2. Sphere of influence 
As with sensemaking, the categories are envisioned as ”spheres” around the 
interviewee. Now what we are interested in is whether the interviewee feels she has 
had sufficient possibilities of influencing the strategy process.  
Too small: 
The interviewee feels that she has too few possibilities of influencing issues.  
Enough room: 
The interviewee feels content with her possibilities of influencing the strategy 
process.  
Too large:  
This may be a tricky category to comprehend at first, but another way of putting it 
might be ”too much responsibility”. The interviewee feels that she has too little 
support in terms of making tough strategic decisions herself. The burden of 
responsibility seems too great.  
In the interview outline there is a question that directly addresses the possibilities the 
interviewee has in influencing the strategic theme. This is a major, but not the only, 
source of information. Again, look at whether the interviewee is content with her 
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possibilities of influencing – e.g. if she notes that she has no possibilities, yet is 
content with this, then the enough room category is in order. 
3. Sphere of activity 
The sphere of activity reflects the interviewee’s activities in the strategy process. 
There are three activity types: champion, citizen and cynic.  
Champion:  
The interviewee actively reports a willingness to influence the strategy process in 
a sphere larger than here immediate responsibilities according to her work 
description.  
Citizen: 
The interviewee has a basically positive or a neutral orientation towards strategy 
and perhaps feels that she is implementing strategy in her work. She does not, 
however, report to trying to influence the organization or other people.  
Cynic: 
The interviewee expresses a negative orientation towards strategy in general. She 
feels it is not worthwhile, or is a negative phenomenon. She does not report to 
trying to influence the strategy in any way, however. 
Coding 
Please code each interview using this form 
Interviewee: _____ 
Sphere of sensemaking:  
content? - yes => enough room 
  - no => too small / too large 
Sphere of influence: 
content? - yes => enough room 
  - no => too small / too large 
Sphere of activity:  
champion: willingness to actively influence strategic issues transcending 
responsibilities of one’s own work description 
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cynic: expresses negative orientation towards strategy, disinterest or open 
hostility. Not willing to do anything about it.  
citizen: no negative orientation, yet no willingness to influence larger issues.  
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Appendix 3. Quotations in Finnish 
These quotations have been presented here in Finnish in order to retain as much transparency in the text 
as possible. The interviewees often use colorful language, which poses the risk of something getting 
lost in translation. The reader fluent in Finnish is invited to examine the quotations and compare them 
to the translations in the text. 
Sphere of sensemaking 
(Q1) “Kyllä mä oon siitä kuullu. Mutta se on aika paljon, että se on ehkä silleen, että meitä [oman 
yksikön väkeä] pidetään. Meitä pidetään ehkä mun mielestä hiukan pienemmässä arvossa kuin näitä 
ketkä täällä on. Meille tiedotaan liian vähän.” 
(Q2) “Mä oon kyllä vaan kehittämisvaiheessa vielä [strategisessa suunnittelussa], kenttä on niin laaja 
ettei siitä oikeastaan näe että kun sen oman projektin […]” 
(Q3) “Kysymys: Onko tämä [strategiaprosessikaavio] tuttu? 
Vastaus: Joo, oikein tuttu. 
Kysymys: Oikein tuttu, millä lailla oikein tuttu? 
Vastaus: Sitä ollaan käyty läpi. 
Kysymys: Nimen omaan tässä YT-elimessä? 
Vastaus: Joo ja myös ihan omassa [yksikössä].” 
Sphere of influence 
(Q4) “Kysymys: Haluaisit sä vaikuttaa niihin [strategisiin tavoitteisiin]? 
Vastaus: No kyllä mielelläni, siis varmaan jokaisella on joku mielipide, että miten se [strateginen 
teema] pitäisi näkyä meillä paremmin, mutta tietysti se, että mä ymmärrän, ettei tota strategiaakaan 
tonne voi mennä niin kuin koko [organisaatio] vääntään, että joku raja pitää siinäkin olla, mutta että kyl 
ne tulee aika annettuina mulle.” 
(Q5) “[…] sit jos se tilanne tulee eteen, niin mä lyön vetoa, että suurin osa meistä ei oikein tiedä, että 
mihin me lähetään kääntymään […] ohjeistusta varmaan tässä lähivuosina toivonmukaan on tulossa 
[…]” 
(Q6) “[…] meillä on kuitenkin aika selkeät ne raamit että minkä verran menee, minulla ainakaan 
itselläni ole henkilökohtaisesti tullut mitään tarvetta että sanoa, että minun mielestäni tämän pitäisi 
mennä eri lailla.” 
Sphere of activity 
(Q7) “No kyllä sä voit feed backiin sanoa, että ei tule toimiin, mut mitä sitten. Mihin se auttaa, ei 
mihinkään. Sen voi sanoa nyt jo, että ei tule mitään tän vuoden tavoitteita, ei tule kesää.” 
(Q8) “Kysymys: Mikä motivoi toteuttamaan [strategista teemaa]? 
Vastaus: No, kylhä se omistaja on asettanu tällasen […] periaatteen tuota, jos ei omistajan tahtoa pysty 
toteuttamaan niin mitäpä se sitten […].” 
(Q9) “Minä aina herätän aina ihmisiä katsomaan [ongelmia strategisen teeman kannalta], tämä oli tällä 
lailla nätisti sanottu.”  
Excluded champions 
(Q10) “Se ei oo luontevan kuuloinen. Mulla on vaan se kuva, että mitä tässä seuraa ja kattelee 
tiedotteita ja muita. Lujaa menee. Sillai. Se, että täällä on perusteellisesti muuttunut tää koko 
arvomaailma […] Nyt vaan raha ratkaisee kaikissa paikoissa.”  
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(Q11) “Kyl mun mielestä, no pitäis ja pitäis, mut ainakin mä haluan tietää enemmän ja mun mielestä 
oikeastaan kuuluiskin tietää enemmän.” 
(Q12) “ […] nää tuloskortit käsittääkseni, no nyt on ensimmäinen missä mä olen nähnyt, että siihen voi 
jopa ite käydä sanomassa, että tää on nyt ihan syvältä. Tähän astihan meille on tullut aivan rauhattomia 
tavoitteita, jotka ei ole millään tapaa sidottuja reaalimaailmaan […]” 
Abandoned champions 
(Q13) “Nyt niinkuin tässä niissä strategiassa, mäkin olen lukenut sitä, että [tietty numeerinen tavoite 
pitää saavuttaa]. Tää on, mä en tiedä miten se on mahdollista. Mistä tulee sitten lisää resursseja tai 
voimia?” 
Discontent champions 
(Q14) “Meillä on aika hysteerinen tiedonjakopolitiikka tässä organisaatiossa [...] Mä olen viime 
viikolla lukenut [strategian], mä sain intraan oikeuden käyttää sitä, koska mä olen [mainitsee 
tehtävänimikkeen] […]” 
(Q15) “Minä luulen, että niillä on niin kiire, että ne valikoivat niistä kaikista maailman viesteistä mitä 
ne saa niin jotkut. Varmaan ne ei koe niitä tärkeitä, koska ne usein, ikävä kyllä, ne sivuuttaa. Tai sitten 
voi olla joissain tapauksissa, että ne huomioi ja yrittää, mutta […] ne ei niitä osaa tehdä. Eivätkä kerkiä 
siihen hirveästi paneutua, eivätkä ehkä viitsi, ajattelevat että helpommallakin pääsee.” 
(Q16) ” […] kaikille luvataan kaikkea, luodaan sellaista että onhan teillä ollut mahdollisuus vaikuttaa, 
on ollut edustaja. Jos me halutaan jäntevää toiminnan suunnittelua, johon strategiat sitten […] liittyy, se 
ei ole ihan joka pojan tehtävä, vaan tarvitaan parhaita poikia ja tyttöjä jotka nähdään [organisaation] 
sisällä selkeästi tulevaisuuden lupauksiksi ja voimavaroiksi.” 
(Q17) ”[…] “että kiitos palautteesta”, mutta rivien välissä, että älä laita uudelleen. Mutta sehän mua 
motivoi eniten. Silloinhan pitää antaa palautetta, tottakai enemmän [...] Että jotainhan siinä on, että jos 
sä pyydät palautetta ja silti sä et pysty kritiikkiä ottaan vastaan niin kuin se on, niin mikä siinä on 
takana. Hyvä kysymys. Epävarmuus.” 
(Q18) “Ja musta toi [näin suuri organisaatio] on aivan pöllö. Sanoinkin kerran meidän [yksikön 
johtajalle], että haluaisin meille sellaista koulutusta, että sisäinen yrittäjyys, että mitä se ihan oikeesti 
on. Että suhtauduttaisiin tähän työhön kuin se tämä olisi oma firma. Että miten eri tavalla silloin monet 
ihmiset silloin tätä työtä tekisi. Ja semmosta ilmapiiri saa aikaiseksi pienissä yksiköissä.” 
Empowered champions 
(Q19) “Nyt me ollaan tehty paljon määrittelytyötä, sitä fyysistä työtä ja nyt sitä pitää sparrata. Mutta 
nyt sen maastouttaminen, se liittyy koulutuksiin, sitouttamiseen, varmistamiseen, että se asia on 
ymmärretty oikein. Semmoisen yhteisymmärryksen aikaansaaminen paremman huomisen 
aikaansaamiseksi.” 
(Q20) “Mä olen esimerkiks kysynyt [alaisilta], että luetelkaa [strategian kulmakivet] ja kertokaa mitä 
ne sisältää. Joka ensimmäisenä on kertonut, niin on saanut sadan markan lahjakortin.” 
(Q21) “No ensimmäinen olisi sitten se, että olen koittanut tässä […] muutostilanteessa, että paras 
henkivakuutus meille kullekin tässä on, että hoidetaan hommamme mahdollisimman hyvin ja se nyt 
sitten suoraan liittyy sitten siihen, että [strateginen teema] on niin kuin just se ja tietysti myöskin 
motivaatio hoitaa ne hommat kunnolla.” 
(Q22) “Entinen osaston esimies [edeltäjäni] oli ainakin mielestään ammattimies joka alalla. Itse pyrin 
siihen, että meidän kotipesässä olisi jaettu kuviot. Olisi tavallaan varamiesjärjestelmä. Kun olen saanut 
oman kuvion kuntoon, seuraava steppi on koko [organisaatiossa] uuteen toimintakulttuuriin 
siirtymisestä.” 
(Q23) “Mutta ei niitä voi lähteä sillä lailla tekemäänkään, että me tehdään semmonen strategia, että 
neljäkymmentä ihmistä siihen uskoo. Se on asia sitten joka on taas niin hömpänpömppää, ettei sitä edes 
kannata lähtee tekemään. Semmosta tilannetta ei edes ole. Ei siihen tarvitsekaan kaikkien uskoa. 
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Riittää, kun minä uskon ja pari muuta. Siis tämmösessä tilanteessa minun mielestäni. Sitten hyvä 
onnistuminen, niin sitten rupeaa kaikki muutkin uskomaan.” 
(Q24) “Ne [omat alaiset] kyllä sitoutuu siihen, mitä yhdessä päätetään ja mitä on tullut käskyjä, niin 
ainakin meidän [yksikössä] asiat kyllä menee niin kuin ne periaatteessa sanotaan.” 
(Q25) “Joo, itseasiassa mä olen nähnyt nää [strategiaprosessikaaviot] sillai, että mä olen itse tuolla 
netissä seikkaillut ja kattellut näitä. Mutta en mä ole näitä nähnyt sillai mitenkään valmiissa esityksessä 
sillai, että olisin ollut kuuntelemassa jotain esitystä missä nää on kerrottu, mutta sillai, että itse olen 
kaivellut näitä ja kattellut [...] Kun tääkin on just semmoinen sen verran iso [organisaatio], niin kaiken 
maalman verkottuminen ja kaiken maailman kontaktit ja tämmöinen niinkun jos on näinkin utelias 
mielenlaatu, niin se on kyllä hyvä tässä firmassa, koska aina kun kyselee ja jutskailee, niin tosi paljon 
selviää asioita.” 
Champions under stress 
(Q26) “Ne [strategiaiskulauseet] on vaan sellaista hengen luontia. Kyllähän ne on meidän itse 
mietittävä, mitä me tehdään ja tosi harvoin oon mistään kuullut, että joku pystyisi sanomaan, mitä 
täällä pystytään tekemään paremmin… että joku pystyisi sen sanomaan, että mitä tehdään. Että kyllä ne 
keinot on meidän itse keksittävä, että mitä tehdään. Tavoitteet annetaan ja. Mutta, että jotain 
toimenpiteitä tulisi jostain, niin kyllä se on niinku.” 
(Q27) “Johto sitoutuu kyllä, keskijohdossa on melko suuri ongelma. Ne on kuin ”pikkukingejä” 
laguunissa nää meidän veijarit. Siinä tulee sellainen että, ”antaa niiden jätkien siellä pääkonttorissa 
suheltaa, minä teen niin kuin olen ennenkin tehnyt”. Siinä on kyllä tällainen ilmiö ja tämä on yksi 
merkittävä ongelma. Työntekijöiden sitoutuminen on pienempi ongelma, ne on enempi alttiimpia 
muutokselle.” 
Disregarded champions 
(Q28) “Että se [strateginen teema] on hirveen vaikea asia, laaja ja vaikea.” 
(Q29) “Että se on sitten tullut meidän ryhmäesimiehen kautta. Hän on käynyt semmoisissa 
[strategiatilaisuuksissa] ja sitten itse kertonut meille omin sanoin, esittänyt viisikymmentä sivua Power 
Pointtia, että tässä on strategia […] Se mikä siinä olisi minusta sinänsä ollut ongelma, että esimies ei 
ole ottanut itse sitä vakavasti ja sitten jos sen esittääkin sitten vähän, että tämä nyt on tällainen mikä on 
tehty, että tästä nyt voi ottaa ilon irti jos haluaa. Niin ei siihen oikein tosissaan voida suhtautuakaan, 
että siihen sitten vain, että tämä on tällaista ajankulua joillekin jotka tekevät näitä.” 
Puzzled champions 
(Q30) “Jos meillä olisi enemmän käytettävissä tämmöstä niin kuin eri tyyppistä tietoa, eli siitä 
ihmisestä tavallaan, minkä tyyppinen se on ja mitä se harrastaa, niin sitä vois ehkä hyödyntää enemmän 
ja sitä kautta miettiä, että mikä sille asiakkaalle oikeastaan olis hyvä juttu. Ne tietojärjestelmät vois olla 
vähän paremmassa kunnossa, että ne ylipäänsä mahdollistais tommosen tekemisen.” 
(Q31) “[…] yksi ongelma tahtoo olla, että on vaikea saada, jos puhutaan jonkun osa-alueen strategiasta 
jota ollaan tekemässä, niin siihen liittyen, liittyvien osien, niin asioista on vaikea saada selvyyttä. Että 
tämä liittyy varmaan osittain siihen ja sitten meidän strategiaprosessi, että kuinka se toimii yleensä, kun 
se on hyvin rinnakkainen prosessi niin sittenhän siinä voi hyvin herkästi sattua näitä ristiriitaisuuksia 
niiden strategioiden kesken. Että se on varmaan sellainen yksi osa-alue mitä pitää kehittää, että miten 
me saadaan helpommin, helpommin saataisiin liittymään toisiinsa ja miten ne, joihinkin strategioihin 
liittyvät asiat saataisiin jotenkin helpommin hankittavaksi tai strategiat helpommin saataville.” 
(Q32) “Saan varmasti vaikuttaa [tavoitteisiin] kun asetan [ne] itse. Ei se siinä mielessä ole. Kysymys 
pitäisi antaa X:lle [suora alainen], että onko hän saanut tarpeeksi tukea. Siinä vois sanoa, ettei ehkä ole 
saanut, että hän aika paljon yksin joutunut ajamaan ylös, mutta vahva persoona, hän tekee sen. Mä 
yritän avata ovia.” 
(Q33) “Kysymys: Miten viestit strategioita? 
Vastaus: Strategioita.  
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Kysymys: Tai strategiaa tietysti voi sanoa myös? 
Vastaus: Viestin [organisaation] kannalta tätä strategiaa… En minä nyt tiedä onko nyt hirveän paljon, 
se on sitä että [organisaatio] teki strategian ja sitten jos ajattelee niin se on aika kaukaista se 
[organisaatio]-taso, että enemmän sitten puhutaan kuitenkin sen [oman] yksikön strategiasta,” 
(Q34) “Suomennan sitä mitä ylhäältä päin on sanottu, koska se on enemmän tai vähemmän 
kapulakieltä. Vaikka kyllä mä sen tasan tiedän, että niitä sanojakin on mietitty moneen otteeseen, mitä 
sinne kirjoitetaan […] Olen laittanut [strategiapaperit] tiimeissä kiertoon, että sen saa jokainen lukea, 
joka haluaa, mutta mä en oo edellyttänyt, että se luetaan. Poimin teksteistä sellaisia asioita, jotka mun 
mielestä koskevat meitä. Mä oon pyytänyt mun tiiminvetäjiä lukee niitä ja poimii samoin niitä asioita 
[…] Enemmän näen, että rooli on kielen kääntäminen.  
Kysymys: Onko kielenkääntäminen helppoa? 
Vastaus: Eihän se tietenkään helppoa ole. Markkinointistrategian tekemisessä esimerkiksi sitä tuli 
luettua niin monta kertaa ja sitä käsiteltiin niin monta kertaa, että sitä rupesi ymmärtämään, mitkä siellä 
oli taustalla. Siellä oli paljon samoja asioita kuin joskus 6 vuotta sitten, kun on nähnyt […] Kyllä ne 
rupee ymmärtämään mitä niillä tarkoitetaan. Mutta jos ne vaihtuisi, niin meille keskijohdolle lyödään 
paperi kouraan ja sanotaan että tossa on ja selitetään kerran. Sitten pitäisi itse jakaa tietoa ja kertoa mitä 
niillä tarkoitetaan sen tiedon perusteella. Se kyllä vaatii aika paljon sitä, että pähkii niitä asioita […] Ei 
se tosta vaan onnistu […] Kyllä mä näen sen, että jos keskijohto ei ymmärrä niitä, me voidaan olla 
aikamoinen tulppa. On turha kuvitella että meidän alapuolella sitä kukaan ymmärtäisi, jos mekään ei 
ymmärretä.” 
(Q35) “Lähinnä tämä ongelma on meikäläisen työtavoissa ja asioissa. Ei ihminen ole koskaa valmis 
mihinkään tai jos ihminen on valmis, niin se on hieno asia, mutta mä ainakin koen, että joka päivä pitää 
oppia uutta. Kun tossa aamupäivällä mietin tätä kyselyä, niin rupesin miettimään omia asioita 
[strategian toimeenpanon käytäntöjä]. Tiedottamista, missä on varmasti petraamisen varaa mullakin ja 
koko meidän osastolla.” 
Overwhelmed champions 
(Q36) “Eikä meillä edes ole paperilla, että miten me toimitaan sen [strategisen asian edistämiseksi]. 
Että se on kanssa semmoinen, mitä me ollaan paljon mietitty ja mihin on ehdotettu työryhmiä ja mihin 
on tehty kaikenlaista, mutta tämä on sellainen asia, mitä tuota niin, tämä menee nyt tietysti mun työni 
ohi […] kukaan ei tahdo ottaa vastuuta tästä hommasta […] Että nää jotka panevat alulle tämän, lyö 
päänsä seinään koko ajan. Niin sen tietää silloin, että me ollaan aika tuuliajolla täällä kentällä.” 
(Q37) “Tuota… mä tiedän että osa mun suorista alaisista käyvät kyllä [strategiat] säännöllisesti läpi 
omissa kokouksissa, mutta tiedän myöskin, että kaikki eivät käy.” 
(Q38) “Mä olen yrittänyt viestiä sitä, että miksi sitä [prosessia] pitäisi parantaa, mitä hyötyä siitä on, 
missä se näkyy. [Asiakkaan] tai jonkun muun kannalta se on tärkeä tämä [strateginen teema]. Mun 
kokemuksen mukaan näinkin turvallisessa ja rikkaassa yhteisössä kuin [oma organisaatio] niin 
henkilöstö ei paljon ajattele, että saadaan parempi tulos. Se ei täällä ole niin se ei kauheasti 
huolestuttanut joukkoa, kun me ei eletä sillä lailla veitsi kurkulla.” 
Recluse citizens 
(Q39) “Niin no sanotaanko näin, että kyllähän tässä on kyllä semmonen määrätty kastinjako tässä 
henkilöstössä on, että on tää suorittava puoli ja sitten on nää [päätöksentekijät]. Sitä ei oikein sanoin 
osaa selittää, mutta siinä on määrätynlainen kastinjako kyllä. Että onko se sitten meidän omaa 
alemmuudentunnetta vai mitä se on, mut jotain on kuitenkin semmonen suojamuuri.” 
(Q40) “Että mun mielestä niinkun työntekijältä oletetaan hirveesti siis, että se jaksaa ja kestää kaikki. 
Että sitä ei niinkun ajatella ollenkaan. Että me ollaan kuin pelinappuloita.” 
(Q41) “Että hyvin tiedän, että se on se joulupuhe tosiaan aina, mikä on täällä kerran vuodessa sen 
pitämässä. Niistä strategioista ei kyllä tiedä sitten yhtään mitään. Kyllähän tää meidän päällikkö, tää 
XX, niin kyllähän se johtaa kyllä ihan riittävästi täällä, että ei mulla siitä ole kyllä mitään valittamista. 
Mutta kun mennään sinne ylöspäin, niin sitten voisi olla. 
Kysymys: Mutta minkälaisista asioista sinä haluaisit kuulla nimenomaan sitten? 
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Vastaus: No yleensä siis, kun en mä tiedä sen mielipiteistä mitään. 
Kysymys: Ja kuitenkin hän tekee semmosia päätöksiä, jotka vaikuttaa teidän työhön? 
Vastaus: Kyllä varmaan tekee. Eli ei sillä lailla kanssakäymistä ole, on morjenstettu tuossa vaan.” 
(Q42) “ […] kiinnostusta riittää näihin [strategian] osa-alueisiin, niin kuin just toi BSC-malli, niin 
siitäkin meitä tavallaan me ei tehdä sen eteen mitään, meidän ryhmä, koska meidän johtaja ei ole niistä 
kiinnostunut. Ja sit meidän on vähän vaikea mennä työntekijöinä sanomaan, et me oltais tästä 
kiinnostuneita, kun se pitäs tulla mun mielestä johdon taholta se suunta.” 
(Q43) “Ei ollut alussa varsinaista koulutusta [strategisesta teemasta], juteltiin keskenämme 
[kollegoiden kesken].” 
Neutralized citizens 
(Q44) “No meillä [meidän osastolla] ei ole siihen ollut mitään hirveästi vaikuttamismahdollisuuksia 
minun mielestäni, että en ole ainakaan itse henkilökohtaisesti vaikuttanut niihin [strategisiin 
tavoitteisiin]. 
Kysymys: Olisitko halunnut? 
Vastaus: Ei silleen oman työn kannalta ei pahemmin ehdi. Täällä on erikseen nämä jotka voi 
suunnitella niitä.” 
(Q45) “[…] välttämättä en kaikkia [strategisia tavoitteita] allekirjoita, enkä näihin ois voinu vaikuttaa.” 
(Q46) “Sit semmoinen avoimuus, että voi avoimesti keskustella. 
Kysymys: Mistä aiheesta? 
Vastaus: Iha mistä vaan. Ihan kaikkeen liittyvästä. Sellaista avoimuutta. Että ihmiset uskaltaa […] 
Voisi antaa kehitysideoita ja, ja niitä kysyttäiskin joskus. Se olisi mun mielestä tosi tärkeä. Se ettei aina 
samat ihmiset […] aika paljon sitä aina samat ihmiset on samassa asiassa määrittelemässä kaikkee.” 
Satisfied citizens 
(Q47) “Tämä on tämä nykypäivä. En minä nyt itse henkilö, jos minä jotenkin muuten pärjäisin niin en 
minä välttämättä viitsisi itseäni piiskata, ei kun ihan oikeasti, minä olen niin kauan jo ollut 
työelämässä, yli 30 vuotta, mutta en minä koskaan viitsimistä vastaan ole, mutta minusta tämän ikäinen 
ihminen jo riittää kun se käy joka päivä töissä […]” 
(Q48) “No meidän ryhmäpalaverit, joita on kaksi kertaa kuukaudessa, niin siellä tuodaan esiin ihan 
tälläkin hierarkian tasolla tämä yleinen talon linja […] Eli se pyritään saamaan meille selväksi, että me 
omaksutaan tämä ja ollaan mukana, sitoudutaan siihen.” 
(Q49) “Olen yrittänyt ihan omalla ajalla lukemalla lukea sitä, mitä se BSC tarkoittaa. Olen tullut 
mukaan sen jälkeen kun asiat pantu vireille. Sen takia kaikki asiat on niin kuin että mä oon itse 
opiskellut enemmän, että pääsisin mukaan ja ymmärtäisin, mistä on kysymys.” 
(Q50) “Joskus organisaatioteorioissa tuodaan esille vanhoja asioita uusin nimikkein ja todetaan, että 
nyt on keksitty jotain aivan uutta. 60-70- luvulla tuli management by objectives, joka ei ole sen 
ihmeempi kuin joku myöhempi tavoiteohjaus tai sitten joku muu. Nää on eri variaatioita, mutta teema 
on sama: saada työntekijät tekemään sen, minkä johto haluaa.” 
Citizens in need 
(Q51) “No ehkä jotenkin se, että se on aika laaja-alaisesti semmonen hahmotus mulla, mutta ehkä se 
pitäisi olla sitten vielä ehkä vähän yksityiskohtaisempi, ainakin tuntuu siltä, että kun meitä on niin 
paljon töissä, et olis jonkunlainen, moneen semmoseen juttuun jotain ohjeistusta.” 
(Q52) “Se [strategisen teeman toimeenpano] vähän kangertelee, se ei ole lähtenyt niin nopeasti 
liikkeelle. Ei ole niin helppo tehdä sitä. Prosessi on kyllä hidastunut.  
Kysymys: Mitkä on ollut ne suurimmat vaikeudet? 
Vastaus: Osastonjohtajan eläkkeelle lähtö ja ei ollut seuraajaa paikalla. Ei ollut niitä päättäjiä.” 
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(Q53) “Minä luulen, että tämä on ainakin tämä strategian viestittäminen niin minä tunnen itse pistoksen 
sydämessäni ja voin väittää että se on kuitenkin ongelma, siis se, että sitä ei ole riittävästi viestitetty, 
siis strategiakeskusteluja, minä olettaisin niin että strategiaa ei voi viestittää sillä tavalla että minä 
panen strategian paperille ja kerrotaan että tässä se nyt on ja sitten se viestintä olisi siinä […] 
Tiedonkulun katkeaminen on suuri ongelma minusta. 
Kysymys: Aha, missä se katkeaa? 
Vastaus: No minä luulen että jossakin täällä meikäläisen ja siellä jossakin [oman osaston 
työntekijätason] välillä niin jossakin siinä maastossa, että minä kyllä luulisin että tältäosin mitä minun 
viestittäminen, viestintä, muu henkilökohtainen, kaikkien muidenkin meidän joiden pitäisi sitten kertoa 
ja viestittää niin se on huonosti hoidettu.” 
Troubled citizens 
(Q54) “[…] nää on kaikkien luettavissa, mitä yleensäkin [Intranetissa] on yleensäkin […]  kaikki 
strategiat sun muut, niin kyllä ne tulee siellä aina sitten esiin. Se on jokaisen luettavissa ja tietysti se on 
silloin itsestä kiinni, että lukeeko niitä vai ei […]” 
(Q55) “[…] jollakin tavalla mä koen, että siinä on niin kuin se on pikkasen kuin sairaalahierarkia, joka 
mun mielestä on, siis sillä lailla mä koen [oman organisaation], jos mä ajattelen, että mä koen itse 
[oman organisaation], siis tietysti erittäin mukava työpaikka, mutta ehkä joissakin asioissa mä koen 
niin kuin jonkinasteisesti vanhanaikaista […] että se on tavallaan siinä, vaikka meillä on niitä 
madallettu niitä portaita ja sillä tavalla on, mutta jonkunasteisesti. Tietysti johtaja, joka on tuolla 
ylimmässä päässä, niin hänellä pitää olla selkärankaa ja kykyä johtaa. Se on hänen tehtävänsä sillä 
tavalla. Mutta sit kun mä ajattelen tällä alaportaalla, niin mä en näkisi mitään kauheeta semmosta, että 
jos asioita ehkä jonkunasteisesti vielä avoimemmin tai jotenkin johdettaisiin, niin mä en itse näkisi 
siinä henkilökohtaisesti mitään pahaa [...]” 
(Q56) “[…] tässä on vuosi suunnilleen ollut semmosta aikaa, ettei ole oikein tiennyt, että mä olen kyllä 
toiminut aivan samalla lailla kuin ennenkin, mutta ei ole tiennyt, että mitä voi tehdä tai mitä saa tehdä 
ja tämmöset kaikki organisaatiot […]” 
(Q57) “[…] tällä hetkellä kun me tiedetään tällä hetkellä että mikä on [organisaation] strategia näissä 
niin eihän siihen voi paljon vaikuttaa […] lähtökohta on se, että en minä voi myydä sellaista tuotetta 
asiakkaalle mikä hänelle ei kerta kaikkiaan sovi.” 
(Q58) “Sinänsähän tää koko prosessi on varsin veikeä, talo on ikäänkuin määritellyt, en tiedä millä 
perusteilla ja mistä, onko se tästä [strategisesta tavoitteesta] lähtien on määritellyt omiksi, tuota tämän 
tavoitteen ja määritellyt tämmöiset luvut, mitä vuonna 2005 pitäisi olla. Se on ikäänkuin se päämäärä 
mitä kohti tässä pyritään, mutta ei oo kertaakaan tässä talossa mietitty sitä, miten se tässä esimerkiks 
[operatiivisella tasolla] saavutetaan.” 
Unenlightened citizens  
(Q59) “Olen valinnut alan koska viihdyn siinä. Työssä ongelmanratkaisu korostuu aika paljon […]  
Kysymys: Oletko saanut mielestäsi riittävästi vaikuttaa [strategiseen teemaan] liittyvien tavoitteiden 
asettamiseen?  
Vastaus: Varmasti olisi ollut mahdollisuus vaikuttaa. Meillä asioista voi puhua suoraan johtajalle. Jos 
järkevästi perustelee, niin saa vaikutettua asioihin.” 
(Q60) “No, ei silleen oikeestaan, että toisaalt meil… en tiedä kyl, mä en ihan kaikkee lue, mitä 
meilläkin painetaan ja tulee näitä […] Henkilökunnan kehittämisstrategia ois’ varmaan ollu hyvä lukee, 
mis sit ehkä ois ollu tiivistetty, et mikä siin on ideana, et sellanen kokonaiskuva siin ei mulla ehkä ole.” 
(Q61) “No kyl se yleiskuva on ihan varmaan jäänyt päähän, mutta tietysti se on niitä pieni osia sit taas 
mitä taas ihan sit me jo käydään, mutta nyt esimerkikisi tässä jossain viimisessä suunnitteluissa, kuin 
tuli nyt, niin mun mielestä siellä on semmosta pari ihan, okei katottiinkin ihan näähän osui ihan niinkun 
suoraan, ei oo koskaan ennen viel näin käynyt, et ihan vois sanoo, et ois kerrottu, et näin teette ja 
suurinpiirtein joku ohje vaan asiasta puutuisi, että puhuttiin niinku ihan vois sanoo konkreettisesti 
asiasta, että mä en nytten seuraavaks kuitenkin kysyt että mikä se on, mutta mä en muista sitä. Mut okei 
se jäi sen takia mieleen, koska se ensimmäisen kerran osu ihan niinku kohdilleen.”   
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(Q62) “[…] se nyt on tietysti vähän utopistista kun johto tekee jonkun tämmösen [strategiapaperin], 
niin ei se sitten välttämättä lukijalle, käytännön tekijälle välttämättä aukene siitä heti. Mutta kuitenkin, 
kyllähän meillä nyt on ihan selkeätä se, että asiakkaat on meidän tärkein kohde mihin me panostetaan 
tietysti ja sitten on tämä meidän sisäinen, että me sitten itse jaksamme niin siihen panostetaan myöskin 
ja minun mielestäni talo sen hyvin ottaa huomioon, että näitä strategioitten toteuttamisessa ajatellaan 
myös sitä, että kuinka sen toteuttajat jaksaa tehdä sen […]” 
Lost citizens 
(Q63) “No mun tapa toimia olis semmonen että mä ensin vähän kattelen ja pyörittelen sitä 
piirakanpalaa, että mitäs mä nyt tällä teen, että tässä vähän enempi joutuu liikkuvaan junaan 
hyppäämään [...]” 
(Q64) “Välillä se voi olla itelle hämärää, et onks tää nyt ihan hyödyllistä.” 
(Q65) “[…] kyl sikäli on kyl hyvä työpaikka, että jos haluu ryhtyä jotain, niin kyllä pääsee, et se ei ole 
ongelma. Se on enemmän ollut se, että ei ole itsellä ollut niin paljon annettavaa.” 
(Q66) “[…] niitä [strategisia tavoitteita] ei ehkä pystytä tällä hetkellä vetämään mittareihin. Että niitä 
pystytään vain sillä lailla aika mutu-tuntumalla sanomaan, että okei sinä teit hyvää työtä ja kaikki sinun 
tavoitteet täyttyi, mutta että miten ne vaikutti sitten siihen meidän strategiavision toteutumiseen niin ne 
linkit on ongelma.” 
(Q67) “Kysymys: Näkyykö [strateginen teema] ryhmäsi tavoitteissa? 
Vastaus: Ei. En olisi suostunut sellaiseen, se on kaikille esimiehillekin päivänselvää, että meillä ei ole 
aikaa. Kuulostaa törkeältä ja kylmältä, mutta kun ei ole niin ei ole.” 
Hopeless cynics 
(Q68) “Kyllä nyt pitäisi ihmisille saada ainakin se saada myös tonne ylöspäin, että kaikilla ihmisillä, tai 
ei kaikilla oo, mutta yleensä ihmisillä on muutakin kuin se työ. Pitäisi kohdella vähän enemmän 
sellaisena, ottaa niiden ne tämmöiset ihmisenä olemisen asiat, nähdä nää työntekijät samalla tavalla 
ihmisinä kuin asiakkaat on. Eikä vaan aina, että ne on niitä työntekijöitä, jotka tekee sen työn. 
Inhimillisyyttä ei ole talossa.” 
(Q69) “[…] tuntuu siltä, että ei tarpeeksi kuunnella esimerkiksi meidän mielipiteitä ja ehdotuksia. Että 
ne ei niinku mee mihinkään eteenpäin. Aina tulee jossain seinä vastaan.” 
(Q70) “[Strategia]prosessissa puhuttiin siitä [strategisesta teemasta], mutten ole mitenkään 
vakuuttunut. Päällisin puolin se on sanojen muutos, riskinä se, että olemassa olevien yksiköiden nimiä 
muutetaan.” 
(Q71) “Mä itse näen sillai, että me ollaan ehdottoman tärkeä yksikkö [organisaatiossa] ja 
ammattitaitoinen ja kunnianhimoinen ja ammattiylpeä. Niin meidän pitäisi. Näistä lähtökohdista mä 
itse työskentelen. Ryhmänä meidän mun mielestä pitäisi nostaa sitä meidän profiilia. Olla uskottavampi 
kuin ollaan. Sillai pitäis näkyä. Mutta tää on se mun näkemys. Tällä hetkellä mä näen sen, että me 
työskennellään vähän niinku jokainen omalla sarallaan. Jos mä kärjistän sitä, niin mä voisin ajatella 
työskenteleväni free lancerina.” 
(Q72) “Täst on kaksi ihmistä lähtenyt […] esimiehet sanoo, että ei palkata ketään, koeta nyt järkätä 
ittelles lomittaja ja opettaa, ne eivät hoida vastuuta, se kuvastaa jotain […] pääasia että hommat hoituu, 
mutta sitten jos jossakin vähän falskaa niin sitten varmaan muistetaan. Eiks tää kerro jotain 
johtamisesta, johtoportaasta?” 
Surrendered cynics 
(Q73) “[…] tuntuu välillä, ettei me tarvittaisi asiakkaita ollenkaan, vaan kyllä täällä pyöritetään niin 
paljon muutoksia ja sisäisiä palavereita ja strategista suunnittelua ja näin, että tavallaan niinkun vanha 
Neuvostoliiton kommunistipuolue, paljonko sit, siellä oli tuhansia työntekijöitä ja sit vaan yhtenä 
päivänä lakkautettiin. Yhtäkkiä vaan päätettiin, että nyt ei tarvita enää, eikä sit, sit vaan ei tarvittu. Että 
ne oli täysin siellä pyörimässä silleen. Tääl on kyllä pahimmassa tapauksessa vähän samoja juttuja.” 
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(Q74) “Monet asiat näyttävät teoriassa hyvältä. Käytännössä ei toimi silleen. Minulla on aika pitkä 
työkokemus, niin jos siitä saisi annettua vähän vinkkejä muille, joilla on sitä vähemmän. En usko, että 
ennen kaikki on tehty väärin. Tuntuu, että pitää uudistua uudistumisen vuoksi […]” 
(Q75) “Kysymys: Uskotko, että [strateginen teema] toteutuu [organisaatiossasi]?  
Vastaus: Jos tietyt avainhenkilöt pystytään pitämään talossa, niin kyllä.  
Kysymys: Haluatko tarkentaa tätä, keitä nämä tietyt avainhenkilöt ovat? 
Vastaus: Siis sellaiset henkilöt, jotka on aivan ensiarvoisen tärkeää tosiaankin pitää talossa joidenka 
tehtäville ei helposti löydy korvaajaa, joko sen takia että korvaaja vaatisi esimerkiksi niin suurta 
taloudellista korvausta että sitä ei [työnantajalla] ole mahdollisuutta maksaa tai ne tehtävät ovat sitten 
niin vaativia tai sanotaanko että ja ne tehtävät ovat niin vaativia ettei niihin helposti pysty 
kouluttautumaan sitten vaan se vaatii esimerkiksi sitä että on ollut pidemmän aikaa tässä kokemuksen 
myötä oppinut ne tehtävät.” 
Disinterested cynics 
(Q76) “Hoh-hoijaa, joo siis ihan loistava varmasti siis ihan liikuttavia asioita. Mutta ei ne 
[strategiaprosessikaaviot] käytännössä toimi. Nää on hyviä nää himmelit, mut todellisuudessa se menee 
semmoseen niin kuin voidaan sanoa, että ei tule kesää ei tule kesää […]”  
(Q77) “ […] yleensä tässä strategiatyössä…Ilmeisesti johtajille on, jotenkin kun ne ovat omaksuneet 
jotkut tietyt näkemykset siitä että miten organisaatiota johdetaan ja miten sitä kehitetään, ja nämä 
näkemykset ovat sitten joidenkin ulkopuolelta saatujen oppien mukaisia niihin on hyvä tarrautua ja 
katsoa että nyt minä olen tehnyt tuon, minä olen tehnyt tämän kaavan mukaan. Että johtajilta tahtoisin 
luovuutta enemmän siihen, spontaanisuutta ja spontaanisuutta siihen johtamiseen enemmän.” 
Dislocated cynics 
(Q78) “ […] just sen takia minäkin kysyin, että uskaltaako täällä puhua mitään. Välillä tulee sellainen 
olo kameroita on joka paikassa, kun tietää sellaisia asioita koska tietää sellaisia asioita mistä ei ole 
julkisesti puhuttu. 
Kysymys: Aijaa. Hurjaa. 
Vastaus: Minä en tykkää ollenkaan sellaisesta, että vahditaan. Että pitää esittää, että on hirveän 
tehokas. Kun ihminen on kuitenkin sellainen eihän se koko ajan voi paahtaa täysillä. Välillä on sellaisia 
päiviä, ettei ole niin hyviä päiviä.” 
(Q79) “Silloin alussahan meillä oli hirveästi sitä yhteishenkeä, että tee sinä, ja ollaan yhtä ja ollaan 
tiimiä ja näin. Mutta sitten kuitenkin se on mennyt siihen, että sillä omalla työllä ei pysty ansaitsemaan 
tavallaan päästä eteenpäin jos ei ole hyvä kaveri vaikka [päällikön] kanssa. 
Kysymys: Että oman työn tulokset eivät vaikuta sitten? 
Vastaus: Tai minä ainakin koen sen niin. Että joitakin ihmisiä palkitaan ja joitakin toisia ei.” 
(Q80) “Että siihen [strategiseen muutokseen] ei ole annettu tavallaan niinkun tällä suorittajatasolla, 
niinkun varsinaisen työsuorittajan tasolla niin paljonkaan aikaa sopeutua […] harvoinpa niitä 
[strategiadokumentteja] tulee käytyy kattomassa [intranetissä]. Joka vuosihan nää tehdään nää 
osastokohtaiset suunnitelmat ja tietysti sitten korkeammalla tasollakin nää suunnitelmat. Ja kyllä nää 
nyt käydään kerran vuodessa ainakin läpi sitten, näytetään. Mutta eihän niihin sillä tavalla meikäläinen 
kiinnitä huomiota, jos ei koske itteään.” 
(Q81) “Meillä siis mä olen ollut turhautunut tähän strategiahöpötykseen, siis niin kuin täällä on viis 
vuotta suunniteltu tätä organisaatiota ja tehty strategioita ja puhuttu aivan äärimmäisen teoreettisella 
tasolla näistä, se on täysin vierasta koko tälle työntekijäjoukolle ja silti ei ole saatu aikaan vielä uutta 
organisaatiota. Ja nyt tulee vaan uusia ja uusia konsultteja ja todellakin niin täysin teoreettisia malleja, 
jotka on kovin vieraita käytännölle. Että tää ei vaan toimi näin. Ulkopuolelta haetaan eri näköistä 
konsulttiapua, kun tää asia olis ollut ratkaistu, kun pannaan [johtoryhmä] tonne [edustustiloihin] 
yhdeks päiväks, kahdeks päiväks laatimaan se uus organisaatio, koska me tiedetään, että mitkä on ne 
tavoitteet mihin pitää pyrkiä ja siellä sitten tapellaan niin kauan kunnes savu nousee, valkoinen savu 
piipusta ja todetaan, että uus organisaatio on syntynyt. 
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Kysymys: Mikä siinä on ollut syynä, että näin ei ole tehty? 
Vastaus: No ilmeisesti täällä on siis [toimitusjohtaja] on ollut jossain määrin heikko puuttumaan tähän, 
mutta täällä pyörittää tämmönen organisaatioyksikkö […] täysin sisäisesti tätä systeemiä ja välillä 
tuntuu siltä, että se hakee työlleen oikeutusta tästä jatkuvasta prosessista ja tää prosessi on jäänyt sitten 
elämään tässä näin ilman lopputulokseen pyrkimistäkään.” 
Passive cynics 
(Q82) “Kyllä tää [mun] viestintä [omalle yksilölle] on vähän tällaista face-to-face -keskusteluja 
asioista.  
Kysymys: Onko nää keskustelut yleensä virallisemmissa vai epävirallisemmissa tilaisuuksissa? 
Vastaus: Både och. Epävirallisissa tilaisuuksissa käytetään tätä inhorealistista puheilmaisua ja sitten 
kun ollaan virallisempia, silloin lauletaan yhtiön lauluja.” 
(Q83) “[…] kyllä se on hyvin pieni nappula mitä meikäläinen täällä vääntää […]”  
(Q84) “Mä käyn niissä [toimitusjohtajan kyselytunneilla] hirveän harvoin, kun ne on vähän semmosia, 
että mulla on niistäkin semmonen kuvitelma, että ne on vähän semmosia näennäisiä.” 
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Appendix 4. Statistical description of the data 
The objective of this thesis is to study social positions in the strategy process from the 
phenomenological perspective of an individual agent. A thorough statistical analysis 
of the data clearly falls out of the scope of the thesis because of the qualitative 
methodology employed, as well as the framing of the research task: elaborating 
individual positions. There is, however, a possibility of giving an account of the data 
in the light of certain background variables, even if this is not the method of choice 
for phenomenological analysis. This description is given outside the discussion of the 
research question, and simply for the benefit of the reader. The data will not be used 
to support the main analysis of the text and is therefore not subjected to significance 
testing of any kind. 
First of all, the frequencies of positions and performance categories are presented in 
the table below (Table 34).  
Table 34. Discovered frequencies of the social positions 
 Sphere of Sensemaking  Sphere of influence N % 
Champions   158 52,4
Excluded Too small Too small 10 3,3
Abandoned Too small Too large 1 0,3
Discontent Enough room Too small 20 6,6
Empowered Enough room Enough room 72 24
Under stress Enough room Too large 7 2,3
Disregarded Too large Too small 7 2,3
Puzzled Too large Enough room 29 9,6
Overwhelmed Too large Too large 12 4
Citizens   118 39,4
Recluse Too small Too small 15 5
Neutralized Enough room Too small 9 3
Satisfied Enough room Enough room 24 8
In need Enough room Too large 3 1
Troubled Too large Too small 14 4,7
Unenlightened Too large Enough room 42 14
Lost Too large Too large 11 3,7
Cynics   25 8,4
Hopeless Too small Too small 5 1,7
Surrendered Enough room Too small 4 1,3
Disinterested Enough room Enough room 2 0,7
Dislocated Too large Too small 9 3
Passive Too large Enough room 5 1,7
  Role-players 125 41,5 
  Role-seekers 109 36,2 




Empowered champions form the largest group, amounting to a fourth of the 
interviewees. Unenlightened citizens are the next largest, puzzled champions being 
the third largest group. Approximately a half of the interviewees regard themselves as 
strategic champions, with approximately forty percent actually performing in strategic 
roles. Approximately a third of the interviewees are looking for a role, and a fourth do 
not want a role. Strategic cynics are relatively rare.    
The background variables 
There are four background variables on which data was gathered. First of all, the 
interview outline itself was adjusted to facilitate discussion at three organizational 
levels, i.e. three forms of formal positions: the top management, middle management 
and the operative personnel. Secondly, we categorized the twelve case organizations 
into three types: private, public, and private with a public (e.g. legislated) mission. 
Thirdly, we were interested in the tenure of the interviewees in their organizations. 
Fourthly, since strategy is an abstract phenomenon, we gathered data on the 
educational background of the interviewees. 
Table 35/5. Description of the interview sample. 
Personnel group N  Organization type N 
Operative personnel 179  Public organization 100 
Middle management 83  Public firm 74 
Top management 39  Private organization/firm 127 
     
Tenure with the 
organization 
N  Education N 
less than 2 yrs 39  No professional education 33 
2-10 years 94  Vocational education 121 
over 10 years 168  University 145 
   Not known 2 
 
Formal positions 
The frequencies of managers, middle managers and operative personnel members 
corresponding to the activity categories (champion, citizen, cynic), as well as the 
performance categories (role-player, role-seeker, bystander), have been portrayed in 
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Table 29 of the main text. A more detailed presentation of all the twenty positions is 
presented below (Table 36). 
Table 36. Formal positions and phenomenological positions  
 N top managers % N middle managers % N operative personnel % 
Champions   
Excluded 0 0,0 2 2,4 8 4,5
Abandoned 0 0,0 0 0,0 1 0,6
Discontent 3 7,7 8 9,6 9 5,0
Empowered 22 56,4 30 36,1 20 11,2
Under stress 2 5,1 5 6,0 0 0,0
Disregarded 1 2,6 1 1,2 5 2,8
Puzzled 7 17,9 13 15,7 9 5,0
Overwhelmed 1 2,6 6 7,2 5 2,8
Citizens   
Recluse 0 0,0 3 3,6 12 6,7
Neutralized 0 0,0 2 2,4 7 3,9
Satisfied 0 0,0 2 2,4 22 12,3
In need 1 2,6 0 0,0 2 1,1
Troubled 0 0,0 2 2,4 12 6,7
Unenlightened 0 0,0 5 6,0 37 20,7
Lost 0 0,0 1 1,2 10 5,6
Cynics   
Hopeless 0 0,0 0 0,0 5 2,8
Surrendered 1 2,6 0 0,0 3 1,7
Disinterested 0 0,0 1 1,2 1 0,6
Dislocated 1 2,6 1 1,2 7 3,9
Passive 0 0,0 1 1,2 4 2,2
Champions 36 92,3 65 78,3 57 31,8
Citizens 1 2,6 15 18,1 102 57,0
Cynics 2 5,1 3 3,6 20 11,2
Role-players 29 74,4 45 54,2 51 28,5
Role-seekers 8 20,5 30 36,1 71 39,7
Bystanders 2 5,1 8 9,6 57 31,8
 
The empowered champion and puzzled champion were clearly top management 
positions, whereas the satisfied citizen and the unenlightened citizen were operative 
personnel categories. Top managers were mostly champions, whereas most operative 
personnel were citizens. The percentage of cynics was somewhat higher among the 
operative personnel. The middle management seemed to ‘hover’ between top 
management and operative personnel, with fewer champions and more citizens than 




The same relations seemed to hold in the performance categories, albeit in a milder 
form. Most top managers were role-players, but there was also a considerable 
percentage of role-seekers among them. There were relatively few role-players among 
the operative personnel, yet a high percentage of role-seekers. The percentage of role-
seekers was almost as high among the middle management. Bystanders were scarce 
among the top and middle managers but relatively common among the operative 
personnel. 
It would seem that a third of the operative personnel is willing to let the strategy 
process be somebody else’s business, while forty percent is seeking a role to play.  
Organizational context 
The twelve organizations were divided into three categories: ‘public’, ‘firm’, ‘public 
firm’. The third category relates to those firms that serve a legislated function of some 
sort, and thus cannot be easily categorized as either private or public.  The resulting 
frequencies are shown below (Table 37). 
Looking at the three main categories, the percentages seem relatively stable, with the 
exception that in firms the percentage of bystanders appears somewhat smaller, with a 
corresponding rise in role-seekers. The number of role-players remains quite stable. 
Context on the organizational level, however, seems to be quite a significant 
phenomenon. There was an organization with no bystanders and a majority of role-
players, whereas there was also an organization with only four role-players. The effect 
of organizational context is a subject worthy of investigation in further research. 
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Table 37. Organizational context  
 Public Firm Public 
firm 

























P % F % PF %
Champions      
Excluded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 0 1 1 0,0 6,3 2,7
Abandoned 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,0 0,0 0,0
Discontent 3 1 1 0 1 1 3 4 1 4 1 0 5,0 7,9 6,8
Empowered 4 5 6 7 12 7 8 5 3 2 4 9 22,0 27,6 20,3
Under stress 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 4,0 1,6 1,4
Disregarded 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 1 1,0 2,4 4,1
Puzzled 3 1 2 4 1 1 2 5 1 3 5 1 10,0 7,9 12,2
Overwhelmed 6 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 6,0 3,1 2,7
Citizens      
Recluse 0 3 1 0 1 1 0 0 8 0 1 0 4,0 7,9 1,4
Neutralized 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 2 1 1,0 3,1 5,4
Satisfied 1 4 3 3 1 7 2 0 0 1 0 2 11,0 7,9 4,1
In need 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,0 1,6 0,0
Troubled 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 2 2,0 4,7 8,1
Unenlightened 4 4 5 5 6 0 3 2 3 2 3 5 18,0 11,0 13,5
Lost 0 0 3 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 7,0 2,4 1,4
Cynics      
Hopeless 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 2,0 2,4 0,0
Surrendered 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2,0 0,0 2,7
Disinterested 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1,0 0,8 0,0
Dislocated 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 2,0 1,6 6,8
Passive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0,0 0,0 6,8
Total 25 25 25 25 27 25 25 25 25 24 24 26
Champions 19 8 9 13 15 11 16 20 10 13 11 13 49,0 56,7 50,0
Citizens 5 13 14 12 10 14 9 4 12 7 8 10 44,0 38,6 33,8
Cynics 1 4 2 0 2 0 0 1 3 4 5 3 7,0 4,7 16,2
Role-players 8 10 11 14 14 15 12 10 4 6 9 12 43,0 43,3 36,5
Role-seekers 12 7 7 6 5 10 10 12 15 12 7 6 32,0 40,9 33,8
Bystanders 5 8 7 5 8 0 3 3 6 6 8 8 25,0 15,7 29,7
 
Tenure 
The tenure of the interviewees was divided into three categories: ‘under two years’, 
‘from two to ten years’ and ‘over ten years’. The resulting frequencies are portrayed 
below (Table 38).  
Tenure does not seem to play a major role in the activity categories, yet it does seem 
to play a role in the performance categories. The percentage of role-players increases 
with the step from 2 to 2-10 years, remaining stable after that. The percentage of role-
seekers shows a corresponding drop with the same step. The number of bystanders 
remains relatively stable, even though there is a slightly smaller percentage among 
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organizational members with long tenures. It would seem that it takes a certain 
amount of time to find one’s role in the strategy process. 
Table 38. Tenure 
 Tenure<2 % 2<T<10 % T>10 % 
Champions  
Excluded 3 7,5 3 3,2 4 2,4
Abandoned 0 0 1 1,1 0 0
Discontent 7 17,5 4 4,3 9 5,4
Empowered 6 15 23 24,7 43 25,6
Under stress 1 2,5 3 3,2 3 1,8
Disregarded 1 2,5 4 4,3 2 1,2
Puzzled 2 5 12 12,9 15 8,9
Overwhelmed 0 0 3 3,2 9 5,4
Citizens  
Recluse 1 2,5 2 2,2 12 7,1
Neutralized 1 2,5 1 1,1 7 4,2
Satisfied 1 2,5 5 5,4 18 10,7
In need 1 2,5 0 0 2 1,2
Troubled 4 10 3 3,2 7 4,2
Unenlightened 8 20 18 19,4 16 9,5
Lost 1 2,5 5 5,4 5 3
Cynics  
Hopeless 0 0 1 1,08 4 2,4
Surrendered 0 0 1 1,08 3 1,8
Disinterested 1 2,5 1 1,08 0 0
Dislocated 2 5 2 2,2 5 3
Passive 0 0 1 1,1 4 2,4
Champions 20 50 53 57 85 50,6
Citizens 17 42,5 34 36,6 67 40
Cynics 3 7,5 6 6,5 16 9,5
Role-players 9 22,5 40 43 76 45,2
Role-seekers 20 50 29 31,2 60 35,7
Bystanders 11 27,5 24 25,8 32 19
 
Educational background 
The educational background of the agents was divided into three categories: 
‘university’, ‘vocational’, or ‘no professional education’. The resulting frequencies 
are shown in Table 39 below. 
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Table 39. Educational background 
 N University % N Vocational % No professional education % 
Champions    
Excluded 4 2,8 6 5,0 0 0,0 
Abandoned 1 0,7 0 0,0 0 0,0 
Discontent 11 7,6 6 5,0 3 9,1 
Empowered 46 31,7 23 19,0 3 9,1 
Under stress 6 4,1 1 0,8 0 0,0 
Disregarded 3 2,1 3 2,5 1 3,0 
Puzzled 23 15,9 4 3,3 2 6,1 
Overwhelmed 3 2,1 7 5,8 1 3,0 
Citizens    
Recluse 2 1,4 6 5,0 6 18,2 
Neutralized 3 2,1 6 5,0 0 0,0 
Satisfied 6 4,1 17 14,0 1 3,0 
In need 1 0,7 2 1,7 0 0,0 
Troubled 2 1,4 10 8,3 2 6,1 
Unenlightened 17 11,7 19 15,7 6 18,2 
Lost 6 4,1 3 2,5 2 6,1 
Cynics    
Hopeless 1 0,7 1 0,8 3 9,1 
Surrendered 3 2,1 0 0,0 1 3,0 
Disinterested 2 1,4 0 0,0 0 0,0 
Dislocated 3 2,1 5 4,1 1 3,0 
Passive 2 1,4 2 1,7 1 3,0 
Champions 97 66,9 50 41,3 10 30,3 
Citizens 37 25,5 63 52,1 17 51,5 
Cynics 11 7,6 8 6,6 6 18,2 
Role-playing 75 51,7 44 36,4 6 18,2 
Role-seeking 42 29,0 50 41,3 15 45,5 
Bystanders 28 19,3 27 22,3 12 36,4 
 
As expected, the educational frequencies portray many of the same phenomena as the 
formal position frequencies (Table 36). The agents with no professional education 
seem to show a relatively high percentage of recluse citizens, whereas only one of 
them functions as a satisfied citizen.  To show the relation between formal position 
and educational background (Tables 36 and 39), the two variables have been cross-
tabulated in Table 40 below. 
Table 40. Formal position and educational background cross-tabulated 
 N top manager % N middle manager % N operative employee % 
University 37 94,9 49 59,8 59 33,1
Vocational 2 5,1 28 34,1 91 51,1
No professional ed. 0 0,0 5 6,1 28 15,7
 
